The Auckland Star. WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED. UNKNOWN. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1918. THE ENEMY'S PERIL

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 244, 12 October 1918, Page 4

The Auckland Star. WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED. UNKNOWN.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1918. THE ENEMY'S PERIL

For the cause thut lacks aariatance. For the wrong that node, resistant*, For the future in the distance, And the good that toe can do.

A situation of extraordinary interest and promise is developing on the Western front. The British victory, or series of victories, on the Cambrai linu has thrust a great broad wedge into the German system, threatening the heart of the enemy's northern communications. The point of the wedge takes in Ix; Gateau, which ie fifteen miles south-cast of Canibrai, and about forty miles cast of the starting point of the offensive in August; the northern side of it stretches in a north-westerly direction to the neighbourhood of Douai, and the southern side rune south-west and ttoutli to the valley of the Oiee. It is a great feat to have advanced the line so rapidly from Cambrai to Iα; Catoau. Measured in prisoners and guns, the British Army tuts won greater victories, but it is evident from the praise given to his troops by Sir Douglae Haig, and the tone of the message from the Prime Minister to the Cominander-in-Chief, that there was something specially important about this success. It was the culmination of a scries of successful attacks on the enemy's strongest line; once thrown out of that line, the enemy had nothing so powerful to fall back upon, and even if he had strong lines in the rear, it was a question whether, under the circumstances, hie army could reach them intact. That during the last week or two the enemy had made up his mind to retire in certain; what we did was to throw him out before he was ready, and in doing so we probaibly disarranged his plans for the whole of the Western front. The situation that has arisen is just what etndents of the war have been hoping for or expecting for the last four years. When the Herman line became fixed between the sea and Switzerland, with the great S'oyon angle in the middle, it was plain that the Germans would have the greatest difficulty in making a general retreat, and that a break-through on one side of the angle would involve the whole line is disaster. Not only did the lines of retrent immediately behind the armies on the two sides of the angle converge, which in the case of a rapid general retreat would lead to fatal confusion and congestion, but tbe lie of the land and the transportation facilities between the German line and the German frontier were such that under pressure of a victorious enemy the German hosts in the centre and the north would not be able to withdraw to Germany in safety. They would be forced hack through Belgium and Luxemburg, where the roads and railways would not be sufficient to carry the enormous and urgent traffic of great armies. The great obstacle is the wooded hill country of the Ardennes, in the south-east of Belgium, which is opposite the centre of the line, and it is towards this aren that we arc now pushing the central group of the German armies. The French tried to produce such an opportunity in 1015, when they attacked in the Champagne, and hoped to reach Vouziers, which they arc now approaching. Nivellc tried again, on a much larger scale, in 1017. when he attacked the southern side of the angle and Sir Douglas Haig the northern. Had Xivellc's own attack succeeded he would have had the whole summer to exploit his success, whereas Foch's victories have given him great opportunities near the end of the campaigning season. But the opportunities arc there. Whereas in Nivclle'e offensive the Allies attacked the Germans in two sectors, the enemy is now being pressed on several parts of the front, practically along the whole line, and we have driven through his strongest line of defence in a vital part of the front, and are advancing into an area of his communications the lose of which in the near future would spell ruin. It is the strategy of the Marnc on a huge scale, an attempt to isolate the main portion of the enemy's armies by driving it off its main lines of communication. The enemy is reported to be retreating on the whole front from the Scarpc to the Meuse, that is to cay, from Arras to Verdun, all along the centre of his line: The British advance from Cambrai? and the French and American pressure in the Champagne and the Argonne, have forced this upon him, his only alternative bcinjj a counter-offensive to straighten his line. While the British have been winning their great victory at Canibrai, French and American pressure has brought the I Allies to Grand Pre, north of the Argonne Forest, which, after four years, ie now -wholly cleared. There are now two questions to be answered bj events in the immediate or near future: Can i Ludendorff extricate his forces between St. Quentin and the Argonne without 1 heavy loss, and what will be his ultimate line of resistance? The answer to the first will lie mainly in the result of the 'battle now being fought east of Cambrai; if the Germans are to extricate themselves from -La Fere and Laon, they must hold us up for a while at Le Cateau. Their next line of resistance may he from Lille to Valenciennes to Mezieres, but the recent Allied advance in Flanders makes it very doubtful whether Lille can be held; if not, the line will be from Antwerp to Samur and the line of the Meuse. But that ie not the immediate ipoint of interest, which ie whether the Germans »v retreat

without great loss, whether their armies can elude the net which the Allied Coni-mander-in-Chipf la trying to throw oxet them. LudendorfT is an adversary to lie respected, hut Foch has been outgeneralling him consistently for months and hie superiority may llamc up in a dazzling climax.