MINES.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVIII, Issue 36, 10 February 1917, Page 13

MINES.

THE "BARBED WIRE" OF THE SEA. £Jj- IMPOHTANT PEASE OF NAVAL WARFARE. One cannot be at soa very long in any kind of a fighting -hip uitiiout discover- ( in; that the Navy ha-5 iv own kind ot barbed wire' , to i-oiuend against. This is not slniny about on poles, neither does it bii.-tle up defiantly like tie n-ire whk-li -; ravvU a-gresdively all eions the Westi-iii 1-roiit. In fact, thore i> a \\;<!e difference between tlie two. Tlic .'att.T makes an | urly enough uhst.i.k- to la.'c. with its , 'Vo'oseberri'V t':.at Irar at tlic feet and i Ion", octopus-likt ti'iiJril* that hold in i i»idlv grip wlinu-w-r tiu'v once twist | around- But wiih all its" horrors tins invention of tin l K\M , <* ""t m-arly , w bad as the "barKd wire-" which the | jailor has to la. c. j When g-iancliig over an up-to-date ' chart of the North Si-a one iinds it , Uotched all about with markings wliir-li 1 ]ook like eruptions. As a mutter of fact these markings do indicate po-sibit, eruptions, for ti. -y show the whereabouts of minefields. Th<ve are the "iarbed wire" of the sea. and a nastier thing to run against man. with all his ingenuity in devising methods of destruction, has never contrived. One n eed exert no effort of imagination to justify the comparison, fur the minetield answers just tlie same purpose ailoat as the barb-wire entanglement does on shore. Without it sea war would be a very different matter from what it now is, or, , jt least, in the narrow waters where all ; the moat important fighting must take j place. One has only to look cursorily at I the situation to understand how important an influence this naval "barbed Trire" exercises upon the conduct of operations afloat. For ono thing, it limits the movements of the belligerent forces. Even cur Grand Fleet, master though it be of the eeas, cannot go wherever it pleasee because of the minefields scattered about the water- Whenever the sea Hun wants to "dig himself in" at a base he drop* a minefield in front of it, and behind this protection proceeds with his task well knowins that no British admiral would be 6-. foolish as to play the enemy's game by taking his ships into such a dangerous area. And they arc not little minefields that the Hun puts down. Some of those he has laid in the North Sea are quite the ■ hireest "entanglements' of the kind ever contracted, containing as they do, thousands upon thousands of rioatmg death-traps. (Notp.-The Hun minefields have now been surpassed in size b3 those recently laid by the British to stop the egreae of submarines and other war TBseS from Kiel and Heligoland Bight.) Ther have cost him a great deal of moaev, but from hie point of view it has been money well spent, since no hostile 5* cm -It through a minefield unless X the secret channels, and where they are continually being hanged in order to prevent any of our vessels discovering, and using, them. KEEPING MINEFIELDS IXTACT. Experience has taught the Hun that ie cannot rely for safety even on his iml- barbed wire" unless he spends a jL*/a«a of time keeping it intact. Our submarines are very inquisitive, and have a. habit of " poking their way tirohofc his thorniest " entanglements, which gives the Hun many uncomfortable moments. Although we on tins side of the Channel hear nothing about these incidents, time and again have our E-boats crept through his " barbed wire and dared the his lair; so mucli •iiTthat he"'never feels wholly secure ajainst them. Surface vessels, however, are quite another matter. For them to frttjempt " jumping" a minefield would almost certain destruction. Barbed wire erected against troops can ie*destToyed by artillery. The kind used sea cannot be swept away in this sashion. A squadron might bombard a nnneiield until its guns were worn out afiil the " entanglement" would still be impossible. The only safe way of treating such, an obstruction lies in finding out its position and tiien keeping away torn it. And that is the course generally adopted. Jlinefields play the part o7 concealed snares as well as protections. Otter eno-ugh have the Huns tried to entice our ships into them, though never once have they succeeded in doing this. Numbers of such traps were laid for Sir John Jellicoe, and he fell into none of them. In fact, the only ships lost in German minefields have been the Germans' ora. Just how many they have had destroyed end badly damaged in this way possibly tlie Marineamt (Admiralty) alone knows. Certainly it is more than one or two, and in practically every case they met disaster 'by dashing into their own mines when running away from British vessels which were ohasing them. The Germans, you see, had to get home somehow in order to reach safety, while our ship? ■were able to stop when they pleased and therefore could keep clear of unnecessary dangers. By bearing in mind what the presence Of these death-bestrewn areas does in tile way of "roping off" cruising grounds, We becomes the better able to underhand certain naval happenings which •night otherwise seem a bit puzzling, guci, for example, as the periodic " com«jgß out" of the German High Seas fleet. Every now and again we are -told Bom Berlin that "Onr High Seas Fleet *ent out into the Korth !Sea yesterday ■Dd returned again ■without meeting *ith the enemy." "WHAT "COMIXG OUT" MEANS. Now this may be quite true in so far Jβ the hare statement of facts goes, though a rank lie as regards the implication sought to be conveyed by it. The German fleet " comes out " in this way quite often—and there is nothing to stop A from doing so. really happens on these occasions is that the Kaiser's «nud "Armada" leaves harbour, steams ip and down inshore behind the shelter of its minefields, possibly ventures a little into some neutral three-mile limit, and then "turns again home." As a military effort such' a " cruise" counts lor nothing, being about equivalent to a Battalion of the Prussian Guards going J°r a route march twenty miles behind W>e German front and then boasting that « was not molested en route by any of the Allied troops. For all practical purposes two fleets O"ght just as well have a stretch of dry , tod between them as a minefield, since I a c one is no more passable to ships than "c other, and so long as the German *"gh Seas Fleet keeps within the shelter « its miles-wide minefields it may eonnnufe to "come out" with impunity. Upon such occasions the German naval commander takes very good care to keep We minefields between himself and the" fntisb Fleet, and not to put them between himself and the shore This naval "barbed wire" also «e----"«ata for sundry thingß that happen off

Zeebrugge. From that base Hun destroyers creep out and seize Dutch merchantmen by coming from behind minefields and "grabbing" the unlucky Hollanders, much after the fashion of a footpad springing on an unsuspecting traveller from behind a wall. And the minefield likewise plays an important part in connection with the sporadic forays of enemy torpedo craft. Without it such guerilla-like adventures would be far less easy. But' the raiders can bolt out and bolt back again knowing that after reaching a certain point on the way home they will be pretty secure against attack, as the minefields will stop pursuers from risking their keels in unsafe waters at night. "If we know where this 'barbed ware' is down, why don't we watch the places?" one may ask. Are you sure we do not? After all, what do we folks ashore know of what happens at sea? Practically nothing at all! Always the Navy has been silent ; now it is quite dumb. But one should not assume that because the Navy is dumb it is likewise asleep. More than once Father Neptune (who is the only person privileged to watch these things) has seen our destroyers playing at "long bowls" across a minefield with enemy destroyers which wer taking shelter behind the barrier. And it does not follow that this "barbed wire" afloat will always stay our progress any more than the barbed wire on land does!