THE RAKAIA ACCIDENT

Auckland Star, Volume XXX, Issue 162, 11 July 1899, Page 2

THE RAKAIA ACCIDENT

| COMMISSIONERS' REPORT

f.THE ENGINEDRIVER BLAMED

THE SYSTEM FAULTY.

iWESTrNGHQUSE CONTINUOUS BRAKES RECOMMENDED.

flßy Telegraph.—Parliamentary Reporter.); f WELLINGTON, this day. ; The following is the full text of the ireport of the Royal Commission (Mr "Pendleton, of South Australia, and Dr. IGiles) into the Rakaia railway collision. It was presented to Parliament Shis (Tuesday) afternoon: — "To His Excellency the Governor,— May it please your Excelleny in pursuance of the commission issued to us dated June 26th, 1899, and the instructions therein contained, that we Should inquire into the causes of the accident (at Rakaia on the 11th .March last) and the circumstances attending the same, including the questions ■whether the accident- was imputable to the negligence of any persons, rind •if so, in what particulars, and to wh.it extent, we have now the/honour to state that we held an exhaustive enquiry at Christehurch on the 29th and BOth ult. On the .first day named we ■travelled over the line between Christehurch and Ashburton and carefully examined the road and working appliances on the up journey between Ashburton and Rakaia. The line is laid •with 531b steel rails, the sleepers, of ■which there are 2100 to the mile, are good and have six inches of ballast underneath; the road is practically straight and in excellent running order. _____ CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE ACCIDENT. "It is desirable concisely to state ihe circumstances under which this, accident occurred. On the. 11th March two excursion trains were booked to Tun from Christehurch to Ashburton, returning in the evening, leaving AshTburton at 6 p.m. and 6.15 p.m. respectively. The working notice for these (trains was issued in due course, and a copy is attached to the evidence. This aiotice provided for both trains crossling No. 21 south at Eakaia, and the first train, consisting of two Baldwin engines, 30 carriages and 1 brake van, left Ashburton punctually, arriving at Rakaia two minutes before the booked time, viz., 6.45, instead of 6.47. The second train, consisting of 1 Baldwin engine, 14 carriages, 2 waggons, and 1 brake van, was 20 minutes late leaving 'Ashburton, and the guard of this train, William Climpson, was unfortunately left behind in consequence, as ; he alleges, of the crowded state of the platform preventing his joining the brake van. It is not apparent that his absence in any way led to the subsequent accident, but we desire to record our opinion that a.guard of such , lengthened experience as he possessed ought to have avoided so serious a blunder as missing a passenger train of which he was in charge. This train, ■under the circumstances which are later on stated, overtook the first train at Kakaia station, and the .driver of it, Charles Henry Carter, instead of stopping outside the first facing points, in accordance with rule, overshot the mark and ran into the front train with the disastrous results so well known. .The Coroner's jury, at the inquest held on the passengers who were killed, returned a verdict of manslaughter against the driver, Carter, who stood his trial at the Supreme Court sittings in June and was acquitted. "It is shown in-evidence which we have taken that the driver (Charles Henry Carter) of this second train started^ from Ashburton at an unusur ally rapid rate and that his speed of Tunning on portions of the road was, especially through Chertsey and towards Eakaia, not only in excess of the timetable, i.e., 24 miles per hour, but also greater than was laid down ■by a regulation which limits the speed of his train as an ordinary one to 30 miles per hour. The evidence of Mr Thomas Danks, who previous to 1878 had 16 years' experience as-a driver on "the Victorian railways, is very clear kpon this point.. The stationmaster at Chertsey also expressed an opinion that the train ran through his station •pretty fast,' and the guard's assistant, Burrows, who took charge of the brake when he found his guard had been left behind, expresses the opinion that the speed was that of an express train. THE ENGINE DRIVER'S STATE- . MENT. Engine driver Carter, when called Xtpon to explain his breach of the rule in not stopping outside Rakaia station, pleaded, Ist, that his guard having been left behind the brakes in the van were not applied when called for; 2nd, that the Westinghouse brake, upon his engine did not act; 3rd, that when his fireman at his instruction "cut in" the air for the Westinghouse tender brake that failed to act for a few seconds; 4th, that he was misled by the head-light of an engine standing on the Methven branch, which he believed to be the head-light of No. SI South, which train he was to cross at Eakaia; sth, that he believed the tail-lights of No. 1 excursion standing in the Rakaia station to be much further away than they actually were; 6th, that no danger or stop signal was given to him until he was close to the first facing points. •• .. COMMENTS BY THE COMMISSIONERS. With regard to these pleas we have to state, Ist, the evidence of Burrows and of Mr Fitzpatrick, who was in the van with him, goes to show that the brake was applied either at Chertsey or immediately afterwards, and kept »n until the time of the accident; and it will also be noticed that engine -driver Hughes saw the brakes of the van were on at the time of the collision; 2nd and 3rd, the admissions of Carter himself immediately after the accident that his brakes were in good order (vide Mr Beattie's evidence), and the fact that the engine and tender have continued to run with those brakes in good order since, j suffice to negative his statement that they did not act properly before the accident. On this point Carter at the ! (enquiry which we held entirely failed to account in any reasonable manner for the difference of his statements immediately after the accident and his argument before us to the effect that the brakes had failed him. It is beyond question that verbally and above his signature he fully admitted within forty-eight hours of the acci- j dent that his brakes were in good order and had acted properly, suggesting rather the accident had arisen either from his misjudging the distance

until it was top late to stop, or from the fact that the preceding train had made, as he expressed it, "bad breaking ground." His statement, "I thought I had a clear road up to the platform and whistled for a. platform signal but did not get- one," is very significant; and we are further of opinion that it is in the highest degree improbable that a Westinghouse brake would be in good order at Ashburton and fail to act within an hour subsequently, and work well without any repairs for three months afterwards; 4th. we-admit that Carter may have been misled by the head-light of the Methven engine in the manner alleged by him, but this does not in :\i\y way exonerate him for running into a 'station before he received a platform signal in accordance with the regulations. The Methven engine was. not mentioned in his working notice, and the Only lights at or near the .station by which he should have been guided were the platform signal, j which he did not receive, and the t,iilj lights of the train in front of him; : sth,'.lie also probably misjudged the j distance of the tail-lights of the train !in front of him, but this, far from \ being a valid excuse, is rather an ad- | mission of a serious error of judgj ment on the part of an experienced i driver.: 6th. according to the evidence j of Mr O'Neill, who showed the danger : or stop signal, if was exhibited about j 300 yards.from the facing points,.a disj tauce quite-inadequate, in our opinion, I for protective purposes, but as no rule j provided, for the showing of such a signal Carter had no right to rely | upon its exhibition and should have I bad his train under sufficient control ! to enable him to stop before reaching i these facing points until the platform ! signal admitting him was shown in j accordance with rule. I CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, j We are of opinion that the accident i arose through driver Carter mainj taining too high a speed, in running j his train between Chertsey and RaIkaia, and from his misjudging his dis- : j tnnce from Eakaia elation when he j shut off steam. There is not the i slightest reason to suppose that Carter I was other than perfectly sober, but as : j in his evidence- he has admitted his j I extreme desire to make up on his j j journey the time which bad been lost j jin starting from Ashburton. we beI lieve that" he allowed that desire to j | override his better judgment, and eon- j I sequently maintained an excessive, j j speed, expecting that. No. 21 south ! | Would be in Eakaia in due time aud j ! that the first excursion train would j 1 have cleared that station. The sup- j | position that his mind was almost | ; exclusively bent upon this one subject | seems to afford a reasonable explana- \ : tion of the. failure of himself and his j < fireman to see the green light which j Burrows, the guard's assistant, alleges I that he waved almost, persistently between Chertsey station, and the station of the accident. COMMENTS ON THE .SYSTEM OE WORKING. ' We believe we shall not be travel - I ling beyond the scope of Your Excellency's commission in making a few comments on the method of working as disclosed by the evidence. Ist. The system of crossing passenger trains at a station unprovided with home and distant signal?, is one which should with all possible despatch be discontinued as dangerous. In this case had such signals been in existence Carter would have been instructed under the usual rules governing their use to come to a stop at the distant signal, immediately afterwards pulling slowly within and proceeding to the home signal or as far as any obstruction on the road would permit, the distant signal therefore protecting his rear. We beg to submit that every* station used i for crossing passengers train and havj ing a resident staff should be supplied ■j with such signals.and that where j trains have to be crossed at a station ! without resident staff the working i time-table should provide for each j train coming to a stand outside these points, and specify which train was to enter the station first. 2nd. We are of opinion that the practice of running double engine trains, consisting of anything like 30 carriages with passengers, is unwise, more especially in the absence of continuous brakes. Even with such brakes, double engine trains should not be used for the carriage of passengers except where/ such additional power may be necessary to assist, a load over an exceptionally bad grade. We are in-, formed that an expenditure of. £275,----000 would equip the whole of the New Zealand railway, stock with the Westinghouse continuous brake, and as doubtless this work could be done gradually and charged over a series of years it seems probable that the burden of the annual interest would be •less than the cost of repairs following slight accidents on some of the heavy grades worked in this colony. _ 3rd. It would be very desirable to institue a system under which stations in advance of a fixed crossing-place should be advised of the late running of a train so booked to cross. Eor example, if in this case prompt advice had been given to Ashburton of the late running of No. 21 south, and it had been the duty of the station master to advise Carter to that effect, he would have been forewarned and doubtless would have run more steadily between Chertsey and Eakaia. 4th. We are of opinion that an important rule such as 317 should: not be allowed to fall into abeyance. We are aware that the working book provides a maximum speed for (a) express and (b) ordinary trains, but it does so without expressly amending or cancelling an authorised rule (317), which forbids the making up of lost time and even these maximums, are, we believe, exceeded by the .drivers. This is a state of things likely to brin"- about a comparatively lax adherence- to the regulations, and we sue-g-est for consideration whether rule 317 should not stand with an added authority to the driver to exceed time-table speed only at the written request of the guard, and I within stated limits. This system has j been found to work well elsewhere, j j In conclusion we desire to express our j ! thanks to all the officers of the de- j ! partment with whom we have been j ! brought into contact in the discharge ■ jof our duties, the performance of j j which has been facilitated by the j I courtesy extended and the anxious I wish manifested on all hands to conI tribute to the efficiency of our work.