HOLLAND AND THE WAR.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVII, Issue 13, 15 January 1916, Page 11

HOLLAND AND THE WAR.

ATTITUDE OF THE DUTCH. IJiRST-HAND (By FREDERICK STUBBS, F.R.G.S.) Whilst sojourning in Holland a fewyears ago I was fortunate enough to make the acquaintance of a number ol' English-speaking Dutchmen. Some 1 met whilst officiating at the ancient Presbyterian Church in Amsterdam, where there is an intelligent and influential congregation of mixed descent, not a few of whom claim as ancestors those devout Scotsmen who sought religious' liberty hi Holland during the time of the wortldess Stuarts. Others I met at The Hague, at Rotterdam, at Leyden, Utrecht, etc! In common with most travelled Englishmen, I saw the present conflict coming, though one always hoped it would not come iv one's own time, and therefore made it my business to ascertain as far as possible the sentiments of the Dutch people in regard to a ppssihle conflict between Germany and England. In the present article the Australasian reader is furnished with the result. The Dutch, as the reader will know, are but a small people, some 0,300,000 in number, inhabiting that portion of the Low Countries, 12.G48 square miles in extent, now known as Holland or the Netherlands. They are a peace-loving nation, industrious, orderly, unaggressive,' democratic. But they also love liberty, and are extremely jealous of their independence. It is that that makes one hopeful—l do not say confident—that before the close of the present war they will come in on the side of the Allies. , FEELING TOWARDS ENGLAND. . But -first let mc say plainly that if they do so, it will not be out of any particular love for ' England. They respect England, and admire her enterprise and achievements, especially in the way of Colonisation. They respect her fighting qualities and her prowess on the sea, which cost the Dutch so dearly during, the 17th and ISth centuries. They recognise that for more than 100 years the British have been good neighbours and valuable customers. But they do not love her. Over and over again when in Holland- have 1 pointed out England's good qualities—her kindred passion for . liberty and order; her services to the Low Countries and to the Protestant cause in the time of Queen Elizabeth and Louis XIV.; her brave and successful stand against Napoleon when the liberties of Europe seemed lost; her respect for the interests of Holland in the' East" Indies. All these things are admitted, but there is one thing that Hollanders seem incapable of either forgetting or forgiving, and that is the defeats which they suffered at our hands 5n the 17th and ISth centuries. They declare with some bitter-nesfr and a good deal of truth .that they owe their downfall as a great naval and colonising Power to Great Britain. It was. of course, the fortune of war. and it was Dot always the Dutch fleets that were defeated. On one memorable occasion a Dutch fleet sailed right up the Thames. The splendid .Art Gallery at Amsterdam is fnU of JJH3s£7*lsV**? defeats They, admit that if Holland had triumphed, England would have had few edenies--to-day.. Nevertheless, thp fact remains that the Dutch as a people have never been quite able to forget or forgive the humiliation they suffered at England's hands, which terminated their career as a, naval Power, and relegated them position_of_a minor State. One oannot. altogether bTame them, though it seems unwise and futile to allow the doings of past generations to dominate the present. But there is the fact, and H needs to be always taken into account when considering Holland as a factor in international relations. FEELING TOWARDS GERMANY.

But the Dutch, though tliey have no particular alteciian for the EngliSih, eer_tainlj do not love the Germans, and during the last iorty years have lived in .constant dread of them. They know perfectly"well that a victorious Germany would the end- of- Holland's independence and territorial integrity. For many years past, iD/jed, she has been openly clainjed as a part of the great Paa-jCennan scheme. The possibility of tiiV-.Germitn annexation of Belgium becoming permanent is at the present moment a nightmare to every Hollander, for he knows that if Belgium is annexed Holland will soon follow. And they lave good grounds for this conviction, Dot only in the geographical position of Holland, but also in- the official declaration of the German Government. "It is obvious," declared the German Foreign Secretary on August' 4, 1914, "that we could'not profitably annex Belgian territory Without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland.-''.. It is true that at the

same fnfe-fRe" German mised to respect the. integrity of Holland, but so. th ey _did,that.oi Belgium. WHY HOLLAND HESITATES.. Why then, has not Holland come in? tirst, because she does not want war. bhc has seen in the ctfse of. Belgium what a l.en?an invasion means, ; and' realises that'if she fights against-Germany r 'h e V territory will also be invaded, whilst if ehe fights with Germany against the Allies she will Ipse her valuable colonies. Secondly, because she is doing very wen as it is. She retains her freedom,'which the success of the Allies wilTniake yet more secure, whilst at the same time she escapes the horrors of war. The risk ol Germany's attacking Holland diminishes each day. On. the other Jiand,she believes that if the Allies are ultimately victorious, she has nothing to fear. They will not rob her of territory, and Germany will not be able. At the" same .time, the Dutch are very anxious for the war to" end. It is interfering seriously with their trade; it compels them to keep their army mobilised; and it burdens them with the care of a vast number of refugees. They know; too/that as long as Germany remains unbeaten their own independence is in jeopardy; and that if Germany were victorious She would not be likely to spare a little nation whose sympathies had been openly on the other feide. Hence Holland's perplexity. -Sbesincerely wishes'; the Allies to win; she is horrified at .the brutal treatment of Belgium; she dreads Germany's -success; and yet 6hc fears to take any decisive step. IF HOLLAND CAME IX. If Holland came iv on the. side of the Allies the result would probably be decisive both for herself and for them. It would render a German victory in the west practically impossible. Not only would she be able to put 300,000 fresh ■ troops in the field, hut she would also. I open the door to a new theatre of war which would deprive Germany of the advantage that her fortification of Belgium has given her. With the assistance of the Allies, Holland could strike at Germany through Westphalia and the Rhenish provinces, cut the main connections of the German armies, and force Germany to withdraw from France and Belgium—which, of course, would mean the beginning of the end—the end which Holland avowedly desires. It is not only that Holland could supply a useful addition . of troops, but she would open a road by which Germany could be easily and decisively attacked. IF HOLLAND REMAINS NEUTRAL. H Holland does not come in, and. Germany wins, her independence, as 1 have shown, wlll be lost. The Hague will take its orders from Berlin just as Vienna, Constantinople and Sofia do now. And all the countries in the Continent of Europe, with the possible exception of Russia, will be in much the same position. National liberty, the right for each nation to develop its life according to its own genius, will pass away. Only one type of civilisation will be tolerated, the Prussian. ■But suppose it is the Allies, and not the Germans, that are completely victorious. In that case, no doubt. Holland's independence will remain. But the Allies will owe her little gratitude, and can hardly be expected to consider the interests -of a Power which refused to aid them when aid.was badly-needed, and the cause was Or take the possible 'contingency of a drawn battle, a patched-up peace.-In this case neither Germany nor the.. AUiea would be pleased, with Holland's conduct, and it on some future occasion (as. is likely), difficulties arose with- Germany, why should the Allies prevent her seizing, say, 'the extensive and wealthy Dutch colonies, with their 40,000,000 of inhabitants, by. way of settlement? Might they not be tempted to allow Germany to satisfy her aspirations at the expense of a Power whoso friendship had.proved valueless? The geographical position of Holland forbids her standing isolated, alone. She is bound to come into one political system or other. It is almost unthinkable that she should choose to commit national suicide by amalgamation with Germany. If, on the other hand, she joins the Allies, she wil? retain her ireedom, and will help them to retain theirs, and to deliver the world from the nightmare of-Prnssian-mHitarismi WILL HOLLAND COJIE IN! , For these reasons T regard it as provable that Holland will come in. Her interests are clearly bound up with, those of the Allies. She is deeply moved'at the treatment of Belgium; she likes the French and respects the English, whom she recognises are now her friends and protectors; her most influential newspapers do not conceal their abhorrence of German methods and their desire for the Allies' success; her citizens have succoured the multitudes of distressed Belgians with a generous sympathy who have taken Tefugc within her hordere. Professor Treub, one of her leading men, and brother of the Minister of Finance, recently declared: "We are anti-German

r Tfeeaiip7we"--;re/good Hollanders and love ■ our country." No, Holland cannot stand idly by and- see Belgium annexed and the Allies defeated. She can easily* find a fpretex.t.foT action—e.g., she may inform Germany- that she regards the- annexa-' tion of Belgium:'ae threatening7her own independence, and demand a withdrawal. 7 Her troops arc already mobilised; the : Landsturm Bill adopted the other day by the Dutch Chamber of Deputies is obviously designed to place the army on a war .footing; and my opinion is that before many months are over Holland will ; cdine"'—.- -