POLAND & DANZIG

REBUFF TO THE REICH

HITLER WATCHES AND WAITS

"TIME IS NOT RIPE"

! (By "Sencx.") j ; Speaking on tlie Danzig question in = ; the Kouso of Lords thi& week, the - ' Foreign Seer. .y. ViseuUi.i Haitiax. -" declared ihal and -restraint. 1 , were needed "if dangerous eonse-; . . queiiees were lo De avoided." Thai: 1 1 statement, in the midst of an apparent j *! lull, raises the Danzig issue to the - j front of British problems, eclipsing! even the tension a\ the Far East. . i -\ - When all the even Is ol reeern, weeks i ■ are scanned there appeal's little doubt; - that last March the i-'oies saved them- j - selves, as the Czechs saved themselves ?in May of last year. By a lightning) = mobilisation after the Memel coup they t" revealed to Hitler that the occupation "■ of Danzig would not merely mean one more bloodless parade for his i mechanised army, and that if the Free I City was going to be included in " Greater Germany it would be brought - there by force. Within a day the * Poles had 250,000 men under arms, * within a lew days they had a declarai tion of support from Britain, and a - little later they had incorporated that promise of support into a pact of mutual I assistance. It was a swift and deter- ■ mined move of the sort that Hitler had • encountered only once before; when he i was facing the, Czechs. But this time i it was backed up by public state-] • ments on the part of British leaders ■ much more definite than any of the hints which were given by Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax and Sir John Simon between May and September of last year. Poland received a definite pledge of aid from Britain, and if * Britain did not honour this promise she would be finished in Europe. A ■ move against Danzig would have the • effect of provoking a general war. ] And as Hitler wants a war no more ' than anyone else he held his hand. NOT WORTH A BIG WAR. From the point of view of total ; German needs Danzig is not worth a major conflict. From the point of view 'of East Prussia it is worth all that • Hitler can do to get it. But he can : win Danzig only by crushing Poland, ; and while he undoubtedly can crush Poland if he is allowed to deal with : her in his own way, even that conquest would prove expensive. To put it briefly, it would probably cost Hitler : 300,000 men to conquer Danzig. And 'at that price (apart altogether from * the other possibilities such a move would create) it is too dear. But the Poles took no chances. At the end of April they had called up more men, and after Hitler denounced the Polish-German Pact because he declared Poland had refused to negotiate, when what Poland had done was to reject his proposals for German 1 status for Danzig and an extraterritorial highway of the sort the Czechs were forced to grant after Munich, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin was called home to help-the drafting of the reply to the Fuhrer. The German attitude was now one of apparent confidence, Danzig was "in her pocket," any temporising was rejected as impossible, and the intervention of Britain and France —the admission of their right to adjudicate in a dispute over "German territory"—was unthinkable. But at the same time, the Nazis were content to wait. They had good reason to do so. For in the first place negotiations were proceeding between Britain and Russia for a ' mutual assistance pact which any move by Germany might quickly call into being. And in the second case tlie Russians were approaching the Poles. Early in May the Soviet Government moved its Ambassador at Athens. M. Nicholas Sharanov, to Warsaw, where the post of Russian representative had been unfilled for some time —in fact, : ever since the disappearance of the former Ambassador at the height of ' one of the Russian purges. At that time the whole Embassy staff was also changed, and a young secretary began to act <as charge d'affaires. ' CLOSER RELATIONS. This could mean only one thing.: that Russia and Poland were moving closer together. Added to this was the fact that Poland had been making over- : tures to the Baltic nations which, a little earlier, had been reported as willing to accept a German non-aggres-sion pact. And added to that was the move by the Russians for a Black ■ Sea pact, which seemed likely to sue- ; ceed, and thus link Russia and Turkey, ( and possibly Rumania, whatever the fate of the Anglo-Russian negotiations. So, though the Corridor is unfortified, and though military experts do not believe that Poland would attempt to defend it for fear of being caught be- ' tween the pincers of the German East ' Prussian forces, on the west, and the main Reich forces to the east. Hitler \ did not act. He was halted by two ; things, the immense wave of patriotism which surged through Poland and brought out even the racial minorities in full force in answer to the mobilisa- . tion orders, and the fear of facing an- ■ other war on two fronts .On May 7 he was reported from a well-informed source to have told his lieutenants that "the time is not ripe for action." He still hopes to come to terms with a Polish Government which will grant more than popular opinion today would allow. And he hopes, also, to pursue his familiar methods of intimidation, boring from within, and propaganda in the countries which might link their ] military destiny to that of Warsaw. < Thus in Britain there has been heard . the suggestion, and in responsible quarters, that "Danzig really is not worth ' a war." And immediately the German 1 Press campaign against the Poles _ slackened, returning to the former < sniping in place of a barrage. At this moment the Fuhrer took advantage of j n call upon him by Monsignor Cesare J Orsenigo, Papal Nuncio to Germany, to suggest tliat if the Pope would use * his good offices in the dispute there ! would (it is reported) be some change : in tho Nazis' attitude towards the " Catholic Church in Germany, especi- ] ally in relation to teaching and finance. CONVERSATIONS WITH RUSSIA. < This was followed by conversations between Colonel Beck, Polish Foreign \ Minister, and M. Vladimir Potemkin, ( the . Russian Vice-Commissar for r Foreign Affairs, which reassured the \ Soviet as to Poland's intentions (the s Russians have long had a sneaking feeling that Poland really would not \ fight), and at which it was determined t to extend the trade and barter agree- ( ment which the two countries made ] some time ago. Meantime, the Poles t took their stand on their original atti- s tude towards the Danzig question: that -^ they would not listen to suggestions of € German annexation, and that they s would not consent to a German high- x way being carved across the Corridor s and thus cutting them off from the sea. . There was a violent Press campaign on this point, and Colonel Beck insisted t that the two fundamentals of any c settlement were unhindered access to i: the Baltic and control of the mouth of x the Vistula River. The Poles claim, c (with great emphasis, that German in- c

terest in Danzig is due, to questions of prestige and ethnology, while Polish interest is that Danzig is part of her vital economy and not to be surrendered to any Power with ambitions of empire.