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THE C.1.8.

HOW THE R.A.F. FOUND ITS TARGETS. (By L.A.R.) During the closing- phases of the war it was constantly reported in the official communiques that "troops and transport were bombed and machine-gunned from a low height." Although, of course, any machine doing an "offensive patrol" would engage any likely ground target, the discovery, and engagement of such targets by largs patrols, of machines was not fortuitous, but was the result of a wonderfully ellicient reconnaissance service, combined with what were known as "Central Information Bureax.' , These bureaux were special wireless stations, established at conveniently situated central sp-us in different zones, and linked up by wireless or telephone with the various squadrons in the vicinity. When the line ha<l been stationary it was generally possible to engage concentrations of troops, columns of transport or other "fleeting opportunity"' targets by long range gun fire after they had ben located and reported by wireless, from our reconnaissance '•planes. But with the beginning of open warfare, and when the enemy were retiring so fast that they were often beyond the range of our heavy guns another system was devised for the harrying of the Hun.

Far beyond the enemy's front line our reconnaissance machines would patrol, ever on the watch for likely targets. The Germans, happy m the belief that they were beyond the reach of serious molestation, would fill the roads in their rear with dense columns. Little notico would be taken of the solitary Eng-lish machine overhead. Meanwhile the wireless key above would be tapping out the information.

Within two minutes the news would be received by the army, and corps squadrons where —on each 'drome —■ flights detailed for this particular purpose would be lined up ready with pUote and observers standing by. A minute later the first machine would have left the ground, rapidly followed by the remaining duty machines. Having the precise "pin point" or map reference tho flights from the various squadrons would make direct for the target, where they would automatically "rendezvous" to the consternation of the Germans, who would suddenly perceive clouds of British machines bearing down upon them from different points on our front. Before they had time to scatter the first flight would be over them, and the bombs would rain down upon the close ranked column, rapidly followed by many more as the successive flights arrived ond dived upon the target.

Then would come streams of bullets as each 'plane dived yet lower, and opened with its machine guns upon the struggling mass in the choked roadway. This system was not confined to the reporting of ground targets. In the same way concentrations of German machines, setting out, perhaps, on a bombing raid or gathering to intercept a long distance raid of ours as it returned from its work, would be reported to the CI.B by our watchful scouts, and once again the waiting 'planes would rise from their 'dromes, and fly. swiftly to engage and destroy the enemy. In "this way the 'R.A.F. rendered invaluable service to the army in the dosing stages, and did much to counterbalance the inability of our heavy guns to keep pace with the swiftly retreating enemy.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/AS19190524.2.79

Bibliographic details

Auckland Star, Issue 123, 24 May 1919, Page 11

Word Count
530

THE C.I.B. Auckland Star, Issue 123, 24 May 1919, Page 11

THE C.I.B. Auckland Star, Issue 123, 24 May 1919, Page 11