WAR OF STARVATION.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVIII, Issue 89, 14 April 1917, Page 11

WAR OF STARVATION.

WHO WILL SUCCUMB ?

BRITAIN OR GERJIANTT!

The (remans are convinced that the quickest way to obtain the victorious pp.ii-p which iLey think the achievements oi Their arniie.- entitle them to is to reducy thu people ,>i Ureal Britain to starvation. Two important aspects of the war. as sif-n thnuigh (rf-rman eyes, point to thi.s conclusion. In the first place the Germans themselves are in danser of being deviated by a food famine. In the Wi-niid place Great Britain, who is Germany's cl.ief enemy, is vulnerable to German attack only through her food supplie.-. Fberefore the (iermans have come to regard the war as a war of starvation. .They occupy large areas of enemy tentory. and the\ naturally contend that while they continue to occupy this territory and defy the efforts o> the Atlies to drive them out the military situation is very much in their favour. They are quite confident that they cannot be beaten by force of arms: t'hnt the territorial gains they have won cannot he wrested from them by the Allies. Therefore ,t seems obvious to the German amid that since the military position does not m itself en-able them "to enforce a victorious peace on the Allies. mean< must be found for preventing the Allies continuing the strugsle. THE CHIEF ENEMY. It has always licen apparent to the Germans that Ureat Britain is the chief factor in the prolongation of the war. But for the participation of Great Britain in the conflict the war would have been over long ago, and would have ended in complete victory for the Central Empires. The Germans believe that it is Great Britain which is keeping ■fche Allies together, and encouraging them to continue the struggle. They believe that but for the determination -which Great Britain lias shown to fight to a finish. France and Russia would long ago have wearied of the struggle. They realise that it is British influence which has checked the German overtures to secure a separate peace, first with France and next with Russia. But what annoys the Germans most of all is the fact that though they recognise Great Britain as their chief enemy they have not been able to make the people of Great Britain suffer the hardships and devastation of war. There is no prospect of waging war on British territory, for the idea of an invasion of England is not practicable at this late stage of the war. because Germany is not able to spare the troops fnr such a risky enterprise. Except for Zeppelin raids, and for the shelling of a few towns on the East Const by German warships. Great Britain has had on her own soil none of i-io horrors of wnr. WHERE BRITAIN IS VULNERABLE. But of all Germany's enemies Great Britain ie most vulnerable to a war of starvation. Great Britain imports the greater proportion of her food supplies, and therefore if these supplies can be cut off. Great Britain can be starved into accepting Germany's terms of peace. To the average Britisher this seems to be a fantastic scheme which is doomed to failure, but the British Government doe~ not tn.ke such a confident, optimistic view of the matter. Great care has been taken in official quarters not to alarm the people of Great Britain with regard to the food question, hut on the other hand the authorities are anxious that the people should get to realise that the position is grave. The regulations with respect to milling flour, the restrictions regarding the use of sugar and milk, the prohibition feeding of game on grain, are each and all an indication of the official attitude to the gravity of the food question in the immediate future. Tile strenuous campaign which is now heing carried on throughout Great Britain for the cultivation of vacant lands is another official acknowledgment that the war was threatened to become a war of starvation. FIRST SUBMARINE BLOCKADE. Crand Admiral yon Tirpitz, as head of the German navy, attempted a submarine blockade of the British Isles in February. 1915. with the object of cutting oft Great Britain's food supplies. That attempt resulted in failure, because the British navy adopted effective measures against submarines. It is now generally known, though it has never been officially asserted, that the British navy accounted for about 70 submarines, chief! v by netting them in steel nets, handled by some hundreds of trawlers, which were added to the navy soon after the war broke out. Some were accounted for by gun fire from ships which the submarines did not know were armed. The great mistake which the Germans made in this blockade was in confining- their operations to the home waters os the British Isles. This mistake was to some extent due to the fact that the submarines which the Germans used in the early stages of the war were small vessels, and had not a large radius of action from their base, because their fuel capacity ■was limited. It was a mistake which played into the hands of the British Admiralty, with the result that at the end of a few months the submarine menace had been overcome, ac Germany had lost the great majority of her submarines. THE NEW CAMPAIGN. The German naval staff profited by the lesson. Since the failure of the first submarine blockade they have been building large submarines of 1,000 tons and over, arming them with guns up to 5.5 inch calibre, and sending them to operate along fche trade routes instead of in British home waters. German submarines are operating in the Mediterranean, in the Atlantic as far south as the Canaries, and ag far north as the White Sea, No doubt meang have been found for supplying these large submarines witfh fuel, which renders it unnecessary for them to return to their base. They are sinking merchant siiips "belonging to neutra-ls as werl as enemyowned vessels, their object (being to reduce the shipping of the world toeueh an extent as to render it impossible for the Allies, and particularly for Great Britain, to obtain food supplies. Starvation by submarine, and victory by starvation, expresses the great German hope. Not only have the German ship building yards concentrated on the ■work of turning out submarines, but in all the large manufacturing towns submarine parts are being built, so that the vessels can be put together in the shipbuilding yards. Before the war it took afcout nine months to complete a submarine, but now the Germans claim that, as a result of speeding up fhe work they have 300 in use and 1.000 under construction. These figures aTe probably a great exaggeration of the rea/1 position, but there is little doubt that the submarine menace has become very serious.