THE WAR IN BRAZIL.

Auckland Star, Volume XXV, Issue 32, 6 February 1894, Page 4

THE WAR IN BRAZIL.

The news from Brazil of the return of Admiral Mello to the command of the rebel navy, coupled with the tidings of a fierce conflict between the insurgents and the Loyalists, would seem to presage a renewal of the more active phase of hostilities. To all appearances Mello is a determined man, and ono likely to see the struggle through to the very end. That struggle we have been inclined to view from one Bide only—the side of the Loyalists. It would be instructive to survey ib from the point of vision of Mello and his followers. According- to the latter, the quarrel arose through President Peixoto in September 7th of last year putting his veto on a Bill providing that no Vice President should be eligible for the Presidency. But though this was the immediate cause of the insurrection which broke out the very day after the President's action, other causes— chiefly "the alleged military despotism and reckless financial policy" of Marshall Peixoto had, according to Admiral Mello, been at work for some time past. With regard to the- outcome of the revolt the leader of it was very hopeful when his opinion was last heard on the subject. Speaking to a "Times" correspondent about two months after the outbreak, he maintained that) the Provisional Government of the United States of Brazil was firmly established at Desterro, the capital of Santa Catarina, and thab tho States of Rio Grande do Sul and Parana were entirely with the insurgents. Mello declared that if he should prove successful, a general election would be held throughout the country, and ib would be a proviso thab no military man should be elected President. The rebel leader is naturally exceedingly anxious that he should be recognised as a belligerenb, as such a recognition would place him in a much better asjvell as safer position than the one he now occupies. The restoration of the Empire he declares was never seriously considered, but should the majority of a new Congress decide in favour of such a step, no action would be taken to prevent it. Very probably, if Mello had been free to attack the qity with his shot and shell—he had all the military stores of the Brazilian Government in his hands when the revolution broke out — he would have had a very fair chance of realising bis hope of victory before this. Bub the war vessels of the Foreign Powers restrained him from destroying a city in which they too had the interests of their subjects to preserve,- and tho rebel admiral, after his first bombardments of Rio de Janeiro, has bad to confine hmself principally to the town of Nicbheroy and the. forts still in possession of the Loyalists. While he was no doubt fretting thab he could not take full advantage of his position, Peixoto was endeavouring to fortify himself on shore and making all arrangements toholdhis own till hisships should arrive. With the advent of his fleet, which is expected daily in Rio, we may look for no ordinary contest, unless the Foreign Powers should interpose. The cablegram of yesterday, which represented the majority of the foreign diplomatists as favourable to both parties in thecontesS being recognised as belligerents, indicates the improbability of any such interference. And, indeed, it does nob appear to us that the Foreign Powers have any good excuse for meddling in the quarrel unless they can make one out of their desire to protecb the interests of their subject; and it is hardly likely that that would be a valid one.