MESOPOTAMIA.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 49, 26 February 1916, Page 11

MESOPOTAMIA.

CTE MILITARY POSITION. ■ jjz ECTEKESTING DESCRIPTION. When a military expedition was planned for Mesopotamia the obviousand probably at the time the only-ob-:ve ccti was the protection of the oil fields at the head of the Persian Gulf, says Sir Thomas Holdich in an article in •"'Land and Water/ , The growing importance of this source of oil supply for our navy in the East was beyond question, and the arrangements for its protection imposed on the Indian Government the necessity for vigorous action. Whilst the oil fields are Persian and well within the Persian border, the most direct (indeed the only practicable) way of "ctting to them is by the way of Muhammera on the Shatt el Arab at its junction with the Persian river Karun; the Shatt el Arab being practically ft Turkish river conveying the united waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris into the Gulf. Some 25 miles above Muhammera lies Basra, the commercial centre of Mesopotamia, possessing a large export trade in wheat and dates, and a colony of British merchants. Basra is gradually" becoming familiar to the British public. The Karun Eiver is navigable up to Ahwaz, which is 80 miles in a straight line from Basra, and near it, "somewhere "in Persia," is the head of the oil supply. The river, after the fashion qf the rivers of Mesopotamia, winds and twists in a devious course from Ahwaz to Muhammera. but it protects the oil pipe to the east of it from the unpleasant attentions of the Arab tribes people to the west. There are Arab tribes on both sides the river, but those on the eastern side, in the plains called Arabistan, are familiar with the oil works, and sufficiently well satisfied with the results of the introduction of a large commercial business amongst them-to be friendly to the company.

The boundary line between Persia and Turkey is somewhat indefinite, but it leaves a strip of at least 20 miles of Persian territory to the west of the river, and the Kab and Anifiga Arabs within it may be reckoned as doubtful friends. The straight SO miles between Basra and Ahwaz thus lies in quasifriendly territory all the way, and the occupation of Basra at one end of the line and of Ahwaz at the other might seem sufficient to secure the protection of the oil -fields, especially as the river Karun is itself a strong natural defensive barrier.

But having eiTected this occupation, our small army from India found itself in face of a new proposition. Equidistant from Basra and Ahwaz about 120 miles (direct) towards the north-west is a considerable on the Tigris called Amara (not Kut-el-Amara), andAmara was an important rendezvous for Turkish forces. As a strategic position it possessed the advantage of possible action directed against Ahwaz or Basra, or both, and it might be impossible to say against which position the main attack was to be delivered. In fact it utilised against both. Thus it betkme. necessary: to ascend the Tigris and ■ (neupy Amari and sit this point it appeared, as if strategically, the "position (so far as regarded the 6aleguarding of the oilfields) was'sound. Then, oJ course, occurred the unex: pected.

It was not known that there was another channel than that of the Tigris Kiver whereby Turkish troops could be conveyed southwards to the Euphrates, 66 as to threaten Basra from the west. The existence of the Shatt-el-Hai Eecting Kut-el-Amara (another 120 miles by the straight road above Amara) upset all calculations. • The Turks were thus able to assemble in force at Xasrie (Nasiriycr) on the Euphrates about 120 miles W.S.W. of Basra (there is a remarkable uniformity in distance about all these strategic points).' and were only displaced by "an amphibious expedition through the Euphrates marshes, which is now a notable record in. the history of the campaign. It should be noted that in this flat expanse of mid-river country, channels are opened up, or closed, with suca surprising frequency that fresh geographical information is required from year to year -in Order to keep mapping up to date. Then, of course, it became necessary to occupy Kut-el-Amara. We know- the story of that brilliant Expedition, and we new know <the importance of holding Kut-el-Amara as the Jast and most advanced strategic position necessary to cover any direct attack on" the Persian oil fields. Was it necessary to go.any further?

TURKISH POSITION. It. was known that the Turks would occupy a strong position (but riot so strong as that of Kut) at Ctesiphon, 80 miles above Kut. and it was evidently expected tha.t after Ctesiphon there would be more than one poeition to carry between that place and Bagdad But the full strength of the Turkish opposition was clearly not known, for no general with any knowledge of the stiffness of Turkish defence would have risked an attack against odds of four to one The prestige of an occupation of Bagdad would have been very greatthe fame of it would have sustained our nuh-tary credit throughout Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, and Bagdad would have been a valuable asset when it comes to peace terms. It was worth some risk, and the risk was taken-successfuUy so far as Ctesiphon we concerned-but the loss of one-third 0 a d.vi S ,on was too great to admit 01 any further venture with the rejnaming two-thirds. The action at Uesiphon W a brilliant episode, which will ever redound to the credit of our Indian army, and the retreat from that position to the stronger lines of Kut el Amara was masterly. Nevertheless it was a retreat, and a set-hack which is most disappointing. The position at present is this. We hare secured our first objective, the safety of the oil supply, and there seems to be little fear of our not being able to retain the defensive at Kut el Amara. Incidentally, too, we have learned some useful lessons. We know at least that a trained and seasoned Indian army, including both European and native troops, commanded by generals who have not been called upon to deal with masses of men so large that all previous experience, even in peace manoeuvres, must absolutely fail them; supported by an efficient and well-trained staff, not selected at haphazard from aspirants to fame, but well-tried officers—such an army can beat the Turk's handsomely (even to the point of turning them out of defensive lines by direct attack) wherever they meet them at any less odds than four or five to one. We have also learned something new about the

strength and the weakness of our native troops which will lead ultimately to a readjustment of popular idea-about the fighting value of certain units. All this is good value, and goes far to discount our disappointment at not reaching Bagdad.