The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. FRIDAY. MAY 31, 1918. THE AISNE OFFENSIVE.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 129, 31 May 1918, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

FRIDAY. MAY 31, 1918. THE AISNE OFFENSIVE.

For the cause that lacks assistance, For the wrong that needs resistance, For the future ''m the distance, And the good that ice c&n do.

The French fieneral Staff expresses itself confident of stopping the enemy's Aisne thrust shortly, and if yesterday's expectation that tlfc halt would come in forty-eight hours is fulfilled we shonld get better news to-morrow. In the meantime the Germans have made a rapid advance in the centre. They are now ivell south of the Vesle, and the furthest point of the advance is near the source of the Ourcq, some eighteen miles south of the original French line north of the Aisne. If we take the message fixing their position as sent on Thursday afternoon, this means an advance of eighteen miles in three days and a half, the battle having begun on Monday. In the Somme offensive in March the Germans opened the attack on a Thursday. In the north, where the defence was very stubborn, they reached Albert, west of their original line, by Tuesday evening, having advanced about twenty miles in six days. In the south the Germans reached Montdidier on Wednesday, an advance of about ."o miles, in seven days. This comparison enables one to judge the rapidity of the present advance. which has been made over country well adapted for defence. Clearly thu Germans have thrust with groat force; having quickly pierced the Allied positions, they are throwing in a great weight of men to develop their advantage, and are again showing skill in the handling of large bodies of troops. The offensive shews that they have large reserves, that they are skilled in offensive tactics and the development of a success, that the moral of at least their picked troops remains high, and that the aeroplane has not banished surprise from wax. This surprise attack by overwhelming numbers followed quickly on a cable message stating that the Germane had been "beaten flat" in the air.

Throughout the war German ofTensives have all shown the same characteristics, and they have differed but little either in their conception or their execution. The German military mind sees things on paper and on the map, and the German commanders have a keen eye for the key positions of a situation. In the great drive against Russia they detected the weak place made by the too hurried advance across the Carpathians, and by the attack on the Donajec they struck at a point vital to the communications of the soithern army. The Ger-

mans owed victory more to the incompetence and treachery of highly-placed Russian officials rather than to great skill on the part of their own commanders. Similar treachery was larjrely responsible for the conquest of Rumania. The Germans are able to secure initial gains by the excellent co-ordination of all 'branhees of the service, by their policy of keeping only local reserves and using the bulk of their troops in the actual firing line, by the emooth working of their transport syetcm, by the rapidity with which they are able to make the guns keep pace with the advancing infantry, and by the massed attacks of their troops. Having inner lines they can concentrate more rapidly for attack on some one sector, and they can move troops more- quickly from one part of the line to another. The French military mind is cool, calculating and mathematical; while the German is methodical, patient, minute in regard to detail, and apt to see weeks ahead where the Frenchman sees months ahead.

The course of the present offensive seems likely to follow on the lines of the recent offensives on the northern part of the line. The point selected for attack was carefully choeen. and the initial force seems to have been tremendous. The Allies have been forced back from strong positions, but the line is unbroken. The great salient in the West still remains, and the Germans would have to make a tremendous advance on the front at present being attacked to neutralise the dang-.r of counter-attack on the line from Arras to Amiens, or on the line from Tuhure to Varenned. Koch is meeting their attacks with the brain

of the mathematician, very much as the matador meets the rushes of a bull in the ring. The Germans aim at capturing vital points at the beginning of an attack, the French aim at holding such points as shall eventually enable them to turn a Gorman tactical victory into a German strategical defeat —" hither shalt thou go and no further." We have seen this exemplified in the manner in which the German Hanks have been held on the line from Ypres to 1-a Bassee. and on the front from Arras to just south of Xoyon. Hut the success of French strategy depends on keeping sufficient reserves intact to counterattack with certainty when the right time comes. If these reserves have had to be employed locally, then the Germans will be so much to the good, inasmuch as they will have gained possession of considerable tracts of territory and such captures of men and material as even the most skilfully conducted retreat inevitably entails. It is here that the moral factor comes in. French military methods impose a far greater strain on the moral temper of civilians and soldiers alike than do German methods. That is where the risk lies. If we know ourselves to be superior to the enemy then victory is assured.