DISTRICT COURT.—This Day.

Auckland Star, Volume XXI, Issue 4126, 24 September 1883, Page 2

DISTRICT COURT.—This Day.

[Ilefore His Honor Judge Smith.]

AMH.NDMBXT OF REGISTER

On the application of Mr Tyler, leave «a» given to amend the register of tho Darwin G.M. Co. (late Hiberina holding) by the alteration of the name "Alsager John White" to "Alsager John Steele," the former being a clerical mistake. UKDEFEXDED CASES. Judgmentwentbydefaultfor tho plaintiffs in tho following cases :—\V. H. Connell v. Thos. Kelly, £20 17s, on a promissory note ; Michael Fitzgerald v. Phillip H. Blnckmore, £49 4f=, wages ; Edward Dowring t. Mitai Titore, £56 "s 6d on a promissory note. ADJOURNED. Fisher and Co. t. Chas. Fletcher, £41 4s lid, for goods supplied. CASES UNDEK AKMTKATIOX. On the application of Mr S. llesketh, tho time for the awards to bo be delivered in in the cases of John Pilkington v. Honry Elliott, claim i' 453. 3s 3a, mid Henry Elliott r. John Pilkington, claim £910 Ss lOd, was extended to the Bth prox. | XV. H. CossELL v. Tk Hemera.—Claim, £32, on a promissory note.—Mr E. Cooper for the plaintiff, and Mr Dufaur for the dofendant.—The case was heard last Courtday, and His Honor now gave judgmont for tho amount claimed, with £5 12s costs. Tho Monkey Case.—Judgment For Twonty-fivo Pounds. Jas. L. Tuksbr v. John- Adams.— Claim, £100, damages.—The case was heard last Court-day, and His Honor now gave judgment. He said":—This is an action brought on behalf of nn infant to recover damages for injuries sustained in consequence of having been bitten by a monkey, the property of tho defendant. The right of tho plaintiff to recover seems to turn upon two points. First, supposing that an animal of this kind is an animal of a domostic nature like ft dog, it would be necessary that the plaintiff should prove that tho defendant was aware of the danger, ous character of this particular individual animal. Or, again, the caso might bo looked at in another way— although it is not distinctly raised in the statement of particulars, but still it is left open for the defondant to raise it—viz., that this monkey belonged to tho class called "dangerous animals," and that therefore it was unnecessary to shew no particular scicnla on tho part of tho plaintiff, and, indeed, if ho had any knowledge at all, it must have been very weak. It was sot up that a monkoy belonging to tho defendant had previously attacked another child in precisoly tho same way, and that tho defendant was informed of tho fact, tho inference intended to bo drawn on tho part of the plaintiff boing that it was tho same animal that had committed ,both acts. However, the defendant alleged in the witness-box that it was a different animal that committed tho previous assault, and that he disposed of italmost immediately afterwards. Ho also called a witness, who said that he was the person who disposod of it. I supposo on that view of tho fact*, the animal which caused tho injuries—the subject of this action —must bo held to have been a different animal from that one. I find it has been hold that whore the defondant, immediately after his dog has bitten tho plaintiff, promises to have it destroyed orotherwise to dispose of it, that that is evidence of knowledge on his part. In this case, the evidence shews that tho defendant not only did dispose of this monkey, which caused the damage, but that he also immediately afterwards disposed of somo others that lie had in his possession. I must be justified, therefore, in saying that this shows some knowledge on his part, and so it entitles me to give judgment for the plaintiff. The evidence on another point, nowever, more strongly justifies me in finding judgment in this way, for it was shewn that the monkey in regard to small children is a dangerous animal, and in this case wo find that while this particular monkey in question attacked the plaintiff, one belonging to the defendant attacked a child also on a different occasion. Therefore it was not necessary strictly to prove any individual knowledge with regard to the one now under notice. Judgment must be for the plaintiffs, and it seems to me that £25 will not exceed the injuries sustained ; and I leave out of that estimate the medical expenses incurred for the plaintiff, which Mr Justice Coleridge holds cannot be recovered in a case of this kind. Judgment will therefore be for the plaintiff for £25.— This judgment also carried with it the costs, which amounted to £8 19s.

Wm. Stranghan v. The Blackmoue G.M. Company.—Claim, £64, salary.—Mr Earl for the plaintiff, and Mr James Russell for the defendant.—The plaintiff was mine manager of the Blackmorc G.M. Company (Tiki), and his claim was for salary, at the rate of £4 per week, from July 10th, 1882 to October 28th of the same year. Tho defence was that in July, 1882, tho plaintiff agreed to let his salary be dependent upon the mine yielding gold which it did not. This plea was denied, and it was further affirmed that tho mine did yield gold within the dates specified.