NAPOLEON IN EGYPT.

Auckland Star, Volume XV, Issue 3795, 28 August 1882, Page 2

NAPOLEON IN EGYPT.

(Fkom "Tins Melbourke Aac")

Now that Knglish troops have actually began the armed occupation of Egypt, it will be of some interest to retrace tbc history of Napoleon's conquest of that country in. 1798. Tha French despatches tor this period are very full, and Napoleon himself bas given a partial his'ory of tho expedition, and wrot6 answers to several of the criticisms that were made upon his military oonduet in undertaking it, in carrying it through, and finally iv abandoning it. 'Napoleon's objects, as stated by himself, were to make Egypt a French colony, to establish an outlet for French cornmorco in the East, and to provide a fortified post from which India might be invaded. He always denied that the destruction of trie French fleet by poison was necessarily fatal to the occupation of isgypt, and maintained that an army of 30,000 French ought to have held it against all coiners, so long as they were on good terms with the natives, he was moat' careful to conciliate the rsligious prejudices of tho people hb was invading. Ho affected tlie warmest: sympathy with Mohammedanism, and held out hopes that he might be converted, a« General Melnou und several hundred soldiers actually were. He refused to give any increase of toleration to the Coptic Cnristians, He'called General Fugiercs sharply to' account for chastising the inhabitants of Tanta, one of ' tho places where Europeans have lately been massacred. " I should consider it," writes Napoleon, "the greatest possible misfortune to see this place, which is regarded by all tbe Kast a3 holy, ravaged by our troops." Throughout, in fact, Napoleon conducted himself as a conqueror who was only at war with the Mameluke", who came to deliver the native population, and who wished to gain its affection's. Tho fablo which an English Conservative psiper has circulated, that the French inaugurated the captui's of * lexandria by a frightful ma«sacre, is absolutely at variance with facts, and has long ago been discarded by all reputable historians. " Alexandria," s»ys Bourienne, who was an eye-witness of the capture, "was Hot handed ' over to pillage, as has often been said . . .

Qn the contrary, Bonaparte marked his entry into Alexandria by acts of humanity and generosity.' Berthier, in his official report, telh the exact truth on this subject." Now and then, no doubt, when an example had to be made, Napolep,n struck * sharp blows and was pitiless. He quelled a dangerous revolt at Cairo by a massacre iv the streets, and by executing a hundred or more in cold blood ; and be stopped brigJindago in tho desert by a bloody razzia, in which bis aide-de-camp killed every male in the offending tribe, and brought back the heads for public exhibition in Cairo. How far this union of moderation and vigour was successful has been disputed. Kle"bor wrote word, soon after Napoleon left the country; " Though Egypt is apparently quiet, she is anything but resigned ; the people is restless, and whatever we may do, considers us only as the enemies of its property; its heart i« always open to the expectation of a change for the better." Napoleon wrote in reply, to this;—" The behaviour of the.

•Egyptians during the Syrian war left no doubt that the people was wall disposed; but it must not have any auxiety about, religious matters, and the- Ulcmas must bo conciliated." There is little doubt that Napoleon's view was the truer, and that the Kgypiians rapidly became reconciled to French" rule. Many of them, indeed, took Berrice in the French army, and 500 or COO followed the French eagles to France, wheu Egypt was evacuated in 1801.

Napoleon estimated the force necessary ft* conquering and holding Egypt at about 30,000 man. He took more than this number with him (33,000), when it was an object to economise troops, and tic laboured to proro that the army after he had left it never fell much below thi» level. At that time the population of Egypt was half what it is now; the Mamelukes only numbered 12,000 mcD, and the Arabs, who were counted by tens of thousands, were only an undisciplined rabble. The real obstacles to a conquest were the deserts and inundations of the Wile, Desaix, whom Napoleon sent on iiamediatelv after lauding, wrote to him from Xl Beiduh, "If all the army dues not traverse the desert with lightning speed ( it will be destroyed. It will not find water enough for a thousand men." Napoleon himself has contrasted his own operations with those of St. Louis in 1250, and has explained why he succeeded where St. Louis failed. "Having disembarked (Ist July) at Alexandria, Napoleon, he writer, "was master of Caho and of all Lower Egypt by the Ist of August; by the Ist of January, 1799, he. was master of all Egypt." "If Napoleon had behaved in' 1793 as St. Louis did in 1250, if he had spent July, August, September, October, November and December without leaving Alexandria, he would have fouud insurmountable obstacles in January and February. JDamanhur, Ilahmaniah, Kosetta, would * have been fortified; Ghizeh, Cairo, would have been entrenched and hiiatling with guns and troops; 12,000 Mamelukes, 20,000 Arabs, 50,000 Aiab Janißsarios, reinforced by the armies of Arabia, See., would have foiled all the efforts of the French army, and it would have had to re-embark." In fact, no sooner had the floods subsided in Upper Egypt than Detaix was s»nt with a small force (September) to prevent the fugitive Mamelukes from forming a new army in thut province. At that time the population and resources of Upper Kpypt were comparatively insignificant. The recent bombardment of Alexandria, by Sir Bcauchamp Seymour took placo early in July. Inasmuch as no preparations had'been made to support it, it has not yet been possible for an English army to march upan Cairo. The 18th of August is the day when the inundation of the Nile is supposed to reach iv height in Cairo ; and much of the country below will bo impassable, excopt in boats, for some weeks afterwards. Unles?, therefore, the .English commander should venture on a sudden daah with the troops at his disposal, it seems probable that the English, like Sr, Louis, will have to remain inactive, though we may hope not for so long a time, i rabi Pasha has undoubtedly stayed neir Alexandria in order to hinder the occupation of Cairo; the country is rising behind him, and Kir Garnet Wolspley may perhaps have to encounter the difficulties Napoleon has described, and may find Dauianhur, Rahuianieh, Ghizeh and Cairo fortified when he arrives. .Besides these, Mit Ghamr, halt-way between Damietta and Cairo, is described in a report by General Vial as a good military pcsltion, with an old but strong wall, which could easily be bo fortified as to command the eastern course of the Nile. Cairo will not be in danger from the Indian troops just landed at Suez unless they are able to march upon it at once, as the iloods extend to within 45 mile 3of Suez. Under any circumstance A rabi Pasha can operate with his whole forces from Cairo upon either British division- tho one at Alexandria, or that at Suez. On the other hand, if he is beaten by the main force in front of him under fair G»rnet WolseL-y, his flank will be menaced by the division at Suez. On the whole, it seems that England ia beginning a war against a better army than Napoicon encountered in Egypt, with smaller forces than N»poleen disposed of, with nothing to hope from the support of the people, and with the season unfavourable to military operations. We must not be distppointed if there are «ome checks and even some roverses before the triumph of the British arms is assured. If, however, theereat powers and Turkey vrill remain absolutely neutral, the issue of a war between Great Britain and Kgypt cannot be doubtful in the long run.