The Aurckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1918. GERMANY AND PEACE.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 187, 7 August 1918, Page 4

The Aurckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1918. GERMANY AND PEACE.

For the cause that lacks assistance, Air the wrong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that we can do.

Whatever the military significance or the military conseqnencee of the German ; retreat may amount to, .we may expect with some confidence that it will be ' followed immediately iby a repetition of those "peace manoeuvres" with which the enemy has always signalised his ' enforced recognition of any ____re of hie plans or efforts since the -war began. Without imputing any disloyal motive to Lord Lansdowne we may point out that his re-entry into the lets at thki juncture as an advocate of "peace by negotiation" indicates clearly enough that he and those ■who share his views at Home consider it very probable that the collapse of the great Marne offensive, on which the enemy built such high, hopes, will be " followed by another attempt on the part of Germany to inveigle the Allies into some sort of discussion about the possibility of a settlement. Happily, the state of public feeling at Home in regard to Germany just now is not calculated to encourage the Lansdowne propaganda, and though we do not invariably agree -with cither the tone or the substance of Mr. "Winston Churchill's public pronouncements, we welcome his vigorous denunciation of these inopportune and fatuous attempts to compromise the Entente Powere by luring them into a controversy through which Germany alone could possibly gain. Bat even if the majority of the Allied nations were in favour of negotiation before their position is assured by a complete and decisive military triumph, it would be a grave diplomatic indiscretion to take this course without considering the state of public opinion in the enemy countries, and our present purpose is to show that so far the rulers of Germany and the great mass of the German people still preserve that grotesquely exaggerated faith in their own innate superiority and their own right to confiscate the possessions and the liberties of others which has made them "the common enemies of all mankind."

Almost exactly a year ago the German Reichstag, expressing for once the inner feelings of a nation weary of war and depressed by the long-continued disappointment of its hopes, passed a resolution which was hailed by pacifists the world over as a convincing proof that at last the German people had experienced the 'wished-for " change of heart," and that henceforth they would compel their rulers to deal with other States on reasonable and equitable lines. This resolution declared for " peace by agreement," not by conquest or by prolongation of the war. But it further laid down the principle that " the forcible acquisition of territory, and political, economic or financial usurpation are incompatible with 6uch a peace," and it repudiated in the. name of the German people, " all plans which i strive for economic exclusion and animosities between peoples after the war. Without inquiring too closely how far this last clause was dictated by the reasonable apprehension lest after the war Germany may find some difficulty in regaining her entry into " the comity of nations," it is quite clear that this resolution corresponds more or less to the famous formula of " settlement without annexations or indemnities," so dear to the international pacifist, and it was accepted in this spirit by the German people and the world at large. For the ' moment the Prussian militarists and the Pan-Germans were forced into the backj ground ; but they were not destined to remain long in obscurity. The collapse of Russia gave them their 'opportunity, and by the beginning of March, after prolonged negotiation, they imposed upon the Bolsheviks a treaty which not even those misguided fanatics would haveaccepted if it had not been forced upon i them by the knowledge of their own impotence, and the threats of a truculent and ferocious conqueror dictating terms , to the vanquished. Of the treaty of Brest Litovsk we need hardly speak at length; in any case it is [sufficient for our present purpose to point out that it repudiated and defied in the most flagrant fashion the principles on which the Reichstag resolution of July, 1917, was supposed to be based. I Naturally, it-was greeted as a veritable

military triumph by the Junkers and the Pan-Germans; but what is more to the point of our argument is that—except for the futile protest of a small minority of Socialista "was apparently accepted ■with enthusiasm by the German people: as a whole. And the proof that it was I acceptable to them is to be found in the impressive revival of "Pan-Germanism which started from that moment, and is still the dominant feature in the .political and national life of Germany to-day. At first the rulers of the Central Powers tried to "save face" for themselves. Count Hertling assured the German people that their armies had advanced into Russia only at the request : of the people of the Baltic provinces, and Count Czernin declared that "the slight i frontier rectifications are not annexa-! tions." But as the immense advantages that the Brest Litovsk treaty had conferred on Germany became more clearly apparent the Pan-Germane threw off the mask once more.

It is true that the monthpieces of the Imperial Government in the Reichstag at first tried to persuade members that the peace "came within the limits of the resolution." But they soon abandoned this , standpoint, and devoted themselves to the | more congenial lao-k of asuring the people that, as the Entente Powers had refused to consider the terms of "a German peace," those terms had been definitely withdrawn. The Pan-Germanic

League officially demanded that the Reichstag should formally retract its decision, and in a few weeks after the treaty of Brest Litovsk was signed the Berlin Press was referring complacently to the famous resolution as '"possessing only a historical value." The German people were repeatedly informed that this peace was necessary to save their "kultur" from "Cossack domination," and, what was more important, to secure them adequate supplies of food; and in spite of one or two spirited protests from members of the minority section, of the Socialist party the tide of public opinion turned once more in the direction of PanGermanism. No doubt the mass of the German people were horrified by the exccsee of Bo__te»_im, and the official Press skilfully utilised their apprehensions to justify an even more vigorous policy for immediate application to the Baltic provinces, Poland, and Rumania. With the reaction of German middle and lower class feeling in favour of "stark militarism," the Junkers and the Pan-; Germans were on surer ground, and they have been able to justify to the German . people the monstrous treatment to which j they have subjected Rumania and the Ukraine, or at least to ensure their pas-1 sive acquiescence. Naturally along with this reaction has gone a revival of the demand for wholesale annexations, huge j indemnities, the restoration of all Germany's colonies, the confirmation of her

conquests, and the extension of her empire I on a gigantic scale in Africa and Asia. Never since the beginning of the war has i German public opinion on these subjects ■ shown itself bo arrogant, so aggressive, and so intractable as It fa to-day, and all] these facte must be taken into account when considering the necessity for inflicting a crushing defeat on Prussian militarism before peace negotiations can begin.