The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED the Evening news morning news and the echo. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1904. THE WAR.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXV, Issue 37, 12 February 1904, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED the Evening news morning news and the echo.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1904. THE WAR.

For the cease that lacks For the tcrong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that ice can do.

The latest news from the Far East appears to confirm in all important particulars the accounts of Japanese successes already published. It is highly improbable that Admiral Togo will allow the Russian squadron to leave Port Arthur without a desperate struggle, in which the advantage of position, if not of force, must be all on the side of our allies. Admiral Seymour has expressed an opinion that the blow at Port Arthur has had the important effect of securing a definite superiority in battleships for Japan. Up to the present the Japanese, even including the vessels that have just left Singapore, were not equal to the Russians in ships of the line, nor had they any other vessels so far under construction as to be ready before the crisis of the war is over. As battleships cost at least a million sterling, and take two or three years to build, the loss inflicted on the Russians cannot easily be repaired; and the gain to Japan is correspondingly great. Our allies are evidecitly making the most of their command of the sea; and the capture of four transports — volunteer fleet steamers—with at least 2000 troops on board is a further warning to Russia that she must confine her operations to the land. Tho loss of men and transports is comparatively a small matter to Russia. But the damage to her prestige, more especially in the eyes of China, may have serious consequences; and the impossibility of sending troops and supplies by sea leaves her dependent on a base 3000 miles away, with which she is connected by one line of railway, which the Japanese have already succeeded in cutting in at least one vulnerable spot. But as far as events will allow us to judge the dash upon Port Arthur was only a casual incident in the opening of the campaign. It was apparently only by chance that Admiral Togo discovered that the Russian squadron in Port Arthur might be taken by surprise. The primary object of the Japanese fleet would naturally he to secure and cover the landing of troops i>n the Corean coast. To occupy Corea. and to establish a strong naval base ;it Masampho, only a few hours' steam from Japan, is the most obvious programme for our allies, and th?y have already set about it wfth the energy and rapidity of movement tl.at seem to characterise them alike on land and sea. They have already occupied Seoul in force, thereby securing themselves as the dominant power in Corea. The support of the Coreaus. lethargic and untrained as they are, is probably of little value; but the command of the country is of inestimable importance to the Japanese. It menns that the Russians if they advance into Corea will have to force their way through a hostile country, leaving their bast and source of supplies at every step further behind. It means, also, that the Japanese now (lank the Manchurian railway, and can deliver unexpected 11 nd deadly blows along hundreds of miles of its course. Even assuming that the Russians do not move beyond the Yalu, they must still depend absolutely upon the one long and vulnerable railway line: while they can make no move to prevent the constant reinforcement of the Japanese army. It is impossible to say how many Russian troops are now in Manchuria. Dr. Morrison says that the number has been grossly exaggerated by the Russians themselves; and military experts have asserted that the Siberian railway cannot possibly supply much more than 100,000 men in Manchuria with reinforcements and provisions and munitions of war. Commanding the sea and operating from Corea as a military base, Japan can pour into Manchuria perhaps 400,000 tre-ops, probably at least equal to the Russians in all that makes for victory in war. Without exaggerating the importance of the successes they have already won, our allies may look forward to the Manchurian campaign with a degree of confidence that even a week ago would hardly have seemed justifiable. We must not lose sight of Russia's immense resources, the well-proved fighting capacity of her soldiers, and the military skill of General Kuropatkin and his colleagues. But it is becoming increasingly evident that Russia is likely to fight this war to the end without assistance. It was probable at the outset that Russia would endeavour to complicate the situation by invading China, and she has already threatened to seize Kalgan. However, she has been checked here by the skilful diplomacy of the American Secretary of State. Mr. Hay has proposed to the Powers that the integrity and neutrality of China shall be respected throughout the war and after it has closed. Manchuria and Corea are specifically excluded from this agreement: but Japan, England, Germany, and France have already accepted America's proposal. This move should have an important effect in limiting the area of the war, as any danger of the dissolution of China would have inevitably caused the intervention

of the Powers on oue side or the othe?. There seems to be a little hesitation on the part , of the Powers as to a proclamation of neutrality; but this is one of the formalities of international law "more honoured in the breach than in the observance." Russia's appeal to the world against Japan's "treacherous" attack upon her is sufficiently disposed of by the general knowledge of the evasion and procrastination to which the Tsar's Ministers stooped before Japan formally withdrew her envoy. Moreover, according to the "Times," the attack on Port Arthur was not made for some hours after the Russian cruisers had fired upon the Japanese off Cbemulpo. The Russians had probably failec'. to realise that the Japanese were desperately in earnest, and tlie military party has thus precipitated a struggle for which the country evidently finds itself somewhat unprepared. But wars such as this are not decided in one or two engagements, and it is still too early to predict with any confidence what course events will now proceed to take.