The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. FRIDAY, MARCH 19, 1915. WHAT WILL ITALY DO?

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 67, 19 March 1915, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

FRIDAY, MARCH 19, 1915. WHAT WILL ITALY DO?

For the cause that lack* assistance. For the wrong that needs resistance, • For the future in the distance, And the good that we can da.

I Three or four months ago it was generally believed t'bat Italy was pre-' (paring to enter the wax on the side of the Allies, and that the advent of spring I | would find the Italian armies in action. The chief grounds for this assumption I were the known- sympathy of the Italian people for England and France, their i traditional hatred of Austria, and their desire to free several provinces which were once part of Italy from Austrian domination. At tlhe 6ame time the fact [tiat, Italy had rejected Germany's appeal to apply the terms of the Triple Alliance to this war wae generally regarded' is [indicating the desire af the Italian people to dissociate ' .tltemselyes entirely from | Germany and Austria, and to take their own course indepaniently of rsust diploImatic Tel_trons. All three Teaßons were in a sense convincing; but the people who argued that tlaarefore Italy wae pre- I j p—ring deDnk*"y to cast in Ker lot with I the Allies eecm to ihave forgotten thati the primary motive of diplomatic action 'is, under almost all circumstances, self interest. There was nothing in the terms of the Triple Alliance that bound Italy . to join Germany and Austria in the field, unless in a defensive waj-; and there was good -reason for the reluctance of the j Italians to do anything that would promote the aims and objects of their tra- J ditkmal enemies, the Austria-—-'. But 1 the rui-ars of Italy, whatever their personal prejudices and sympathies may be, mmst think first of their country's interests, and it has become increasingly cleaj- eince the new year opened tiat if Italy joins in the wae she will do so only at the moment and under the circumstances that suit her beet, and that s&e will ally iberss-li* to the Pow-ere .wiao are meet Kkcly to be able to oasist her to realise her national ambitions after the war is over. i 1 Taking all this into account, we can I well understand why Italy ie vacillating I now between England and France on | I the one hand and Austria and Germany ion the other. Naturally the rival] 1 Powers are doing their best to induce I I Italy to believe that her interests are] ! involved in theirs; more than this, they j have gone so far as to offer her valu- | abit- territorial concessions to secure her i ; ] 1 assistance. In this somewhat ignoble competition. Germany, as befits her desperate situation, lias taken a leading part. Trince yon liuelow has been authorised to assure the Italians that if they will help Germany now the Kaiser will undertake to overcome Austria's objections, and to secure for Italy a large accession of territory. At the same i time the German envoy ingeniously points put that if England and France are successful their naval ascendancy will be established permanently in the Mediterranean, and Italy will never be able to attain the object of her ambitions as the dominant maritime Power of Southern Europe. All this is plausible enough, but the chief difficulty from, yon Buelow's standpoint lies in reconciling Italy's claims with Austria's interests. The Italians demand tbe cession of the Trentino and the rest of "unredeemed Italy," the transfer of Austria's chief naval bases on the Adriatic, and the control of the Dalmatian coast, j | which would cut off Austria almost en-! 1 tirely from the sea. All that Austria jis inclined to offer is a small strip ot ! territory north of Lake Garda and along the upper course of the Adige. which, j welcome as it would be under ordinary | circumstances, is not at all likely to satisfy the Italians just now. Of course, yon Buelotv assures Italy that Germany must win in the long run. and that sbe wili.be able to reconcile Austria to any course that the "senior partner" in the Alliance may deem expedient. But there is so wide a the Italian demand and the Austrian offer that • Italy may well hesitate to accept th; German guarantee that after the war iis over all her requirements will be fully met.

Moreover, .frhe Italians have not forgotten that in the early stages of the wir Germany endeawoared to secure their support by offering Uheni Corsica, Tunis, and other Frenoh poavissione, which, at the present time do not seem ait all "ikely to fall into Germany's hands. "But it mu-st not be imagined that the Italians are by any mea'nß co fh-mly convinced as the average Engli)=4iman that the war can have only .one end. According to out cable njaieiges to-day. the representatives of the Triple Entente at Rome 'have jmvt he-en assuring the Italian Government that tihe defeat of Germany and Austria is quite inevitable whether the Italians come into the --car or not. This we believe to be true. But corrsid-ering the resolute stand which Ge.rma.ny lias made again-st the three great Powers and the tenacity with which she '.s clinging to the ground »h<haii occupied in E-elgium, France and Poland, the Italia no may still feel gome doubt about the outcome of the struggle. Like all other European nations, they a-re still ob*Cii"ed with the idea of German invincibility, and they do not •realJse, as we do, the immense wealth and strength of the British Empire and tlhe limitless resources of its Allies. For all •tlhese rcai-ons they may still feel in-eli-jed to take the <rh*k -ot sstauding out till' the* Avar -ns" "over —rather than face tin? danger of coming in oa ■ the wring side. Of co-rose this policy of " tna*tcrly inactivity " has its own peculiar disadvantages. If Italy docs nothing for the -Allies, they will I certainly not reward her for her neu ! trality. supposing that they win. And if they lose, even assuming that Cer many kept faith with Italy iv regard to the cession of Aui-trian territory, it requires very little imagination to sag gest that in a =hort time the overwhelm ing ascendancy of Germany "will extend from Central to "Southern Europe. The lost Italian provinces, with the greater parr, of .Austria, will be absorbed in the Pan-German Empire, and Italy's hopes and aspirations will be blighted for ever Vet that is a distant danger, and there is much to be said, from the Italian standpoint, against any rash incursion into the field of war. The horrors of carnagp and devastation that have been let loose in Belgium may well deter the Italians from taking Undue risks themselves; and the weight of the financial and commercial classes who have so much to lose by war thrown into th« scale against popular enthusiasm will quite possibly decide the question, and [induce th c King of Italy and his advisens tp, choose peace, wth all its risks | and its serious future contingencies, as 1 the safar alternative. ,