VERDUN AND ERZEROUM.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 66, 17 March 1916, Page 2

VERDUN AND ERZEROUM.

THEIR EFFECT OK THE WAR. ME. ASHMEAD BARTLETT'S LECTURE. MELBOURNE, March 6. The effects upon the future progress of the war of the German offensive at Verdun and the Russian successes in Asiatic Turkey were discussed by Mr. Ashmead Bartlett in the course of a lecture at the Auditorium, on Saturday evening last. He took a decidedly op- J I timistic view of the general situation, and predicted that the -war would be nearing its end. if not completely over, by the end of 1916. i It was very hard, the lecturer said, to see What the Germans would gain even if they succeeded in capturing Verdun, because they would come upon a series of very strong positions. The movement was absolute madness on their part, because it would be worth the Allies' while to allow the Germans to attack other fortresses at the same co3t to Germany aa the present attack on Verdun. The French and British com-manders-in-chief had always endeavoured to get the Germans to take the offensive, and to suffer a repetition of the great losses they sustained in the j early stages of the war. In the second great German offensive, -when Calais was the objective, the Germans -had every possible advantage on their side, both as to superior numbers and artillery. Yet they failed to break through, and it was utterly hopeless for them now to attempt an offensive. He their real object was to deliver such a smashing blow that the French army j would not be able to resume the offensive m the spring in conjunction with the British Army. They feared more than anything else a joint offensive by the French and British. The main offensive in the future mnst come from the British troops, the French having had a much greater hammering than the British. There was no getting away from the fact that the defensive in modern warfare enjoyed enormous advantages. Nowhere since the war started had a great offensive succeeded, ; with the single exception of the German ; drive through Poland. In the early days of the war the Germans made gTeat advances, but they failed to defeat the armies opposing them. There was reason to believe that the Allies would be able to break throngh ! the German line this summer, and then the German position would be very precarious. An important-factor during the present year would "be the power of the Russians, and' there ' was every reason to believe they wonld be able to resume the offensive with a very considerable chance of success. If Russia could invade Bukowma, Rumania •would, in all probability, come in on the side of the Allies. At Verdun the Germans must have lost at least 150,000 men, arid, judging by the British losses at Loos and the French losses in the Champagne, 200.000 would probably be nearer the mark. The Germans appeared to be out-manoeuvred at every pomt. The French and British leaders had come to _the conclusion that the gun was everything, and that lives must I be think ; that men could be htniedrjagtiiaet posii tions, and could take them "by the weight of numbers. Verdun had proved I that a comparatively small number of fTnen with" an overwhelming force of I arti!lery could defeat a much larger I force. In the future the Allies would i rely upon an overwhelming force of j artillery. It was in the Near East that one ! must look for any decisive success in the near future. Here the entire situation had been changed by the Russian capture of Erzeroum. According to the lateet reports the Germans had withdrawn from Serbia, and the Auetriane were very weak there. The Bulgarian? had not a large enough army to hoW Serbia and their own territory and to engage the ever-growing forces at Salonika. If the Turks could have assisted Bulgaria, the prospects would have been different, but the Turks must keep an army in Thrace, to-resist the Russian advance and the troops from Salonika. It was as certain as anything could be in modern warfare that the Turks would not assist the Bulgarians when the All>es advanced from Salonika. Rumania held the key to success in her hands, and he believed that she had already decided to come in with the Allies, but was waiting for the pyschological moment to strike the blow. If Rumania crossed the Danube, as she did in 1913, and invaded Bulgaria, the Bulgarian army would be crushed between two enormous forces. He believed that the moment Rumania declared in the Allies' favour, Bulgaria would agree to any terms, even to the extent of fighting on the side of the Allies. Greece would immediately follow Rumania. Bulgaria out of the war would mean an Austrian retreat acroee the Danuge, and Serbia would come into her own. There ought to be no difficulty then in driving the Austrians out of Transylvania. There being no defensive positions between Adrianople and the defences of Constantinople, the Allies ought to be able to get possession of the Gallipoli Peninsula from the north, which, to his mind, was the right way to take it. Operations in the Balkans were impossible until the spring. If Constantinople, as was likely, fell into the hands of the Allies this year the greater part of the credit would be due to the Australians and New Zeaj landers who had fought and died on Galilpoli. It was due to the losses they inflicted on the Turks that the Russians were able to commence their successful offensive against Erzeroum. The lecturer discussed the problems connected with the futrrre of the Balkans and said the Turks must be driven out of Europe. As to the future of war, he predicted that war on land would din out of its own weight. Frontiers would be defended by trenches, which no power after the experience of this war, would venture to attack. The mastery of th« sea would resolve itself into a mastery of submarines. A lasting p eac e would jbe secured not co much by the defeat j of the German army and navy as by th* • awakening of th e Germany people to the realisation of the meaning of democracy