The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1918. THE FATE OF POLAND.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 228, 24 September 1918, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1918. THE FATE OF POLAND.

For the cause that lacks assistant*, For the wrong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that tec <sin do.

After the war is over it is not likely that the plans and of the Cen-

tral Powers will make much difference to roliiiul. But for the time being a great deal of interest attaches to the attempts that Germany and Austria arc making to settle the Polish question between them. For the various schemes that have been advanced for this purpose not only throw a great deal of light upon the real purposes and intentions of the Central Powers, but bring out in clear relief the inherent difficulties of this complicated problem. When, after two years of warfare, the Central Powers succeeded in overrunning Poland, their immediate object was to conciliate the Poles, and not merely to the extent of placating their antagonism, but with the. hope of inducing large numbers of them to tight against the Allies. To attain this end it was necessary to offer the Poles at least the hope of political freedom and independence, more especially •because Russia had already promised that Poland .would be liberated after the war, and would receive full rights of self-government. As v eet-off to the Russian offer the Germans therefore declared that they meant to emancipate Poland, and when they entered the country they posed officially as liberators and champions of freedom. But the response to the specious promises of the Central Powers was, from their point of view, extremely unsatisfactory. For in a. short time it became clear to the deluded people that the Council of State set up to prepare the way for the "liberation*" of Poland was simply the mouth-

piece of Germany tyranny, and the methods adopted by the German armies occupying the country were ac barbarous and " frightful" as they proved in Belgium and France and Serbia. The Poles simply refused to fight for Austria, and Germany, and after a few months it was impossible to keep up the pretence of friendship and alliance any longer. The Central Powers therefore had to adjust themselves to the new situation, and attempt to device plans for the settlement of the Polish queetion, which should secure the interests of Germany and Austria in the future without driving the Polee into direct and dangerous hostility during the period of the war.

It must be Teraembcred that though Germany, as "senior partner," has naturally taken the lead in dealing with the Polish <ruestion, Anetria has at least as direct an interest in the peaceful solution of this difficult problem, and it was Austria that suggested the only rational and practicable plan yet put forward by the Central Powers for a final settlement. Germany's idea was to establish a kingdom of Poland including the greater part of the German, Austrian, .and Russian Polish provinces, with the exception of the districts now annexed to the Ukraine. But this State, while nominally free and independent, was to be ruled by a German -prince—cither one of the Kaiser'e sons or a near relative of the Hohenzollerns, and thus German ascendancy would 'be established there on an impregnable basis. But this scheme -was not likely to satisfy cither the Poles or the Austrians, and therefore Austria suggested another plan. Russian Poland was to be incorporated with Galicia, and the ne-w Poland thue created -was to be included in the Habsburg monarchy. The union of Austria, Hungary, and Poland under one crown might possibly have the effect of ibolstering up the tottering power of the Habsburgs, while the Poles of Gaficia, who had ibeen governed far better by Austria than their brethren had been treated in Russia and Germany, were likely to induce the great majority of their kinsfolk to accept thie scheme for want of a better one. But Germany objected on the ground that she would get little out of the re-arrangement in comparison with Austria; and Hungary. Prussia's natural ally, also objected, because "trialism" would reduce the influence and authority enjoyed by the Magyar under the Dual Monarchy. It might have seemed probable that Germany, with her wonted disregard of pledges and promises, would propose to annex Poland forcibly to her own empire. But the Hermans have learned by bitter experience that the. Poles cannot be coerced into absolute subjection, and they have no wish to increase their own I difficulties in Posen and Silesin and East i Prussia by forcibly subjugating many millions more of this proud and intractable race. Therefore, Germany is not i prepared to put forward a rival scheme j of the same character ac Austria's. Uut slio refuses t<i approve of Austria* j-lnsi, lii-caii-e she has not the .-lightest inteni tion of confirming any degree of frei-dom i on the Poles in '-jr <jwn territory, and ' she understands clearly cuough that the

creation of a free and independent Poland just outside her borders would speedily mean the disruption of her own empire. It should be clear from theue considerations that the so-called "Austrian plan" for the settlement of the Polish question is much the most reasonable yet proposed by the Central Powers. The effect would be to establish a Polish Htate with an area of albout 75,000 square miles and a population of from twenty to twenty-five millions; and though the new Poland 'would not be really free and independent its people iwould-seeiirc far better government under the system that has been maintained in Galicia than they have ever enjoyed under Russia or Germany. But it is not in the last likely that the Poles would ever be content with half-meaeurea of this kind. They realise fully the truth of the maxim that even good government is no substitute for selfgovernment, and they have not the least intention of being used as a buttress to stay up the failing fortunes of the Habsburge. Even if the Poles accepted this plan in despair, the result would simply be that the llahsburg monarchy would include yet another distinct nationality conscious of its right to freedom, and like the Czecho-Klovaks in the north, and the Jugoslavs in the south, continually resenting ite enforced servitude, and ceaselessly striving to vindicate it* just claims to liberty. A new i Poland under the dominion of i Austria-Hungary would be as permanent and as dangerous a menace to the world's peace as the subject Czech and Jugoslav provinces are to-day; and there is no likelihood either that the Poles wonld submit to such an arrangement or that the Allies will permit it after the war is over. As for the threatened German ascendancy in Poland, the Poles understand too well what German rule means to cherish any illusions about tl.eir destiny if Prussianism is to control it. For l*russia, which inaugurated the infamous partition policy a century and α-half ago, has been the source of all their woes, and when the German Empire was founded in 1871, Bismarck set on foot the policy of repression and tyranny which to "the Man of Blood and Iron" seemed most likely to eradicate "the Polish peril." For the past 40 years Germany has striven to despoil the Poles in her stolen territory of a.l tlicir possessions, and at the same time has laboured desperately to extirpate the Polish language, with all its historical legacies of literature and culture. And the net outcome of all this is that the Poles in Poscn and East Prussia hate their masters with an intense and implacable hatred. The Germans for more than a century "have ridden roughshod over the feelings and ideals of one of the most chivalrous nations in Kurope"; and however the war ends we can at least be certain that the Poles will never rest content with a "settlement." that leaves them rrust'ed bene^ 4, - the Prussian jackboot or tears from j< , .:: - their long-cher-ished hopes of independence and freedom.