MOROCCO AND LORD ROSEBERY.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXV, Issue 202, 24 August 1904, Page 4

MOROCCO AND LORD ROSEBERY.

lyorrl Rosebery has hp«ra somewhat cynically described as "an oppornmisr who always nrsses his opportunity." Certainly his public conduct since hi? retirement from office has never given the impression that he is a "born leader of men.," or that he possesses any definite and fixed convictions on most of tin , great questions of the day. A few weeks ajro he wrote his customary letter on the question of Mr Chamberlain's proposed Colon : al Conference; -with the result that the foremost Free Trade organ in England declared that it could not discover whether Lord Rosebrry was for Mr Climnberlain or apainst him. The question on which this spoiled dilettante among statesmen lias iast given England the benefit of his views is the Anglo-French agreement affecting Morocco; and those wlio arc fanrliar with Lord Ro-sebery's political prejudices will not be surprised to learn that in his opinion the Agreement. A3 far as it concerns Morocco, is "disastrous," and likely to lead to unfriendl'ness with France in the near future.

This comment upon one of the most notable diplomatic achievements of the agp mipht be rejrarded as startling if we did not recollect how hopelessly Lord Rosebery is biassed against

any and every act of his political opponent**. We do not think that the foreign policy of the Balfour Administration has always been either strong or consistent. But we can understand Lord Rosebery's rriticis-n only as an attempt to makn polit : cal capital out of the Anglo-French Agreement; and that is how it has evidently appealed to the general public at Home. Even the •'Westminster Gazette." strong Liberal and Oppositionist organ as it is, has remarked that Lord Rosebcry onght to explain what danger he foresees, and bow this threatened enmity between England and France ; <= likely to arise. As n matter of fact, no one who has viewed the case from a non-partisan standpoint eoulil so interpret the Anglo-French Agreement; and it is really deplorable to see a man of Lord Rosebery's ability lending the force of his great name and social influence to revive the ; nternational enmities which have been so lately and so h-appity dispelled. The surest way to cause trouble between either individuals or nations : s to anticipate it; and no man in Lord Rosebery's posit'on is justified in using *uch a question as this as a pawn in the paltry game of party politics. The terms of the Anglo-French Agreement, as far as they concern Morocco, have already been discussed in these eohnnns. France is to occupy Morocco on the same terms as those on -which England occupies Egypt. The Sultan and bis officials remain nominal rulers

of the country, under the advice of French representatives. Ail existing British interests are carefully guaranteed : and the coastal trade will be free to both nations. K'o differentiation against either Power in the matter of taxes. Customs dues or railway and, transport charges will be allowed. The, two Governments will jointly prevent | any fortification of the Moorish coast j for 250 miles along the shore opposite ' Gibraltar. As to "facilities for trade, j France has even agreed that English goods passing through Algeria to Morocco shall be carried on the same terms as French good?. In return for England's admission of the preponderating interest of France in Morocco, the French have undertaken to reorganise the fiscal, judicial and commercial system of the country after the fashion'of Lord Cromer in Egypt: and England will benefit more than any other Power by the substitution of "law and order for the corruption and anarchy now rampant in Morocco. We need not dwell on the complex circumstances that rendered European intervention in Morocco inevitable. But it has been freely admitted by the Britirh Government that France's* position in Algeria not only gave her a preeminent interest in Morocco, but made her the only Power able to interfere successfully with (he internal affair? of the country. The only question worth debating is whether the Agree nient has provided satisfactorily for" Uin safety of existing British interests i North Afric-H. Lord Roseberys views .ire (hose of an inveterate political par lisnn. As a counterblast to him we may quote the opinion of Mr Waltei liirris, one of the few Europeans qualiierl by long residence in Morocco and • ing personal acquaintance with thr country, thr Futtan. ami his Ministers to speak with authority on the que.s ion. Mr Harris has publicly stated ihat "the Agreement has brought about ;-iIG only possible solution of the Mor ,<vo question, and our sole interests in '.he country—the open passage of the Straits of Gibraltar and the protection of our commerce—have been sufficiently and satisfactorily guaranteed." Thai s the view taken of the position by al Ihe most responsible diplomatic author! ucs in England and Europe; and, h spite of Lord Rosebery, we believe the future, will prove the Anglo-French understanding in Morocco to be a plerV of friendship. as we ll as P permanen material benefit to both the high con tracting parties engaged.