RUSSIA'S GRANDIOSE SCHEME.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXV, Issue 202, 24 August 1904, Page 9

RUSSIA'S GRANDIOSE SCHEME.

KT.-ROPATKTX CONQUERS TVDIA— > OX TAPER. CFroiu Our Special Correspondent.) " J.OXDO.V, July 15. '< \'nw up know why General Kuropat- \ tin nnd the Rm-iru; -army have made «iirh nil indifferent Maud ngavnst, the!! fjL'rre?-! , <■ Troops or Kuroki. \'. m-tcacl of preparing or trouble withi' i.l.ip.m. ilial i"/:ilii"!H stvnlpjrist. Kuvo* i ~;,;!,iu. iin-. been rnnet'iitrutiii;* his nuts-!] {iV mind en phms for the invasion of liiiiiii. By some, means the London ' l> pi , . ,, .**" ii.i-> "lanaued lo set hold of ,\li;ii purprA'Us to be "'iin ttxiift t to nil a- , ion" hi Kuriipull.'in's matured tleVigriH mr dririn™ I ho English out of their ,ii-p«i dependency. The document is ilouideilly startling, and in other times uouid be calculated to make n ftreat n'ir in the Old Country. Out ta-dny the name of "Russia" is .--i-aree Rood cnouph to scarp hen.s -with, ■mci the ancient bojjey headline, "Rus-i-ian Designs on India.'' is more likely i.o make a, man lurn to the date of hL; i nioniinjx paper to see if by ihance he 'ins pickcl up fi Icn-yeur-old new.-, shfet '.lij.ii t'i uivi' liim evfTi a mild thrill. The. "V.\ press"' m.-;ure« us that there ■jt no need In take I In? document "in jii ulurniUl spirit" siih;o it is the busi,,H'..i nt every nation lo prepare plans Jor Hi , . , invnsioii of a passible enemy's, I'.OHiilry. ll'viiL-rly; but (accejttinp for ai CiKiiiienl. 1 ho "I'.xprc-.5 ,, document PS Kuropatkin's plans arc not liprely designed to meet a situation ,'i:it inierht aV ; =e, Imt. a situation it was ''lussia's J!i*entio:i to create by hook or us-nok nt no yon , distant dato, had Jap- -, n hern as complacent a? St. Peters'..nr~ wisliprl in the matter "f in Korea, <";r as impotent to| rr?i<=t. it. .is the Czar's advisers rippcar, lo hare irnpfj'mcd Japan in be. i P\it briefly as passible, Kuropatkin's : jrherar is ns follows: — The ppiiernl divides hj-s c.impainpi into three ph;is-s. He would first advance; 'hrmijfh TurkP«tan with 115.000 men in ..Wei .nnniofl nf tlif! rierht and left. The first phase would end by the tak- : Mij. , of Herat, nnd by the holding of .ill' 'lie north of Afghanis tan from Herat to Badnkshan. ; Aft "i" -.1 pan-so of i wo years, 1o con■quiM- or win over 1 he Afghan--, the .- j < ;- .-ouJ nd\aii'-e, in two cohimn.'i woirid lip m.ulc. with Kandnbar and Kabul as ohicclivps. Thence lmlia would be. inrailevl by the Bolan and Khyber Passes. In order to make thrs advance Pflfe!' from renrwnrd attack. Kuropatkin pro-j poPPS to r.-incilial.e P.-r.'.i.a in every pos-j ulile way, and ro enable the advac.-e oi tho army of the right to be made', partialis through Fors: .n territory. Tho plan to obtain iho good will of. tbn Persian muliahs is Lo secure from; the. Shah authority lo station a Iv'.i*-. ,sian official at Mcshetl. near the. Afghan. frontier, who would look sftor the nil- 1 (Trims from who r.row7l to I'he.j iioly places in the Plcin. I By the religious shieke with: naril cwah, this ojrenfc would win over, ihe tribes of Easir-rn Perria, through. uhofn territory the. Unssiau advance would he made, and they would be cm-j /.loved to aruard the Russian flank. The fim. army corps of Turkesran wnuld commence operations from Tash-: kend'. a Kur-siau iniliiary depot in' South Tuvkcst.iP, wif.h the second army corps moving Mevv. The two would nuiivh south until they held the line between Hent end Kashgni. and if meanwhile the Af-j ■rhans had tailed to be "won over" tlic| ei'tire force would halt whilst Heratj was bL j pfip;ed and Russian administrationi firmly established throughout northern Afghanistan. The advance to Kandahar and Kabul *-ould be dependent on the attitude of the Afghans. The arts of diplomacy would be given n faJr chance to win the Ameer over to the Russian side, but if he proved denf \n (.he chink of Russian <rold and the persuasive, toiifrue of Hussian agents. Kuropatkin appear? to Jiave no doubts that he could speedily crumple up the Ameer's army. Still, j, r prefers the softer methods of dealing with the. inhabitants ov these, countries which intervene between him and Ibis denned prey, and seemingly hns an overwhflrning belief in Uic efficacy of ■Russian diplomatic methods to effett hh purpose of winning over l'crs.ians, Afsha.ns a-nd the like. Kuropatkin lays jireat stress on ihe flefcssiiy of appointing ahorifrinal itifrcnts in the r-everal countries lie doidffns to use n> hi<rhw«iys for l.is Indian Army, and throughout the piece he is i»ver' hinting at (lie advisability vi using p;old instead of lend. The Ciruev.-il estimates lliivf. if Ills plans iire followed, by ihc time the ■n-;ir brcak-i out (he will choose his own <iine. and remarks that "a oasus belli" ran at any lime be found through a collision between Aifflian and Russian outposts) British influence will be ao /end in Persia that there will be no need to fear any movement of our troops 'from the (<lilt side. Moreover, he believes thai with the Russian advance ■through Afghauiflian. news of which ■would be sedulously spread among the siativos of India, the Briti-h would tind that, the loyalty of a great part of the Jiutives would di s a')pear. and that we thouM discover uurse.ives faced with )S,'>7 over again on the eve n£ (he Rtis,ri;in attack. Kuiopatk'ui would prefer lii-s ciimjiroper against India in commence in November, when not mily i.- the weather in tl;" rirnpn-od theauv o; war hpaltliier for the men, but all>the chief parts will be frozen and so safe from uilack-i by the British Xavy. The General.-i scheme for the proflrioninp: of th* irnop< and ihe carriage nf \rnr mat"r'nl are. on im |irr. nin«t tomplete, hi nl-n are hi." plnn-. for frood-winkinc our as to his <nic objective"* «hen advancing upon \!ie Tndiart frontier. Dm the day for putling Vi« sclieme fur inciidinjr India into upeviitiou i<? • far "If. If.v the i inir Kiiropnlkin has • pii!r,| wiili Kuroki and Rur-sia iind Japnn Hie :'l }>cii.'c. niethink- the I'r.sir *nr| hi- advi-crs will he ready for a prolonped period of peace. Tii .my case England is not taking ♦he "Express"' translation of Kuropatkin's FeWnip "in an a hi rnii'-t spirit," «mr sliriult] \vr have done =j even if R.us*ia"-- hand- had hren free The eminent *tialcpi.«-ts plans all appear lo have liceii nind ,, mi 1 ,, ! , supposition thnt '•vliilit he ;v,; - ;ui a ml doiiij; Knplnnil vvciiili] be <-nl:u!;. sleeping oft* ihe oiTei , ; s «f the troll ih African v. *u\ ami quite unaware that aiiyrlung unusual was transp'rinj? beyond the Afjrhan border. Moreover, a?) in his plans (or the r.Tnnc'iurian campaign. Ivurnpatkin makes no allowances for liic disarrangement of his schemes by reason of the enemy's refusal to do as he expects. TTtai arrangements allow for nothing hut

entire success all along the line, the only alternative he contemplates being the use of force instead of heavily gilded diplomacy when denVinp with the inhabitant of the "buffer -. State*. "We are sure to win in the end," says Kuropatkin, '"but"—. Probably h? Mould come upon as many "'buts" in his advance against India as he has found during his 31anchurian campaign. as ir may seem, Kuropatkin's for tht? overthrow of British rule in India has been in the hands of the Tiritirh War Office for months past, aiv! Lord Kitchen nr has all but complete.his preparations a£»ain«t such eventMnlitic-• as the Russian General eontcuipla+ed brinjiiriu; about. The liowev of the Anjlo-Indian Army is to be found within easy distance of the Indo-Afghan frontier, and if Iho Russinns tuannged to pnt to Herat they would have >omethinsr bpside? th? Ameer'e hill men to walk over in their southerly march.