The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. SATURDAY, MARCH 18, 1916. THE "THUNDERBOLT."

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 67, 18 March 1916, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

SATURDAY, MARCH 18, 1916. THE "THUNDERBOLT."

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To realise why the resignation of' Admiral yon TjrpiU has come as a thunderbolt to the the Germane, pnc roust consider the history of tbe last eighteen years. His position was unique in naval development in this generation. Lord Fisher reorganised a navy that haii had undisputed command oi the sea for a hundred years. Yon Tir-: f>itz raised a minor navy to the position of second navy in the world, and impressed on a nation indifferent to seapower his and his Emperor's conviction that its future lay on the water, and that it was its destiny to challenge the mietrese of the seas on her own elemen , . ThJB is not to imply that yon Tirpit' U as great a man as Lord Fisher; the naval history of the last eighteen months leaves no doubt on that point. But British people, to whom the infamy of his connection with Germany's submarine warfare i= unforgettable, must

admit that yon Tirpitz is a very remarkable man. To the German he has been for years the outstanding figure in h's country's navy, the man responsible for its growth, the challenger of Great Britain. The Kaiser from his boyhood was fired by the ambition to create a great fleet. Knowing the history of his eountrv thoroughly, he remembered that the German maritime States had once been etrong at sea, and the power and traditions of the British Navy, with which he was well acquainted, he admired ani envied. So from the beginning of his reign he worked for a German navy, but for some years he lacked a minister powerful enough to give effect to his ambitions. The Reichstag had little or no sympathy with the new policy, and the people, already carrying a great military burden, looked -with suspicion on the attempt to add to it milKope for warships. For a decade the estimates were cut down by the Reichstag, unta in 1897 three out of tbe four cruisers deemed indispensable were rejected. Then the Kaiser found yon Tirpitz, who brought to the Admiralty quite a new personality and new methods. He had thought deeply about Germany's future on the sea, had made up his mind what was required, and was prepared to use all the means of the statesman and the diplomatist to gain h : s ends. He was, in the words of Mr. Archibald Hurd, "not only the intellectual author of Oerman naval legislation, but the statesman who devised and directed the means by which it was popularised and passed through the Beichstag." Before his time German naval strategy was based on coastal defence and commerce destruction. Yon Tirpii* baaed hie programme on the idea that battleships alone are the decisive factor in naval warfare. He had first to convert the Emperor, who believed m cruiser warfare, and then the Reichstag and the country, and he succeeded by skill, persistence, and tact. His predecessor had declared that it was impossible to bring in a programme for years in advance, but yon Tirpitz persuaded

the Reichstag to agree to one of nearly twenty years' duration. Hie predecessor, as was the custom of his type, treated the Reichetag with contempt, and attempted to bully it; but Yon Tixpitz, whatever he may have ielt, was considerate, urbane and good-humoured in his dealings with the popular body, whose support was absolutely necessary. He suffered fools gladly, was polite to all parties that could help, and in every possible way inculcated and encouraged interest in the Navy. The Preas Bureau of the Ministry of Marine was employed with a skill worthy of Bismarck. The waves of Anglophobia that swept over the country were used to swell the demand for a stronger Navy- Of course yon Tirpitz did not give public expression to the ultimate aim of the policy which he was directing. He went no I further than to cay in the preamble vo the famous Act of 1000, that " Germany must have a battle-fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest sea power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world." The rapid growth of German naval power under his direction compelled Britain to redistribute and reorganise her fleet, which was to a large extent living on past achievements. These reforms were carried out by a man who saw clearly what Germany was aiming at, and opposed her with all the force of his genius.

We do not yet know what part, if any, yon Tirpitz played in the German councils that decided to make war. There were indications that the German navy was not ready for the conflict, and yon Tirpitz may have spoken for peace The war party believed at first that Britain would not fight, and when they found that they were wrong, it was too late to retrace their 6tcpe. Whatever yon Tirpitz's responsibility may have been, the ruin of his hopes was soon apparent, "li we have a strong battle fleet," lie said to the Reichstag, "the enemy will have to defeat it before he can blockade our coasts. But in such circumstances he will, before he de-

Clares war on Germany, consider very | carefully whether the business will cover his expenses and justify the risk." Britain took the risk, and has blockaded Germany for nineteen months without a great fleet action. Within the past fifteen years about £300,0.1 "\OOO has been spent on the German navy. Much of this money was raised by loans, and is still unpaid. The German people were told that 'it would give them protection for their trade, but where is their trade to-day? The first submarine campaign, which was to reduce Britain to starvation, failed; the second, or rather the continuation o f the first, is overdue, Germany lsliof only Deafen" at sea. but she has not even saved honour from the wreck. If it is true that yon Tirpitz rasigned because of "overwork and anxiety, aggravated by the failure of his I plans and advancing years," it is what I might have been expected.