The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and the Echo. FRIDAY, JULY 26, 1907. CONTRABAND OF WAR.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 177, 26 July 1907, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and the Echo.

FRIDAY, JULY 26, 1907. CONTRABAND OF WAR.

for the ecus, that lack, assist****, Vor the wrong that needs routine*, Far the future te the distune*, , And the g—u that we can da.

It is quite possible that the discussion of the intricate question of Contraband of War at The Hague Conference may not rouse any special interest in the public mind. Yet, as a matter of fact, the precise definition of "contraband" is a matter of the most vital importance, not only to nations actually engaged in war, but —as we had occasion to learn during the recent conflict between Russia and Japan—to neutrals looking on. It must always be remembered that the rules of International Law, by which warfare is supposed to be regulated, are only conventions agreed upon by the Powers for their mutual convenience. No single Power, or combination of Powers, is in a position of authority over the others, and, consequently, there is no means of enforcing a penalty for a breach of these conventional arrangements. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that the Great Powers should be as far as possible unanimous in their views about such a matter as the definition and treatment of contraband; for such a dispute as arose about the right or Russia to. confiscate British ships and cargoes during the recent war might easily develop into an international crisis. England has always held certain definite views about contraband, which have been largely adopted by America and Japan. But Russia, during her struggle with Japan, extended the definition of contraband far beyond its original limits; and the result has been such inextricable confusion that England, to avoid such' difficulties in the future, now advocates the total abolition of contraband. As Lord Reay has explained to the Conference, the capture and confiscation of what should be "free" cargoes may involve such serious injuries to any country that compensation would, never cover the loss, and, therefore, it would be wiser and more equitable to abolish right of capture. But England is opposed by Germany and Japan, and there is not much prospect that the Conference will adopt the Bntish view of this complicated and dangerous question.

Generally speaking, the view of contraband usually taken in modern times has been that it includes goods of a "hostile" character, travelling to a "hostile" destination. It must be understood that the offence against international law for which contraband is confiscated is the carrying, not the selling, of the goods; and the belligerent, for this breach of the Law of Nations, has a case, not against the neutral Power, but against the individual trader. As a rule, neutral Powers do not accede to a request to prevent their subjects from carrying munitions of war to an enemy. Belligerents, as a great authority has said, must be their own policemen. But any neutral Power may protest against the inclusion of certain classes of goods by belligerents on their lists of contraband; and a neutral Power may justly demand compensation for its subjects if property of theirs, which should have been "free," has been confiscated on the pretext that it is contraband of war. These considerations show how important it is that the character of contraband should be carefully defined, and that there should be a general agreement among the Powers on the pointGenerally speaking, contraband is divided into two classes —absolute and conditional. The Japanese prize list, which is the briefest, most consistent, and most intelligible classification yet published, includes as absolute contraband only arms and ammunition, with machinery and material for making them, naval and militray uniforms, and, generally speaking, "all goods intended solely for use in war." Conditional contraband — that is to say, goods that may be seized if they are intended for the use of a belligerent—include food and drink, horses and fodder, gold and silver, and' material for railways and telegraphs. This is generally regarded as a reasonable statement of the case for contraband But the position has been immensely complicated by the line of action taken by Russia in the recent war, which virtually ignored the* distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, and included in the black list such articles of general use as cotton, rice, and coal. The abolition of this distinction between absolute and conditional- or relative contraband is really the crucial point in the debate now going on at the Hague Conference. For it means that in time of war belligerents may seize and confiscate any class of goods, " which may be used for a warlike purpose," including the support or maintenance of the enemy on the field. This, of course, means that food of all kinds would become contraband, and that it would be practically impossible to claim that any kind of merchandise in neutral bottoms would be free from the risk of capture and confiscation in war time. The objection to this view is obvious, for it manifestly means that the whole of the world's commerce might be paralysed, and an immense amount of neutral property destroyed during a war that originally concerned' only two nations. Russia's action as regards contraband has been singularly inconsistent; for in 1884 she subscribed to the French dej chelation that coal could under no cir-

cumst&nces be regarded as contraband. Now we find her nuuntainihg that "every kind 1 of fuel" is contraband unconditionally ; in other words, that it can always be confiscated iv war time, and that the belligerents need not trouble to inquire its destination or the purpose for which it is being carried. England, during the Russo-Japanese war, maintained consistently fthafc coal cargoes were not contraband unless they were clearly destined for the warlike purposes of Japan, and we know how nearly differences of opinion on this point led to- an outbreak of hostilities between England and Russia. The United States Government has endeavoured to clear the ground by urging upon the Conference a distinction between absolute and" conditional contraband, closely following the lines already laid down by England and Japan. Bnt England's proposal for the abolition of contraband is a heroic remedy that would rob most belligerents of so valuable a weapon that there is not much hope of getting it unanimously adopted.

But there is more than the desire for consistency, or even for the security of her mercantile marine behind England's effort to get rid of all these international complications by abolishing contraband. England's position among the Great Powers of the world is unique in this respect, that she depends almost absolutely for her existence upon her seaborne food supplies. Without the grain and dairy produce and beef and mutton poured constantly in.o England from across the seas, she "would he helpless; and iv case of war, if her food supplies were cut off, she "would be speedily starved into submission. This is why England is so anxious to have all doubt as to the true meaning of contraband cleared up as quickly as possible. Fourfifths of her wheat and flour conies to her from abroad, and, if it is once admitted that food is unconditional and absolute contraband her existence as a Great Power is at once jeopardized. So keenly is this felt by British jurists that one distinguished authority on the subject recently declared that England must fight, if necessary, to mamtain her case. "It is a matter of life and death for'tis to prevent any change in International Law which shall make the food of the civilian population undoubtedly contraband, and if arguments and protests will not do it, force must." Happily for England, her interests in this matter are shared by the United States, her chief source of supply. Our American cousins are not prepared to see their wheat export trade destroyed at Russia's bidding, and the United States representatives are certain to support England in this particular at the Conference. But at present it appears to be more probable that the Powers will agree upon a wide extension of absolute contrband, than that they will accept England's proposal, and refuse to allow to belligerents the right of capture of any sort of neutral merchandise.