SATURDAY, JULY 15, 1916. THE WISDOM OF BISMARCK.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 168, 15 July 1916, Page 4

SATURDAY, JULY 15, 1916. THE WISDOM OF BISMARCK.

One of the many indications of failing confidence in tbc German people and their rulers is the recent pronouncement of the Imperial Chancellor that no foreign territory will be annexed by Germany at the close of the war. As a reason for this remarkable change of front, Bethmann-Hollwcg appeals to the name and tbc memory of Bismarck who, he assures us, always set himself against such acquisitions. To some extent Beth-inann-Hollwc'g docs justice to the wisdom of his great predecessor in office. For it n well known that after the FrancoI'ruesian war, Bismarck strongly opposed the retention of Alsace-Lorraine. In his '"Reminiscences" he explains that in his opinion it was unwise to aggravate and perpetuate' the hostility of France by detaching provinces which would remain permanently antagonistic to the Germane, and therefore would always be a source of weakness and danger to the new Empire. But Bismarck's counsels were overborne by the arguments of Moltke and the heads of the General Staff, who, for purely military reasons. cJemiinded that Metz and Strassburg and the provinces of which they form the natural centres, must be held by Ger n;any to protect herself against French aggression in the future. The militariete had their way, in spite of the statesman, and what lias been the result? Alsace-Lorraine has . been, as he pro dieted, a permanent eource of hostility between France nnd Germany, and there fore an enduring menace to the world's peace, and it says something for Beth-inann-Hollweg's statesmanship that even at this late hour he has at last come to realise that on the question of the annexation of conquered foreign territory Bismarck was right, while Moltke and the militarists were wrong. We may faiT\y assume that BethmannHollweg's change of view has been caused by his enforced recognition of Germany's failure. In the early stages of the war the Chancellor, like nearly all the politicians and journalists and lead,ers of public opinion in Ger- , many, talked freely of a permanent occupation of Belgium and Poland and Northern France. And it must not be forgotten that if Germany were actually to conquer in this war, even the wisest of statesmen— even Bismarck in Bethmann-Hollu-eg'3 position—would find it difficult to withstand the pressure that would assuredly be thrown upon the German Government to maintain its possession of the territories that its armies have occupied. For while the militarists demand annexation for strategical reasons, the "captains of industry" and the " money-kings" of Germany demand it no less emphatically for commercial and financial purposes. "The Chancellor's worst enemies," we arc told, " arc the Coal Trusts, the Raw Iron Trust, and other producing.' cartels.'" These are absolutory determined 0,1 European as opposed to colonial annexations for the purpose of enlarging Germany's limited natural resources. More especially they are resolved that the coal and iron fields of Belgium and the great industrial centres of Xorthcrn France shall not be restored to their owners. On the other hand the militarists demand no less insistently that Poland and portions of the Baltic provinces must be retained to act as a " buffer State" against the encroachments of Russia on the eastern frontier. CSfo doubt if Germany won an attempt , would- be made to carry out both- these programmes. But now that Bethmann-Hollweg has been forced to realise-that Germany is not likely to achieve her ambitions, we may fairly infer that he is speaking from the depths of his innermost convictions when he declares against the projected annexation of conquered foreign soil.

So ■ far as Germany is concerned we certainly do not anticipate that she will be in a position to assert her own views when the final settlement comes. But the policy which Bismarck 'would have preferred to follow in 1871, and which Bethmua-HoUflreg now end.otiM, mast

be taken into account by the Entente Powers and their allies when', the terms of peace are finally arranged. For the whole history of Europe for the past century proves the futility of any sort of international settlement which ovef' looks the necessity for respecting racial and national instincts and sympathies and prejudices. The reason that the Concert of Europe failed to achieve any permanent and satisfactory settlement of the afl'alrs of Europe after the downfall of Xapoleou was simply that the Powers generally ignored nationalism as a factor In European politics. By forcibly dismembering most of the European States, and by compelling brave and patriotic nations to accept the sovereignty of alien tyrants, the Powers perpetuated the rivalries and hostilities that have culminated in this terrible conflict. The Eastern Question, with all its tragic consequences, and the division of Europe into two great armed camps, have been the outcome of the short-sighted; and immoral policy adopted by the Holy Alliance a hundred years ago; and if the world is to escape the recurrence of these horrors the Powers must resolve that the new Europe shall be reconstituted on strictly racial and national lines. Even the Germans, when their megalomaniac obsessions and- hallucinations have been dispelled i.y.overwhelming defeat, may be able to realise that they would have been far better off if they had never tried to coerce into submission the Poles of East Prussia and Posen or the Danes of Schleswig or the ardent patriots of Alsace-Lorraine. But because any attempt to impose foreign rule upon a nationality which aspires to govern itself is fraught with danger and evil, it will be necessary for the Powers to resist the temptation to dismember Germany or to bring any section of the German people under foreign sway. The restoration of Schleswig to Denmark, and of AlsaceLorraine to France, will be perfectly consistent with the principles of nationalism; and so, too, will be the consolidation of Poland into an autonomous State. Indeed, the only hope of peace and safety for the world in the future lies in the strict and impartial assertion of this principle, which cannot be infringed more safely by Britain or France or Russia than by Germany. "The wisdom of Bismarck" did not avail to save Germany from folly and ruin; let us hope that in the light of half a century's experience it may prove more useful, to Germany's foes.