THE GERMAN PERIL IN POLAND.

While people are contemplating the, Russian menace to Poland, the German peril to the new Republic is just as' real and much harder to fight, according to mid-European correspondents of the British and French Press, who point out- that, the present position of Poland is very different from what was foreseen last June by President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George, and' Mr Clemen' ceau, when, its safety within the fron-t-ies fixed for it by the Treaty, of; Versailles was "admittedly dependent on tlie; capacity cif the League of Nations to uphold the rights of the weak and on the complete disarmament- of Germany." Hence it should be the positive and persistent policy of the Allies to give ijew Poland a base strong enough to withstand the challenge of any adversary, according -to one British authority* on Polish affairs, who would have the Allies keep well in mind the immense political-possibili-ties of Poland which, placed between Germany and Russia, is undoubtedly "the key-State of Europe," and the "centre, of gravity will lie neither at Paris nor at Moscow, neither at Lettdon nor at Berlin: it lies at Warsaw." Can Poland's access to the sea be regarded as secure now, asks a Warskw correspondent of the London Tjnies, in face of a German army of more than a million men and of the doubts that - overhang.,the future of the League? Of the 'dangers threatening" Poland from east and west, that from Germany is infinitely -the greater in the view of this, writer, who believes that : the- Polos are fully able to beat the Bolshevik if they receive sufficient munitions and equipment for their arniv.

The writer says that the German menace is not one which' can be met by armed--force;.'. He proceeds : "The strong . men wlip, with or without the Government, control the fortunes of Germany to-day, the chiefs of the military caste and the capitalists, do- not intend that Poland shall exist for moi'e than a . season as an independent State. The plan is to prevent it from ever becoming strong, except under Gepnan influence. Poland is to be a stepping-stone to Russia. lii pursuance of this policy half a dozen new railway lilies were planned and partially, built. A new scheme; for reorganising the railway station at "Warsaw for the speedier handling of goods traffic was thought out. The Vistula and the Bug were surveyed with an , eye : to their development for barge traffic; the prospects were found good, and docks were started at 'Block and.other places. On the other hand, the Lodg textile mills and hundreds of other factories were stripped of all their most valuable machinery, the Germans openly avowing their- intentionof squashing these possible rivals." . The general Jines of this policy are still held in' view,, according to this Warsaw t } • and it. is the German aim to prevent in .©verv • .possible way the consolidation of Poland. As means to this :end, strikes are* encouraged; communist agitation fostered, and-political squabble incited. We read » "At the same time, if the Toles; canf be induced to accept the help of German experts to organise their advantage is to be, taken of the .opportunity to establish' German: influence in. Poland as strongly as it was established in Russia when the-war broke out: the Prussian officials in Posnania were open- i ly encouraged to remain at their posts for this purpose. The Prussian Poles are to lie- discouraged and discontented, by having -everyflaw ■ and -weakness in the Polish methods of administration held under theiiu, noses and contrasted with Prussian (efficiency. The Polish market is to be flooded with products, i of German manufacture, and German i. nanital is to b'd skilfully used. to establish controlling influence l in every big enterprise that 'the Poles mav undertake. Motor cars, agricultural machinery, and' every sort .of manufactured goodsj- from to fountain pens,

aro- now ■ being offered in Poland by i Germans at prices at least 60 per cent..; lower than. anything which Entente countries can produce. The comparatively favorably rate oi' exchange bc- , tweeu Polish: and German marks, of course; helps the' German. It is to hia ' advantage that the. Polish currency should stav: so low that the Poles can-, -not afford "to buy from .England, iTrance or America, and there is a good deal of evidence that the market has b,eon manipulated by German agents with this object." No efFort is spared to render Poland I-dependent upcHi Germany, whose policy is to gain economic. and. political conl troll Thus the correspondent writes: — l "The way in which the German authorities have persistently hindered the I Poles from enjoying free use ol Danzig lor "import and export, and the careful steps they have taken to remove from ■ the'port everything that could be of use to the Polos! (all', in defiance of the terms of the Treaty) are just one more example of German determination to prevent Poland from developing normally. The wretched Poles are to be shepherded into making a mess of their country, and then, when they are quite helpless, the Prussian will step in and run ;it for them."

A't first sight it would seem easy enough far the Poles to avoid these pitfalls, it. is admitted, but the trouble is that some men in Poland would "welcome this solution of Poland's difficulties." Though the mass of the people detest the Germans, "Gefmany has her friends in Poland,." Then there are others among the Poles of Galicia who, "without being definitely pro-German, are yet so accustomed toywork'ir'g with the Germans, using Get-man methods, and tliinkiUg on German®Tihes -that they retain their old orientation, almost unconscious of the fact that there are alternatives." .For example:—"Mr Bilinski. though lie has done Poland a service by straightening her financial organisation during his period of office as Minister, is one of the Galicians whose connection with Germany proved to be too strong for the welfare of'his country. .-He showed a decided preference for .dealing-with Germany rather than Great Britain in purchasing locomotives, even though in this case the British conditions were highly, ' favorable to the Poles. It will be impossible for the Poles to set aside every official who served Austria or every man who collaborated with the Germans in the kingdom from 1916 to 1918, but both Poland and'her Allies must beware of the danger -which lies in seeking; help [from an enemy. It must lie admitted, however, that only too often there are initial advantages to 1 be won for Poland by looking to Germany. The Allies waste months in deciding whether Poland's demands are justified, how they can be met, and who is to meet them. The Allies are very expensive. The Germans are cheap and prompt." The Allies have friends in Poland who will support their connection with Poland- through thick and thin rather than risk dependence on Germany, this Warsaw informant goes .on to say, hut there are others, equally patriotic, who see their country's ®eeds and who, if the Allies ar-e not ready with help, will turn elsewhere for it, and we read:—"General Pilsudski, the Chief of State, is no respecter of formalities where the welfare of this country is concerned. He left the Gejynans in the lurch without warning wrren they would serve Poland's ends no longer, though it meant withdrawing his brigade from the front in the middle of a battle. He has made the Germans serve his purpose once before in the Polish cause; he may do so again. If he does so ho will count on himself to see that Polish independence does not suffer, hut the Allies' conception of Poland as 5 barrier state between Germany and Russia will go by the board." '

A Warsaw correspondent of tho London Morning -Post charges tlie enforced resignation of Pademvsk-i as Polish Premier to a parliamentary coup, manoeuvred, by Mr Bilinski antl his pro-German sympathisers. They were determined to drive from power the man who "personified Polish feality to the Allies," and to enthrone General Pilsudski as the? single suprepie figure, in tlie State. But, says this correspondent, they had no means of gauging what the effect upon the country would be, and ho pro-ceeds:-—"No Polish constitution has' ever, been enacted, -ami the present Diet is merely as representative a. body as it was possible to assemble in the chaos of twelve months ago. Its membership is composed not of representatives. chosen at polling-booths l>v voters, hut of representatives of political 'clubs' from those sections definitely recognised by the Peace Conference as Polish. Hence when the pro-Germans took the momentous step of turning out Paderewski they knew that ,tliey had made -a parliamentary success, but they did not know at all how accurately the Diet reflected that , public opinion with which before much more time had gone by they would inevitably have to reckon in a properly organised election.- It was in consequence of this uncertainty that /Bilinski and his following were seized with mild f eight and were prompted to allow the present colorless, non-commit-tal Government to take office." Two main arguments offered to the Poles in favor of an alliance with the Germans are thus described: ".Recalling the days of the German occupation, it is asked. Were you- happier then or now? You had plenty of lood then because the Germans introduced an equitable system of rationing; your business flourished because the Germans ordered and paid; prices were moderate because the Germans guaranteed the Polish mark; there were quiet and plenty and comfort under the Germans, but to what pass liaye 12 months in the role of an Allied protege brought you? The other cliie!" pro-German argument is that owing to- the collapse of the Polish mark- - due, it is contended, to Allied interference—Poland lias no choice but to. turn'at last economically to Germany. At the moment, Pilsudski has to' all purposes and single power. Pilsudski will do nothing which he does not. believe helpful to the- Polish , State; tho Allies are nothing to him, save as they may bo brought to serve the Polish cause; Germany, with*'Pilsudski, is in no better case. But lie cn r joys that supreme and single power which invariably is congenial to the military instinct, and lie enjoys it., by virtue of the Austrian, the pro-Ger-man Party, the activities of which he has not tried at any time to impede." The strength of the pro-German 'elements in Poland is' indicated by the Morning Post's who points to the lour million Jews in the country who will "for a host of reasons incline to any party or policy favoring 'pro-Germanism." and lie proceeds: "There is not a little socialism in the industrial centres of Poland, and that vote will support Germanisation. The extensive portions of the country . formerly Austrian- will pay tribute to Austrian leniency in thb old days by endeavoring probably to establish Poland as Austria's heir in Europe. And then there is the army. 600,000 strong, blindly holding Pilsudski as its hero, largelv commnndcd by officers of the Pilsudski Loyal Legion. But though these elements —Socialist, Jews, Austrians, tho Army—add up 'to a : formidable total, it is to be remembered that there, are 35.000,000 persona within the frontiers already defined bv the Peace Conference as Polish. # Altogether the Bilinski clique saw thr.t tliev had need of propaganda." ' Their campaign has. for .some time been in full swing and "from one end of-this county to the-other, from Lcmberg to Danzig, from Posen to Vilna, doctrines not. only of anti-Allyism. but doctrines, of' outright, frankly avowed . pro-Germanism are being preached." . Aire being preached," the writer States,j "through newspapers, through paid through political clubs, through hired orators. Nor is the arnij being-neglected in the great pro-Ger- ■ man drive that-is. being pushed forward, not. merely bj; Polish politicians, but, beyond the faintest vestige of doubt, by thousands of wbrkere settled in Poland during the last year by- the Berlin, .Government. The intelligence section; of. the Polish Government iiad at one time not long ago the names of ■ five thousand well-identified ' German agentsnothing is. easier than to point out any day men -dining in the first restaurants of Warsaw who are. known to be in regular receipt 1 of funds; from | the German Exchequer; equally, minj gling with- the. .thousands which 3aily; i:±roop to the-public works,, undertaken' by. the Polish. Government to- relieve tlie unemployment problem, are hundreds of subsidised emissaries from Ber-

,> gii ' 1 | Im. Pio-GemiHiDsiH m Polund, m.]i » | -affiliated wilh, 'but lieither crushed im> " | spurned by Pilsudski,, is not i-ontom' ' i dimply to -.tippling•' I PaderetvtsUi. "'lt is out to.W'in deiniit(.| v I and decisively if it cau/.V } ; ; •' '! '.I jf',rt,uy, ; • V 1 [ "What muddle .superfluous prepay. tion makes.''—tttanus. Certainly be prepared, tor wise pre. paration means also tills battle .hatf ; won ; L"::t superfluous preparation j 8 ju. advised. Always be prepared during ■ winter time, wiiicht<j the is clironic cough and cold time, tor's Lung Preserver is. ample prk • paration, for this sterling remedy 18 „ ■■ tture, sale and prompt remedy, j't n j p| the trouble in the bud and fo'rtific ß •against the return-visit. Tho lionifi that knows "Baxter's" is cough and told, proof. Get large , bottle ot' thi« 64-year-old specific to-day. IS 0 ( ] al chemist and store.