THE SIEGE WAR IN FRANCE.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 64, 16 March 1915, Page 4

THE SIEGE WAR IN FRANCE.

During the past montn we liave received news of a long serjes of sniall successes ami! advances made by the French and British troops at various points along tho great lime of entrenched positions that stretches through France from Southern Alsace to the south-.west, corner of Belgium. Xoiic of these operations have been extensive enough individuailly to make much difference to the situation. But collectively there is mo doubt that they arc producing an appreciable effect upon the position and prospects of the two great armies. They have entailed very heavy losses upon the Germans, they have in many cases secured for the Allies points of vantage from which they cam more effectually threaten the German lines of communication arid their sources of supply; and taken altogether they show that General Joffrc amd his colleagues are still steadily carrying out his declared policy of "gnawing away" at the German lines, gradually weakening their power of resistance, and thus preparing the way for decisive movements at this chosen point of contact when the opportune moment comes. That this change in tactics has already been initiated is shown by Lord Kitchener's reference to the "successful offensive" taken by our troops in France during the past few weeks.

'Naturally a great deal of interest has been taken in these minor operations by the military experts in England and France; and their observations upon tho gains and losses recorded all along the line of entrenched positions since the beginning of the year have enabled them to draw some very significant and suggestive inferences. Ouo important conclusion which they have reached is that th*.German lines are. 7 ;already "wearing thin" in places; that is, the enemy has found the greatest possible difficulty-in strengthening them against the constant pressure applied by the Allies, and has also found himself compelled in many instances to "stiffen" the weaker positions against assault by drawing reinforcements, not from any permanent reserve, hut from other portions of his own lines. A striking illustration of this view of the case; is to be found, in a comparison between the fighting at Soiasons and the fighting at Burnhaupt, in Alsace, early in JanuaryAt Soissons, as our readers may remember, the French made an advance, and drove hack the Germans opposite them; but within forty-eight hours they were in turn driven back by strong reinforcements, which ultimately outnumbered them by four to one. .At a critical moment in the struggle the bridges over the Aisnr, behind them, -were swept away By a sudden flood, and they were finally forced to retire across the river with a loss .of several guns and 5,000 killed, wounded, and missing. This was tbe most considerable success that the Germans have J gained this year iv the trench fighting; but their triumphant reports fail entirely to do justice to the help they j received from the flooded river, which for the time cut off .the French retread and prevented their supports from reaching tljeni. (However, oijr present point i 3 that at Soissons' the heavy German reinforcements took nearly two days and nights to reach ■the" RQint of danger, and that they were then unable to push their advantage further. J j About the same time at Burnhaupt, j in Upper Alsace, the French conducted' another, offensive movement''that was temporarily successful; but the Germans, j after being strongly reinforced, in four' days' time repelled the French, hut were unable to -do more, and retired to their I original positions. Many more instances of the • same kind have been recorded; and according to the: military experts thej lons delay in procuring reinforcements indicates that the Germans have riot" at present any jfer- j mahent reserve or -reservoir of troops from which supports can be drawn to relieve any threatened point. The alter-1 native is to draw reinforcements from different points of \ the lines already manned; and this accounts for the great, length of time that has in many cases elapsed before the pressure of the Allies on the German front has been relieved. A further proof that in the case of Soissons and Burnhaupt the Germans strengthened their weak points by withr drawing troops from other parts of their entrenched positions is. to be found in the fact that during the two ° weeks in which the Soissons and Burnhaupt incidents took place, the Allies gained ground iat many points—at Lens, lArrasf Boye, Perthes, Verdun, Pont-a-Mousson; and this was the penalty paid |iby- the Germans, for- weakening '".thrtr ; lines by drafting reinforcements from •one poi.t>t to another. A final inference is that the Germans are, with difficulty, holding their "own* .and %at thglr strength is barely sufflc.ieii't to keep back the Allies, because even when they have concentrated their reinforcements at threatened points they are still unable to push their advantage and drive the enemy back. AH these facts certainly suggest that the outlook for the Allies in France arid Belgium is eminently favourable, and that as soon aa the new French and British' armies are in the field the Isiege war" will take on-an-en-tirely new chancer*