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Auckland Star, Volume X, Issue 2890, 21 July 1879, Page 2

The new Representation Bill has at length been brought down. It is framed, as before intimated, upon the basis of population, and awards to country districts a proportion of 25 per cent relative to population higher than to town districts, Looking at the scattered nature of rural constituencies, and the area included in an electorate, it will be admitted that this proportion is not too much. The Bill contains sixteen clauses. Clause 2 provides for the election of a certain number of representatives of the House of Representatives (in addition to Maori members) the number being left for the House to fill in. After a dissolution or other determination of the existing House, the General Assembly is to continue for three years, to be compiled from the day fixed for the return of the first writ, unless the Assembly shall be sootier dissolved. The Act also constitutes a Board, composed of the Speakerof the House, Colonial Secretary, Chairman of Committees of the House, Comptroller, and Auditor-General, and Resii strar-Gencral, to be called the Representative Board, any three to form a quorum, and exercise the functions of the Board, which may make rules for the conduct of its business. Within three months after the end of the present session of parliament, and within three months after the taking of every census, the Board is to divide the colony into Electoral Districts equal to the number of members to be elected, exclusive of Maori members, the districts being as far as possible arranged so that only one member shall be elected for each of the districts. Electorates are of two classes, country and town. Boroughs having a population of over G,500 soul*, forming each one town district, or divided into two or more—but where the population of the borough is less than that number, it may be included in a country district or in one or more contingent borough. The remainder of the population of the colony will be divided into country districts ; the total number of members elected for these bearing to the aggregate population a proportion exceeding by as nearly as possible 25 per cent, the proportion borne by the total number of members elected for the town districts to the aggregate population of town districts. The Board is to divide the aggre--gate population of country districts by the total number of members, and the result obtained will be called the " nominal number for country districts," a similar course being adopted in respect to town districts. The division of the colony into Electoral Districts is alsojto be effected so that each country district and town district shall contain a population as nearly as possible equal to the normal number respectively. The Board may divide the olony into districts at its discretion, aud its division ' will be iinal. Though the census returns will be sufficient evidence as to population, the Board may,in its discretion, take other evidence. The Board is to report to the Goveruor, and tho names and boundaries will be gazetted, a day being fixed for the division to take effect. If necessary, the Governor may appoint officers to form new rolls, the mimes of electors entitled to vote immediately before the division of the districts, ——* «_,__« jiii...th-._, now__ r011.... and.

tricts constituted under the Act, the Board may remove his name if he does not appear to be sufficiently qualified. New rolls are to be published and frill take effect from and after the day ttf the dissolution or expiration of Parliament. Writs for the election of members of the new parliament are to be issued when new rolls have befen published. Rolls constituted untier the Act are to remain in force until the dissolution or expiration of the parliament existing at the time when the division was made, but if at any time it shall appear to the Governor to be necessary to summon a parliament before the first or subsequent division of the colony into electoral districts and new rolls published, he may issue writs as if no such division or rolls had been made, and no election will take place under the Act until after a dissolution of expiration of parliament next succeeding the parliament in which such division shall have been effected, and in that case, immediately on such dissolution or expiration, the Governor shall appoint the officers before-mentioned, and the electoral rolls then in force for the election of members of the Assembly will be the rolls from which the new electoral rolls will be formed. The Act is not to interfere with the Maori Representation Act of 1867 and its amendments.

The subject of Representation has so often been discussed in these columns, that it is not necessary to .enter into any discussion of the reasons which support a system regulated by population. It is of the highest importance that the representation of the country should be removed from the sphere of political inlluence, and placed upon a self-regulating principle—and none appears more equitable than the apportionment of a member to a fixed number of inhabitants. Though the change will give a greater balance of power to some Middle Island districts, it is impossible to resist the right of the most populous centres to demand are-adjustment. The means of correcting the evils we labour under must be found in another direction ; and that, wc bolicve, is in a measure supplied by the proposal to make parliaments triennial, bringing members more under the control of the people. Auckland is in its present position to-day because of the incapacity of its members rather than from their numbers. The interests of the province have been lost in self-sec king and narrow petty personal caprice often persisted in under tho high-sounding title of "independence," to tho breaking up of Auckland's combined power, and the damage of the primary interests of the community at large. Parliament is continually nut of harmony with the feeling of the country, and as the gentlemen chosen ;is representatives are very ordinary mortals, whose opinions will not bo accepted as oracular by the masses of the people, the oftener they are sent to give an account of their stewardship and renew their vows the better. We would rather trust the masses of the people who have no axe to grind, no friend to serve, with the endorsement or condemnation of the policy and administation of a Government than we would place such power in the hands of a political body, the disinterestedness of a great part of which is more than suspected and whose wisdom, hereditary or acquired from experience or education, is of an indill'ercut kind. The individual who places his own opiniou very high above the common judgment of the people belongs to that general class which is broadly described as fools and rogues. Objection to more frequent appeals to the couutry must, therefore, rest largely on the ground that the propogation of ono or other of these divisions of humanity is a matter of State concern.