A MEMORY OF MOROCCO.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 53, 2 March 1907, Page 4

A MEMORY OF MOROCCO.

The inner truth of diplomatic affairs is never easy to reach within measurable distance of the events themselves; and as it is only a year since the Algeeiras Conference, it is too soon to expect a full and authentic account of all that happened, "behind the scenes" on that momentous occasion. However, there is enough collateral •evidence to lend credibility to the sensational article in the "Revue dcs Deux Mondes," to which our cables refer to-day. According to the writer, the well-known editor of the "Temps," nothing but the determined opposition offered by England, Russia, and the United States to Germany prevented the Kaiser from gaining all that he had attempted to secure in Morocco. Oui readers will remember that after England and France, the two Powers chiefly concerned, had decided to reorganise the affairs of Morocco, Germany demanded, that her claims should be taken into consideration. The Kaiser, skilfully enough chose the moment when Russia was prostrated by her reverses in the Far East, and before the Anglo-French "entente" had been subjected to any serious test. France for the moment seemed helpless, and after Delcasse had been driven from office by ihe Kaiser's threats, the Rouvier Ministry gave way so far as to admit Germany's demand for an international conference. The Kaiser's pilgrimage to Tangier now seemed likely to bear fruit, and the German envoy demanded, not only that Germany should have something to say in the financial and military control of Morocco, but that a Moroccan seaport should be leased to Germany. As a naval base Casablanca or Mogador would have afforded Germany a magnificent opportunity for extending the scope of her naval policy and- for threatening England's naval communications in case of war. But to the joy of France and tne relief of the rest of Europe England took a much more serious view of her obligations under the Anglo-French convention than the Kaiser had anticipated. It was known at the time that England's firmness encouraged France to reject the Kaiser's claims. But it has not hitherto been authoritatively stated that England, Russia, and the United States in this instance acted iv harmony with each other and with France. Before the conference met England had assured France that in ease of an unprovoked attack by Germany, France might depend upon England's -aid. - But neither France nor Germany appears at the time to have taken this assurance literally and seriously; and it needed the heavy pressure that was applied at the Algeciras conference to bring out the real meaning of the Anglo-French

"cordial understanding." It is not possible to comprehend why France was content to make a few nominal concessions to Germany, secure in the knowledge that in the last resort she could depend upon the support of the United States as well as of England and Russia. And the light now thrown upon this interesting episode indicates clearly the course that diplomatic relations between the great Powers may be expected to take if Germany should again attempt to browbeat France into submission to her will.