THE INNER HISTORY OF A GREAT WAR.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXIX, Issue 246, 14 October 1908, Page 8

THE INNER HISTORY OF A GREAT WAR.

KUi-OPATKIN'S SENSATIONAL MEMOIRS. The commercial aggression of a clique of promoters, of which the Czar himself was one, with an investment of the royal family funds of £300,000, was the underlying cause of the disastrous Russo-Japanese war. ''"McClure's Magazine." in its September issue, publishes the first of a series of extracts from i the military memoirs of General Kuro-pa-tkin, Minister of War for Russia during the year immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities in January, 1004. The narrative of General Kuropatkin is translated by George Kennan, the veteran student of Russian affairs, who has added an illuminating foreword and an article describing the royal timber enterprise which wielded such tremendous influence upon the destinies of the empire. The article is of such iuterest that it should be widely read. TWO CAUSES OF WAR. Two facts that shed a word of light upon Russian events are made clear in General Kuropatkin's history. The first is that the Czar, while declaring repeatedly that he desired by all means to avoid a war with Japan, and instructing his ministers to use all their power to that end, permitted the Korean timber company, in which he and the grand dukes had invested hundreds of thousands, to continue its politico-mili-tary aggressions which eventually dragged the empire into a war for which it was unprepared Further back in point of time, but of equal influence in bringing about the impasse with Japan which made war the only solution possible, was the choice of thp Maj-ehurian route for the transSiberian railway. It is shown that this crossing into foreign territory was a stimulating influence towajd turning the eyes of the Russian Ministry to the Far East and its possibilities of exploitation. Tbe commercial activity and consequent military occupation aroused the suspicion and opposition of both China and Japan, and laid the groundwork for the disputes which brought about the war. SEIZURE OF MANCHURIA. "This change of route," says Mr. Kennan in his introduction, "was the first striking proof of the fact that Russia, in the Far East had begun a policy of energetic action. The occupation of Port Arthur, the foundation of Dalny, the construction of the southern branch of the railway, the formation of a commercial fleet on the Pacific, and the timber enterprise of State Councillor Bezobrazoff on the Yalu River, in northern Korea, where all links of the same chain which was to unite permanently the destinies of Russia and the destinies of the Far East, and thus bring gain to Russia." "There is a prevalent opinion," says General Kuropatkin, "that if we had confined ourselves to the construction of the main trans-Siberian road, even if we built a part of it through northern -Manchuria, there would have been no war; that the war was caused by our occupation of Port Arthur and Mukden, and, more particularly, by the Bex Bezobrazoff timber enterprise in Korea.*' GIVES WARNING TO CZAR Another council was held at Port Arthur, and the veTdict was the same as before. Gen. Kuropatkin quotes from ■his report to the Emperor, in which he said: — "Our actions in .the basin of the Yalu and our behaviour in Manchuria have excited, in Japan, a feeling of hostility to us, which upon our taking any incautious step may lead to war. The activity of State Secretary Bezobrazoff has practicaily brought about a violation of the treaty with China and a breach with Japan. "During my stay in Ja-pan I had opportunity to see with what nervous apprehension the peopl% regarded our activity on the Yalu, and how they were preparing to defend, with arms, their Corean interests. Our operations there have convinced them Russia is about to proceed to the second part of her Far Eastern programme —that, having swallowed Manchuria, she is getting ready to gulp down Corea." FEARS DOWNFALL OF RUSSIA. Kuropatkin states that the duty of carrying out "the recommendations of the council devolved upon Admiral Alexieff, and apparently in ignorance of the admira-l's connection with the timber company, comments wonderingly upon his failure to correct the evils so far as they lay in his power. The general declares in a pyramida. diagram his judgment of the impo-rtance of Russian interests in different parts of the empire, placing the empire's interests in Corea in at the small end of the pyramid and the maintenance of domestic peace, and the integrity of the western bonndaries of the empire in the large end. "Columbus solved the problem of making an egg stand on its end," he concludes, "by breaking the egg. Must we, in order to make our pyramid stand on its narrow Oorean end, break the Russian empire?*' The answer to Kuropatkin's question came in the events which followed his retirement from the Ministry of War in August, 1903. Alexieff, through the influence of his timber company connections, became Viceroy of the Far Eastern provinces; there was no step made toward correcting the evils which were leading always on toward war and the relations of the Powers were becoming more strained. CZAR BLIND TO DANGER. General Kuropatkin returned to service when he saw the trend -of events, and made two reports to the Caar, recommending the return of Dalny, Kwangtung, and Port Arthur 'to China, and the withdrawal from Southern Manchuria and Korea. On one of these reports the Emperor but, a few months before the declaration of war made the following marginal note: "The alarm in the Far East is apparently beginning to subside." The negotiations with Japan under the direction of Alexieff failed to' accomplish a solution of the disputes between the Powers, and finally war was declared, bro_gh- about, as Kuropatkin shows, by the faSoreof the Emperor and his Government to put down the propaganda <xf aggression promoted by the timber company of Bezobrazoff, of which the. Emperor himself was a stockholder. That the Russians, knowing their own unpreparedness for war, did not recognise the power and the readiness of Japan during the negotiations £hs general comment--; upon. UNABLE TO EVADE WAR. "When onr potation in tihe Ear East became difficult, and there seemed to be d-tinger of ropfansa with J-Ep__n," he con-xlu-ies, "I was in fern-tic of d_casi.e

measures, and proposed that we avert war by a______ti_;g the unthneliness of our attempt to get an outlet on the Pacific, by restoring Bort Arthur and Kwang-tung to China, and by selling the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern railway. "A__d yet, even now, I sometimes ask (myself doubtfully, 'Did I do everything tha* was within the bounds of possibility to prevent war?' The strong desire of the Emperor to avoid war with Japan was well known to mc, as it was to his other co-workers, and yet we, who stood nearest to him, were unable to execute his will." KUROPATKIN FORESAW TROUBLE. General Kuropatkin was opposed to the occupation of southern Manchuria, believing that it would end in trouble with Japan, in which he was opposed by ■Admiral Alexieff, then commander of Kwangtuug. This problem was, however, apparently settled by the treaty made with China in 1902, 'which provided for the evacuation ; of Manchuria within a year, with the exception of a military guard for the railroad. "Mukden had actually been evacuated, continues the general, "when sud- , denly everything was stopped, by order of Admiral Alexieff, whose reasons for taking such action have not been cleared up. (Mr. Kennan, in his supplementary article, prints correspondence which seems to establish the fact that Alexieff was interested in the timber enterprise, and, like the Czar, was completely dominated by the state councillor Bezobrazoff.) Mukden which we had already evacuated, was reoecupied, as was also the city of New Chwang. The Yalu timber enterprise assumed more importance than ever, and in order to give support to it, and to our other undertakings in northern Corea, Admiral Alexieff sent a force of cavalry with field guns to Fengwangcheng. ACTIONS ALARM EVEN EUROPE. "There is good reason to affirm that tbe unexpected change 6f policy that put a I stop to the evacuation of Mukden was an event of immense importance. 'So long j as we held to our intention of withdraw--1 ing all out troops from Manchuria and so long as we refrained from invading Corea with our enterprise there was little danger of a break with Japan; but we were brought alarmingly nearer to a rupture I with that Power when, contrary to our • agreement with China, we left our troops | in southern Manchuria, and when, in the | promotion of our timber enterprise, we entered Northern Corea. Tbe uncertainty, moreover, with regard to our intentions, alarmed not only China and Japan, but even England, America, and ' other Powers." : In spite of the Minister for War, the : aggressions of Russia in the Far East continued; Dalny was improved, created, ' and fortified; evacuation was so long de--1 layed as to be practically abandoned, and the activities of the Promoter Bezobra- ' zoff grew bolder. He made bolder and bolder proposals, even asking for the concentration of 70,000 troops in Southern ' Manchuria for the protection of the concessions of the timber company. While publicly proclaiming his oppo- ! sition to the Far East policy, Alexieff i met many of the promoter's requests, 1 and showed a desire to support with his ■ left hand the schemes of the State ■ Councillor. ARMY IS USED FREELY. | In the operation of the timber com- . pany, whose stockholders were members of the royal family, Bezobrazoff made ' free use of the army, many of the important posts of the enterprise being held by army officers. Finally, the a__it_ide of China and Japan became so threaten- ; ing that a special council was ap- _ pointed to consider the situation and rcl port to the Czar. This council, which • was composed of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lamsdorff, Minister for Finance i Witte, and Kuropatkin, recommended i that the activities of the timber concern • must be strictly confined to commercial • lines and that Manchuria be immediately ' evacuated. "It pleased his Imperial Majesty to : say," declares Kuropatkin, "after he had i listened to these declarations of opinion, I that war with Japan was extremely un- . | desirable, and that 'we must endeavour . to restore in Manchuria a state of tran- ■ quillity. The company formed for the i . j purpose of exploiting the timber en the j i River Yalu must be a strictly commercial . j organisation and must exclude all ranks 1j of the army." , I "I was then ordered to proceed to the I j Far East, for the purpose of acquainting • > j myself with our needs and ascertaining j what the state of mind was in Japan. In the latter country I became convinced the Government desired to avoid a rupture f with Russia, but that it would be necesf sary for us to act in a perfectly definite 1 way in Manchuria, and to refrain from j f interference in Manchuria or Corea. If j - we should go on with the adventures of I t Bezobrazoff and Co., we should be threat- \ > ened with conflict." j