A CHANGE OF PLAN.

Auckland Star, Volume XLIX, Issue 72, 25 March 1918, Page 4

A CHANGE OF PLAN.

Sir Douglas Haig makes it clear in his dispatch on the fighting on the British front in 1917, that the original plan of the Allied Powers, as agreed upon at a conference in November, 1916, was to make a series of offensives on all fronts, and, aided by these combined offensives, the British Army was to make a determined effort to gain possession of the Belgian coast. The French, however, came forward at tlie beginning of last year with a new proposal which necessitated a complete readjustment of tho plans previously formed, and Sir Douglas Haig received instructions to support the French scheme as far as posaible. Tlie French proposed to make the main attack in the region of Soissons, and British operations were to be mainly directed to assisting the French by holding as many of the enemy troops ac possible on the front round Arras. It was suggested that if tho French offensive failed, the French would fight defensive actions on their own front and would detach troops to assist us in our Flanders campaign. Aa a consequence of this change of plans, we had to.begin the offensive before Italy was ready, and sooner than we had ourselves intended, while the Flanders campaign had to be postponed till late in the year, when weather conditions were unfavourable. The French operations did not achieve the success anticipated, and on the face of it it would seem that more might have been accomplished had the original plans been carried out. At any rate a study of the dispatch reveals the confusion resulting from sudden change of plans, though one has to remember that touch of tlie failure must be attributed to the defection of Russia and the consequent movement of enemy troops from the East. Hindenburg's tactics were closely studied by the Allied and were found in the main to consist of attempts to draw us on in the centre and attack us on the wings. The French met these tactics by halting the offensive when it had reached a definite point, as at St. Quentin, while Sir Douglas Haig adopted at first the principle of alternate fronts, and later of simultaneous fronts. The careful study made of enemy methods makes the Cambrai reverse all the more puzzling, as our troops were drawn on till a dangerous salient had been created, and then smashing blows were directed against the wings, blows which, nearly succeeded in crushing in the sides of the salient. To these main tactics the Germans added certain tactical innovations, the chief of which consisted of an elastic front calculated to a distance that would bring an enemy assault to its weakest strength. This calculated depth synchronised with the effective range of the German artillery. xuub, when the assaulting Allied infantry were tired and disintegrated, tho Gormans would turn loose thdir effective ■barrage and pour In their counter-at-tacks with fresh seasoned infantry held in reserve for this purpose. We met these tactics by the adoption of the " limited offensive," in which the attack was not pushed to the depth calculated by the enemy. This necessitated a change in the German tactics, and they began to hold the front trenches in greater strength. The French replied to this by a system of barrage in which long-range guns, sometimes of the naval type, were used in conjunction .with field guns, and whole sections of enemy trenches were cut off from their communications for days at a time, thus rendering them an easy prey to the assaulting infantry. In some of the more recent fighting on the- French front the number of artillerymen on the French side is said to have exceeded that of the infantry put in line.