The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The evening News, Morning News and The Echo. THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1919. THE RHINE FRONTIER.

Auckland Star, Volume L, Issue 68, 20 March 1919, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1919. THE RHINE FRONTIER.

1 ■ For the cause that lacks assistance, For the wrong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that we can do.

Tt would appear from several recent cable messages that the Allies have been seriously considering the question of modifying Germany's western frontier in such a way as to render any further

aggressive action on her part against

France improbable or impracticable. The latest report is to the effect that the Conference has now definitely dropped the idea of a lierman republic on the left or west bank of the Rhine to act as a buffer State between French and tierman territory. But whether the scheme has been abandoned or not, it involves certain important political considerations which deserve some little attention. The suggestion that the German provinces west of the Rhine should be in ?omc way separated from tlie rest of Germany is, of course, duo to the very natural apprehensions of the French people as to their future relations with the Germans. It is true that Germany is for the time being reduced to impotence. But so far there has been no proof forthcoming either that the Hermans as a whole realise the completeness of their defeat or that they have been so profoundly affected by the war as to undergo any sort of moral transformation or change of heart. I'cr-h-aps we need not attach much importance to yon Kuhlmann's threat that 'the Germans will reach Paris again by 1925; but even if we do not take this sort of thing literally, it indicates clearly enough the danger that sooner or later the Germans, when they have recovered from the shock and humiliation of all these disasters, may-

attempt to retrieve their losses by another and more terrible "revanche," for which their victims may be unprepared. Naturally France must take account of these possibilities; and the anxiety of French statesmen about the future is heightened just now by the prominence given to the League ol Nations project in the peace discussions. and the knowledge that under such a system France or any of Germany's neighbours might be denied the right to prepare themselves for such a conflict. We have only to assume that in the distant future Germany or her friends may succeed in dominating the league to realise that France is well justified in demanding seme such precaution against the revival of "the German peril," as is implied by this proposal to establish an independent buffer State west of the Rhine.

It must, of course, be recognised that this scheme involves something entirely distinct from the declared purpose of the Allies to restore Alsace and Lorraine. The " lost provinces " are already recognised as part of France; they are French in the racial and national sense, and were torn by violence from the motherland. And the idea that underlies this new proposal for a " buffer" Rhine province has nothing to do with Nationalism; in fact, we may say at once that the scheme hns been exposed to serious criticism because it appears at first sight to be antagonistic to the principle of nationality which, as the Allies have declared all along, must provide the basis of the new European settlement. The object of the scheme is purely military and defensive, and from this point of view the situation presents a curious resemblance to that which arose at the end of the FrancoPrussian war, when the Germans decided to annex Alsace-Lorraine. As is well known, Bismarck was at first averse to annexation because he saw clearly that France, deprived of her provinces,

would never rest till she regained them.

But Moltke and the militarists were too strong for the statesman. At this time, it must be remembered, nobody had realised that Alsace and Lorraine contained mineral wealth of inestimable value, and the chief object that the Germans had in view in annexing these districts was to establish a political boundary to the west of the Rhine, and thus to keep the French at some distance from their own natural frontier if ever the expected "revanche" should materialise. In a military sense the new frontier successfully attained its purpose of threatening France and protecting Germany. But as Bismarck had foreseen, the outrage inflicted on French patriotism and national spirit by this violent spoliation had made the breach between the two States irreparablo long before this present war. Now it is France that demands a revision of her eastern frontier to ensure her own safety, and it is obvious that any kind of reconstruction that would imply even in appearance the transfer of what is in a national sense German territory to France would arouse just the same inter-racial bitterness as the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and would perpetuate active antagonism between the French and the Germans for an indefinite time to come. Clearly the one course open to the Allies is to refuse to be guided by purely militarist considerations, and to reject any scheme that would infringe in any way that eternal principle of nationality which they have pledged themselves to uphold. Surely the history of the past century, with its countless wars and revolutions all sprung from the suppression or neglect of nationalism, provides a sufficiently impressive object lesson to prevent the Peace

Conference of 1919 from following jn the steps of the Council of Vienna and the

other ill-omened international conferences of a hundred years ago.

In saying this we do not intend to imply that the proposal for a buffer State west of the Rhine would of necessity involve any form of annexation or any infringement of the sanctity of territorial rights. What is suggested is the creation of an autonomous State, probably republican in character, that would stand between France and Prussia and defend the French against a sudden anil treacherous blow from their implacable enemy. But it must be pointed out that, no matter to what degree of freedom aud self-control sucli a State possessed, it would of necessity be to some extent dependent on the goodwill of the Allies and subject to their authority, even if it were not placed immediately under their protection. Further, the erection of the ■ Rhine province into a separate State would mean tho dismemberment of Prus- ! sia, and this might quit? conceivably involve the same sort of grievances and difficulties as Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. It is noteworthy that M. Guyot, the distinguished French publicist, three years ago suggested, among other plans to protect France against future German aggression, the erection of .the Rhine province and Westphalia into a separate State. Criticising this scheme, Mr. Harbutt Dawson, a recognised British authority on German affairs, maintained that any such scheme would he dangerous and impossible, because "no parts of Prussia arc more passionately loyal to the Crown, or pride themselves more upon their identity with the monarchy, than the present provinces of the Rhineland and Westphalia, now united to it for over a century." If evidence is needed to the same effect it can be supplied by a reference to the history of Napoleon's confederation of the Rhine and the Kingdom of Westphalia, which he conferred on Jerome Bonaparte. Tlie object of these "special creations" was to weaken Prussia and to erect a strong defensive barrier for France, which is precisely the purpose of Guyot, Ribot, and the other French statesmen who have supported the proposal we are now discussing; and the complete collapse of Napoleon's scheme before the German patriotic and nationalist movement in 1814 should be a sufficient warning to the Allies to-day. In our opinion, no such project has any chance of permanent success, unless the provinces in question, of their own free will, detach themselves from Prussia and claim their independence. Happily the collapse of Prussian militarism and the spread of democratic doctrines in the great industrial districts of Western Germany arc likely to promote some such separatist movement rthere. But unless and until these por- j tions of Germany spontaneously break away from Prussia it seems to us that ' the only course which the Allies can' safely follow in regard to them is to treat them still as integral parts of Germany, and to provide for the safety of l France by neutralising the Rhineland for military purposes, or even by policing it for an indefinite time to come till the dangers that the French have such good reason to fear are finally dispelled.