THE FORTRESS PROBLEM.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 63, 15 March 1915, Page 4

THE FORTRESS PROBLEM.

Early in the war the rapid destruction . of Liege, Xamur and Maubcuge dealt j a serious blow to all preconceived ideas ; as to tire powers of resistance of fortified positions. In a few days three of the strongest fortresses in tlie world, defended on the most elaborate plans drawn up by the greatest' niilitaty*engineers of the age, were simply reduced to ruins by the German Biege artillery; and people in general-arrived..-at*: tne,-conclu-sion that it was no longer possible to hold a fortress against modern mortars and howitzers. However, this judgment seems to have been somewhat premature, and it has subsequently been modified by the experience gained in the siege of two other fortresses, which have held out for a considerable time against a furious artillery bombardment without showing any sign of surrender. Verdun ,- in the western theatre of war, and Prremysl in the east, have been exposed to very heavy attacks for considerable periods, -and Przemyslat least has been for some time completely isolated from any supporting force. Yet Verdun'has be£n apparently quit. safe, and the Russians seem imorc likely to reduce Preinysl' toy famine than &y blowing up its defences. There is, however, «h explanation to offer for the success 61 these two "strongholds in warding off the destruction; that overtook Liege aiid -Cainur. The I Germans were able to destroy the forts in the Belgian and French strongholds because there the heavy gunis were -fixed in position, the range could be taken> and the lire 'concentrated front a distance of many miles *with Infallible 'accuracy, and the result"Was simply a, preordained matbema-ica- certainty. But 'if in the first place the o-twbrks of a great fixed fort are extended several miles in advance to keep the enemies' batteries at a. great ;_~tance, and behind this screen the -defending guns instead of being fixed in casemates and cupolas are rendered mobile, and ferred from ,ohe' point to another, on light railways, then the overwhelming! superiority of force ceases to be-with the offensive. This-plan, of "rendering] the defence mobile" has been .oliowed at Verdun with great success, while the: French field forces have prevented the Germans from massing their heavy batteries against it except from «, -great distance. Frzemysl has not enjoyed this last advantage, but there is reason to believe that here also the transformation -of the fortress, guns into a series of mobile batteries, constantly changing their position and carefully concealed from view, has had the effect of keeping the enemy at a. distance and preventing him from attaining that deadly accuracy of concentrated five which so speedily overwhelmed the defence at Maubeuge, Liege, and Xamur.