The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1915. STRATEGY AND POLITICS.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 63, 15 March 1915, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1915. STRATEGY AND POLITICS.

for Ike emtue that lacka Mtt.fMee, For the wr_ny that need* retistaeoe, For the futulrc in the 4utan.ee, And the good that we on de.

One of the most interesting aspects of the great struggle now in progress in Europe is the relation between the political and strategical considerations by which the Allies and tbe enemy are affected. To put the cage more speciflcally, in estimating Germany's chance of holding her ground successfully against Jier numerous assailants we must take into account not only the military difficulties and dangers that she has to face, but certain political contingencies which may affect the result of the struggle even more seriously than a great victory or a great defeat. First, in regard to Germany's ally—it is clear that the weakness of Germany's position is due chiefly ,to the unstable and ineffectual condition of the Dual Monarchy. AustroHungary has always been an incoherent and badly-assoTted "Empire; nnd though Hutigary 2ms always headed tho militarist party in the Dual Monarchy, and the determination of the Magyar te retain their ascendancy over the Southern Slane ha« been largely responsible for the conflict between Austria and Servia. the fact remains that Hungary has little interest in fighting Austria's battles, and none at all in fighting Germany's. But if the strain of this tremendous conflict weakens the bonds that unite Hungary to Austria, much more certainly will it tend to disintegrate the rest of the Empire hy giving free scope to the racial enmity between Slav and teuton,- and encouraging theJiopca of'the subject races th'at'have Tsb long yearned "to free themselves '"from Austrian or Magyar domination.

Regarding A_stria%ungary as an ally of Germany, we sec then that it is essential to Germany's succ.se' that Hungary should hold fact to its self-imposed duty of keeping up the struggle against Russia on the one hand, and Servia on the other. But the Magyar cannot hold their ground alone, and the question is, what can Germany do to help them! At present the Russian armies are advancing upon the Carpathians, the natural bulwark of Hungary against invasion, hut Germany's desire to assist her ally is subject to sercTal important military considerations. If the passes of the Car-' pathians are to be defended and the Russian armies prevented .from .entering 'Hungary, reinforcements must be sent there by the German General Staff. If I those peinforcements consist of Hungarian troops, the majority of these are .fighting in Poland, to keep Silesia clear. lof invasion. If German troops are sent, they would have to be detached from | the German forces in East Prussia or on I the western theatre of the war, i thus seriously weakening tire German position at some other vital | point. On the other hand, if they abandon Hungary, Germany .and A_B.ria will lose their largest source of supply, I from which their wheat, petrol, and horses can be drawn. The problem coni fronting .the German .peggral Staff the tfftVe j/Qhow -cap Jfcftfcy iiilre Hungary without hopelessly compromising their plan of campaign elsewhere? To lose Hungary would "be not only to imperil their supplies of food and war equipment, but to risk the immediate disintegration of the Dual Monarchy and the irretrievable collapse of Austria. It therefore follows that Germany will be compelled chiefly by political considerations to attempt to save Hungary by gacri-ciiig her prospects or .by j taking undue risks in some other portion of the widespread field of war; and we: can be sure that the Allies will take' prompt advantage of any diminution in her power of .resistance elsewhere. . ■„ I

Another interesting phase of the.relation between politics and strategy in this war develops from « brief -survey of the special regions in which Germany is How most closely engaged. A glance at the map shows that active fighting is now in progress in four "districts oh the Continent, separated by almost the whole extent of the theatre of war. Belgium and Northern France, Alsace, East Prussia, and the Silesian and Hungarian -Order form, roughly, the four angles of a great quadrilateral, including the whole Germhn Empire Within it; and it is evident that this means that a heavy strain is thrown upon Germany by the dispersion of her military strength upon these widely-separated lines. But what is even more important to observe is thai Germany is bound by political considerations to strain every nerve to defend all these four corners of her Empire against invasion, and that she cannot allow ihcreelf to be forced by military exigencies to sacrifice one to the 'other. She cannot withdraw from Belgium without abandoning the only one of the spoils of war that has fallen to her lot, and thus publicly admitting her failure to -the world aud the German people. She cannot withdraw from AlsaceLorraine because "it is something which has become knit up .with the whole German soul, and to abandon it is like a man abandoning his title or his name, or surrendering his sword." East Prussia again is the home of the Prussian Monarchy, and to allow it to be overrun by the Russians would be for the Hohenzollerns ■ simply suicide. -Silesia, too, must be saved from-. inva- ; sio* A*".At ia tbe strategic key

to the road to Berlin from the east, but it iB the home of the aristocratic' landowners who form the main strength of the Prussian Monarchy, and it is one of the greatest industrial centres of the Empire. These are thus good and sufficient considerations of an entirely nonmilitary character that would forbid Germany to retire from either Belgium or Alsace, East Prussia or Silesia. Yet to hold them all imposes, as we have seen, the heaviest possible strain upon Germany's resources, because of their wide geographical separation. It is clear, therefore, that a great deal more than military tactics or strategy must be taken into account if we are to estimate accurately the probabilities of the duration or the outcome of the near.