ALLIANCE OF ANGLO-SAXONS AND JAPS.

Auckland Star, Volume XXIX, Issue 149, 27 June 1898, Page 3

ALLIANCE OF ANGLO-SAXONS AND JAPS.

LATIN RACES IN . OPPOSITION.

So absorbingly interesting is the prospect of intervention by the government of the United States in settling the disturbances in Cuba, and the consequent hostilities with Spain, that many happenings throughout the rest of the world are lost sight of or are passed by as matters of no concern to us. Yet it is possible to conceive of such far reaching consequences following our action in interfering in the Spanish-Cuba imbroglio as will disturb the already excited state of international politics throughout the whole world. In the Far East Great Britain and Japan are apparently in accord in endeavouring to check the growing influence .exerted by some of tlie European Powers toward acquiring the control of affairs of the great empire of China. Fleets of warships are gathering in Chinese waters, and preparations are making with a view to be ready to meet the contingencies of an armed conflict.. Ts'o coalitions have yet been formed between the parties concern-' ed, but, that Japan and England would be found fighting side by side is not a chimerical idea by any means. The two nations are friends in more than one sense—both possess somewhat, similar forms of government, both are progressive, both are modern in their points of view, both to a great extent are admirers and friends of the United States and our institutions, and both, together with tlie United States, are not liked by the remainder of the world. The United States and Japan have for many years been pulling along well together. We have admired their pluck, their development, their quickness, and their success; often have they been called the 'Yankees' of the East' because of their sterling qualities, and like ourselves they are rather proud of the title.

The cordiality existing between Japan and the United States and between Japan and Great Britain ought also logically to exist, therefore, between the United States and Oreat Britain. This follows the corollary that two thing's equal to the same thing1 arc equal to each other. As a matter of fact, England and America are, at bottom friends. Mood is thicker than water, no matter how much some people may pretend that it is not. There can be no better proof.of it, than the action taken by the Powers, now that our dear land is to gird up its loins and set forth to do battle with Spain.

THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND,

AND JAPAN

Two nations — England and Japan— have quietly, with no ostentation, permitted the fact to be generally understood that way down in their hearts they 'are with us every time.' What a triumvirate the throe friends would make —the United States, Great Britain, Japan! On land or sea who could stand against it? Perhaps not all the world banded together.

Should this event of coalition come 1o pass one antagonist, naturally so from taste, habit, religion, environment, and tradition, would be found in the. Latin world, composed of I'"ranee, Italy, Spain, Vortujral, and Central and South America. Even now these people of the same ancestry ••■ta nd together in sympathy, ko far as we can judjje, against the policy the United States is pursuingl toward one of their members. And, as before hinted, it. is not a wild flight of imagination to conceive of such a combination of circumstances Following our intervention in Cuba and subjection of Spain as wouhf lead these Latin countries to combine against the United States, England, and Japan. For were the Latin race to rise against the United States just so surely would 'St. Oeorfje' come to our rescue, and Japan would quickly follow. Should such an event happen but one. conclusion, we believe, would follow —the annihilation of the Latin States. This belief is based on the relative strength afloat and ashore of the dilVereiit nations of which we have been speakin;.'.

Groat Britain ;ts a sea power stands cupreme. It is her. policy to hnve lie- naval force more thun equal to that of any two other naval forces combined. She not only possesses, theiefore. tin1 most powerful Meet in the world, but whe can increase this .(left by the addition of new .ships quicker than any other nation can. II takop Knglnml but a year to lay down, build, arm and equip a 15,000----lon .battle f;hlp. France can construct a similar vessel in three years; so can

we. Italy would require about, four years, ami Spain a still longer lime. In tlie Houth American republics such lighting elements cannot, be produced at nil, there being' no .shipbuilding facilities. This is also the ease with Japan. liul Japan is spending money now, a great deal of it. in having her navy built in lOngland. In a few years she will be in possession of a very strong, formidable licet, which wi)] be. the equal in every way of tho Ileets of sumo of the first I'owers of Europe, and the superior of any squadrons in Oriental waters.

Tho relative strength of navies -depends much on their relative strength in buttle, ships. This strength for lhc> countries we have under consideration is, in numbers of battle ships built and building, as follows: — Great .Britain, 02; Japan. C; United States, 10—total, 78. France, [U); Italy, 15; Spain, 3; Argentina, 1; Brazil, 2; Chili, .'3—total, (50. However, this is not altogether fail" to those countries where coast defence- held to be the principal reason for formulating a naval policy, is provided for by having; a national floating force composed extensively of coast defence vessels. Then again the armoured cruiser type is not included in the abovo figures, though such ships ar^ in many ways quite the equal, of some of the battleships and the superior of a few. Let us then, for purposes of comparison, take the number of armoured ships of the countries as our measure of relative naval strength, excluding only river monitors and obsolete vessels like the thirteen old monitors now being distributed among our ports 'to light the Konb of fearful adversaries.' We will thus find, built and building, the relative armoured strength to be in numbers as follows: — England,Bs: Japan, 10; United States, 19—total, 114. France, 60; Italy, 20; Spain. 12; Portugal, 1; Argentina, 7; Brazil, 5; Chili, s—total, 110. Still another and perhaps a better way to state what may be the relative strength of navies as indicated by their armoured fleet is to give' the armoured displacement tonnage as well as the number of the ships, as follows: — DisplaceNo, ment England 85 703,000 Japan 10 02,000

United. States. 19 i 92,000 Total , 114 947,000 France 00 436,000 Italy 20 184,000 Bpain 12 100,000 Portugal. 1 2,500 Argentina. 7 25,000 Brazil 5 15,000 Chili 5 28,000 Total .... 110 790,500 This gives the Anglo-American-Japanese coalition an overwhelming 'preponderance, which must insure its , eventually overcoming all opposition. To attempt to localise the strife should the two combinations above be engaged in hostilities'the one with the other would be an impossibility. It would range all over the globe, and might last so long as a single ship of one of the Powers remained afloat. Neither can any attempt be made to give the strength of each Power in cruisers. A mere statement of the number each has would serve no purpose, for their are so many types of cruisers and their efficiency varies so greatly, according to the duties they are expected to perform, that no two experts could be found to agree as to which was the most valuable. Cruisers are, however, a necessary part of a fleet. No armoured, squadron should ever be sent to fight unaccompanied by them.

On the other hand, no uaval war will ever be terminated by cruisers. Commerce may be destroyed and great damage wrought, but so long as a battle ship lives she is the cruiser's superior, and should she meet her would destroy her. However, here are cruiser data of vessels above 2,000 tons:—England has 115, Japan 15, United States, 20 total, 150. France, 2G, Italy, 17, Spain, 8, Portugal, 2, Argentina, 3, Brazil, 5, Chili, 3, Peru, 1; total, 05. Here, again, the Latin force is far inferior. So to hold the trade of the world in its grasp would be a simple matter for our triple alliance, and perhaps the battle might be won by starvation.

THE PERSONNEL AND THE SMALL

CRAFT,

Now, as to the personnel. Great Britain Las a trained force of seamen and officers of over 100,000. Including reserves the personnel available for sea duty numbers approximately 150,000 men. Japan's personnel can be safely put at 20,000; in other words, she can must-r. like ourselves, as many men as .she lias ships for. Our force afloat is nearly 1,0,000, making for our combination a total oi: 185,000—say 200,000 men. A greater number will be found in the Latin coalition. France has about 150,000 men and reserves, Itnly ."50,000, Spain 25,000, Portugal, 9,000, Chili, 10,000, Argentina, 8,000, Brazil,.s,ooo—a total of about 2:10,000 ?nen. But without ships men are of no account; hence this factor is unimportant. A naval element of defence common to the .countries we have been pitting against each other is tho torpedo flotilla. It is a force, which must be reckoned with, though it. is an \inknown one, on account of the quickness with which it can be augmented. The figures as they hold now may be given roughly as follows: — Destroyers — Great Britain, 105; Japan, 10; United Sattes, 3; total, 118. France, 18; Italy, 20: Spain, G; Argentina, 4; lirar'.il, 8; Chili, A; total, 50. In this valuable sea-going type the Anglo-Jananese-United States fleet has an excess of two to one, which will enable it fo efl'eclively dispose of the torpedo boat fleet of the Latin combination, amounting to about 500 I boats, us against the triumvirate's 350 boats. However, England and the United States could readily, if called on to exert themselves, add torpedo boats at the rate of one hundred each in about, three months. Tho other Powers cannot do such quick work. THE LAND FORCES. Enough has been said to demonstrate conclusively that on the seas the combination of Anglo-Saxons and Japanese can stand up successfully against a Latin bund. And when armour, armament and discipline enter into consideration this fact will J stand indisputable. To defend a country against enemies' soldiers and fortifications are provided, as well a3 sailors and .ships, and the two forces ought to" go hand in hand and work together. An ideal defence is a purely naval one, for were the force afloat sufficiently great in numbers and power every port and harbour in a country could be held inviolate and the entire littoral guarded, BeI sides this, the enemy on the sea could be overhauled and routed as well. | This policy, broadly stated, is that ol' moving the defence of one's own shore up to the littoral of the enemy. Even Great Britain, with her tremendous sea power, is not yet in a condition to meet all the emergencies of such a defence. So recourse must be had to fortifications on land as a means of securing immunity of attack from seaward. Unless the object of an attack be invasion, {he coast, fortifications of a country need to be established only at those points where they can protect the prominent cities, arsenals, and navy yards. Tp safeguard these institutions against bombardment is imperative, else the enemy will strike home. In the event of war, however, involving the Latins against the English, Americano, and Japanese, many other considerations besides fhose pertaining to bombardment must enter. The question of obtaining and protecting coal for the fleets is one of decided moment. Both fleets and fortifiea-! tions will be required to protect adequately those stations where the ships must be supplied. This in itself is an immense undertaking, for Gre.it Britain alone owns so nyiny of them that the drum beats in tffeir garrisons are heard around the world. Bermuda, Halifax, St. Lucia, Gibraltar, Malta. Cyprus, Aden, Trincomalee, Singapore, Ilong Kong1 are some of the gems in this girdle of black diamonds. Not all the Latin Colonial possessions together can approach these in point of situation, strength, a.ud coaling facilities. The Azores, Canaries, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Tahiti, Martinique, are not of the same lustre, though they have a decided strategic value.

To blockade these vantage points would be undoubtedly the part of wisdom of the superior force at sea, and to swoop down upon them and destroy them would be a part of the tactics to be employed. Forts with great guns and squadrons of hai'bour defence ships would have to be the means employed to prevent any catastrophe falling- to one of these places. Already has ]<!ng-land attended to this matter more thoroughly than other nations, and to-day her coaling1 and fitting- depots are as impregnable as land defences can make them.

To garrison military posts, whether at home or abroad, in stich a manner as to render them independent of the navy has been a part of the policy of all the countries of which we have been speaking-. The Dreibtmd, England, Japan, and the United States, have, however, while doing their best

in this direction, not neglected to take into consideration the invaluable assistance home defence will receive trom a powerful fighting- fleet. This is not so observable in the ■Latin, confederation we have in mind Many of the countries composing* it are very deficient in the strength of ■ their fortifications and the aw, mounted therein are not of the l>e"t Especially is this true of the entire coast of South America, where, though every port is defended by earthworks, battlements, and fortifications, yet they all are so ancient so badly located and of such, faulty construction, that the emplacement of modern guns to operate against a modern fleet would be out of the question. Our combination of the three Great Powers could force every one, and have the towns and shipping these deienees are supposed to protect at their mercy. Invasion of a foreign shore under the Circumstances of such warfare as we have supposed would be a probable feature of the operations. This would call for men and ships. In previous wars England has sent men to invade foreign lands; so has Japan; so, too, has France and Spain and others. Probably they would make the attenr- again. The mc..:.od of procedure which might be adopted is difficult to foretell or foresee, in view of the many complicated situations which must of necessity arise from prosecuting a war on so g-ra*id a scale as we have indicated. Still, that armies would be. in the field and on the sea Cannot be doubted. Armies are maintained by nations nowadays—however vast their numbers—on what is called a peace footing. Thus, for instance, our regular army consists of but about 26,000 men, yet to swell this number by. calling out reserves, militia, and volunteers to nearly a million would be the work of a short time. This statement is true of other countries, so when, giving data of troops this fact must be borne in mind. The land forces existing at the present time belonging to the Powers whose combination we are considering are as follows:— Great Britain 200,000 Japan 100,000 ' United States 26,000 Total 326,000 France 570,000 Italy ' 240,000 Spain 80,000 Portugal 36,000 South America 90,000 Total 1,016,000 This pence-footing array leaves our Anglo-Saxon-JaiDanese combination sadly deficient. Nor, were the forces to be raised to a war footing, would the relative difference be changed. What this war footing may be has recently been given by some statistician as follows: Great Britain 060,000 Japan 500,000 United States ?,00,000 Total 1,360,000 France 4,350,000 Italy 3,000,000 Spain 190,000 South America 600,000 Total :.. 8,170,000 These figures are misleading, as said before, for Aye know that the United States could put a million men in the field, and both Great Britain and Japan could doubtless double their strength. Nevertheless, in point of numbers, the Latin combination will always, because of the number and nature of the populations, greatly outclass the other combination. However, this preponderating land force ot the Latins can be neutralised by the equally superior force of their opponents on the sea.. Given the fleets of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, their officers, their crews, their prestige and the glory that has always surrounded their flog, and they will overmatch and bring* to terms theLatins, first afloat, and then ashore, so surely as the day follows the night. As intimated, this alliance of nations suggested at the beginning of ! this paper is not a thing 1 which can- ; not happen or which may not happen. Indeed, events look to be slowly and surely making for it, and perhaps all of us will live to see it.