The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. THURSDAY, MAY 30, 1918. DEMOCRACY AND LOSSES.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 128, 30 May 1918, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

THURSDAY, MAY 30, 1918. DEMOCRACY AND LOSSES.

For the cause that lacks assistance, For the uirong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that we can do.

Since this year's campaign began millions of people must have discussed the difference between the German methods of attack and the Allies', seeking to know why the Germans have been able to do what we could not or did not do last year. We have explained more than once the difference between the German and French theories of war, which has been exemplified in the tactics and strategy used on the Western front. We do not propose now to refer to this again, or to_ discuss such factors in the situation as the suggested improvement in the enemy's tactical methods, but to consider another factor that has been given striking prominence lately—the difference between a democracy and an I autocracy in relation to casualties. The

question is by no means new, but there has probably been more private than public discussion of it. Mr. Bonar Law, however, made it a public question when, in the debate on the Man Power Bill last month, he said, in answer to the suggestion that the Allies might have done more when they had the superiority: "It is obvious now that a successful effort against entrenched positions could be made only by throwing the full weight of the whole Allied Army into tbe attack. That was attempted by General Nivelie. lam going to say nothing whatever about the result, but I say to the House of Commons that there is this difference between armies led and belonging to countries with Parliamentary institutions and those of our enemies, that we must be affected by the casualties, but that our enemies make up their minds to go through with a course, and, whatever the casualties, they go right on without regard to the initial step. That makes a great difference." Here is a frank admission by a Minister in a democratic country that democratic Governments must make their military plans with an eye to what Parliament will say if the losses are heavy.

If the explanation of the cessation of Nivelle's offensive last year, that it was stopped by frightened politicians, is true, it is perhaps the most impressive instance in history of the influence to which Mr. Bonar Law referred. It is said that a number of French deputies were invited to witness Nivelle's offensive, and that they were so appalled by the French losses that they posted off to Paris to get the attack stopped. They succeeded, and the Government actually announced that the French army would awa.it the coming of the American army before undertaking another big offensive. German propagandists worked to deepen the public disappointment caused by Nivelle's limited success, and it is said that deputies were influenced by the exaggerated total of losses they put about. The result of Bis political interference was far-reaching. It is said that w-Jien the advance was stopped the Germans were on the point of retiring to the Meuae. It is also reported that the British authorities urged that the French attack be resumed. Sir Douglas Haig, after having been obliged to change his plans for the season to conform to Nivelle's plan, saw this plan wrecked, and had to attack the Germans in Flanders without the help of a great French offensive in the south. He incurred heavy casualties, and though he gained valuable ground, reached no decision. The losses that are said to have frightened the French politicians were no doubt heavy, but had they been increased by, say, 50 per cent, the Germans might have been driven far back and the whole face of the campaign changed. As it was, losses far greater than these were incurred in subsequent fighting that was a result of the halt, and the Germans, instead of being on the line of the Meusc or beyond it, hold to-day a good deal more of France than they did in April of last year. The German looks at the problem of casualties logically, and is unhampered by Parliamentary pressure. He argues that it is better to lose 100.000 men in one blow and make sure of a / decision, than to lose 10,000 men at a time in ten blows and run the risk of not getting a decision. If, as has happened I

often in this war, a German commander loses the 100,000 men and does not get a decision, his superiors can ignore any dissatisfaction that may arise among civilians. Their commanders know this, and act accordingly. French and British commanders feel that if they lose not merely too many men, but what civilians ignorant of military affairs consider too many, they may get into trouble. That British commanders in the Boer war were influenced by this feeling is generally believed. We do not know whether General Buller was so influenced at Colenso, but it is a fact that he broke off the battle before his army was fully enga"ed —one historian describes the action as more of a reconnaisance than a battle . and incurred casualties which in the lio-ht of subsequent wars wer° almost triflin". The attitude of the British Government towards casualties was stated by the Director of Recruiting in a statement to the House of Commons in January, "The Government has gone most carefully into this question of casualties, and while seeking not to hamper the action of our commanders in the field by judging their actions by the casualty returns alone, is determined that carelessness with regard to human life and thoughtlessness with regard to casualties shall be stamped out wherever it appears." The principle laid down here is unexceptionable. A military commander who is careless with the lives of his men is a had soldier as well as an inhuman man. But it is a question whether Sir Auckland Geddes was wise to express himself so in public. Is there not a danger that his words may incline generals from taking risks at times when risks should properly be taken? "No general can do himself justice with a rope round his neck," comments the "Spectator" on this warning. The truth is that the good general is on the one side most caTeful of the lives of his men, and solicitous for their welfare, and on the other ready to incur severe loss to win an important success. Wellington, hard and unsympathetic personally, looked after the welfare of his men, and broke down when he rode over the battlefield after Waterloo, but he had the strength of will to incur terrible losses when he deemed it necessary. The dreadful carnage at Badajoz was justified only 'by success. If on that last night, when the breach streamed with British blood, and victory hung in the balance, Wellington had stopped the assault, all the previous losses in the siege would have been incurred in vain. Badajoz is a miniature of the great struggle to-day. If we falter in the breach, in the last assault, those who have died, before will have died in vain. But we will not falter. However much democracy may have hampered its soldiers by its wish to avoid heavy casualties, that v> isli has sprung from ignorance of war and shortsightedness rather than from an unwillingness to pay the price of victory. The French themselves, who have supplied the example of interference cited above, have gloriously proved that a democracy will make any sacrifice for freedom and justice.