DANZIG INCIDENTS.

FORMING A "PEACE FRONT."

(Br PERTTNAX.) PARIS. May 2.J. The Nazi attack? upon Polish Customs officials in the Danzig- area are causing uneasiness here on account of their systematic and deliberate character. If they are really part of a concerted plan it is difficult to believe that Heir Hitler will placidly put up with the Xote delivered to the Danzig Senate by the Polish General Commissioner. The incident is a timely reminder to British, French and Russian rulers that their methods of protracted discussion are out of date and a tripartite agreement must either be concluded without further delay or it will come too late to act as a deterrent and will be of use only as an instrument of war. An effort is likely to be made in London to persuade Mr. Chamberlain not to wait until Wednesday to reach a. decision about the compromise M. Daladier suggested to Lord Halifax on Saturday to reconcile British and Russian views about the co-operation of Soviet Russia with the Western Powers. Lord Halifax is personally convinced that, the French plan must be acted upon a* soon as possible, and most of the other members of the Cabinet share his opinion. But for Mr. Chamberlain, (lie adoption of M. Daladier's scheme means the abandonment of his conception of o "i/ieacc front'' and the coming in of a coalition of the old type In fact it is impossible to find out in what respect Mr. Chamberlain's, so-called '•Peace Front." if it were to be really effective, ! would differ from the coalitions of'the past, i Pledges of Assistance. Innovations urged by M. Daladier upon the ' British Cabinet's acceptance can be summarised as follows: Firstly, hitherto Mr. Chamberlain wished to limit co-operation with Russia to Eastern Europe, and he only admitted an indirect, bond witii Moscow, a bond arising from the fact that as regards Poland and Rumania guarantees given by Britain and France would mingle with a similar guarantee to be given by Russia. According to M. Daladier's suggestion, the bond would become a direct one, since Britain. France and- Russia would issue a joint declaration of mutual assistance. , Secondly, those three great Powers would be committed to assist each other not only i if a. direct attack had been launched on any ] one of them, but. in addition, if aggression j had befallen any State bordering upon Ger- j many. Thus on the above two points an i important advance towards the Russian thesis I can be noticed. However, the demands put j forward by Moscow are lx>ing submitted by M. Daladier to two noteworthy restrictions.

Firstly. Estonia and Latvia, which do not border on Germany, are being excluded from the defensive c-vstem. Lithuania only would be taken in. Secondly, in case of a. direct attack upon the territory of one of the three signatories, the pledge of mutual assistance would have to he enforced automatically. But if the attack was indirect, that is. if it was directed against one of the States bordering upon Germany, a diplomatic consultation would have to he held between Britain. France and Russia to ascertain whether a vital interest of one of those three Governments had been jeopardised or impaired and whether a warlike counter-move could be deemed necessary. The probabilities are that Stalin and Molotoff and their advisers will not, easily comply with those two restrictions. They will probab'.v argue that the inclusion of Lithuania in the defensive system is not really a concession made to the Russian standpoint since last April. Colonel Beck was given in London the assurance that the political and territorial integrity of Lithuania would be regarded as of vital interest to Poland. Moreover, they will explain that Estonia and Latvia are bulwarks of Russian independence in the same manner as Lithuania is the bulwark of Polish independence. Moscow must be sure that Franco-British support would be available to her. Moreover, a. sea attack on Estonia and Latvia cannot be absolutely ruled out and described as a mare's nest.

Diplomatic Consultation. As to safeguards provided against the alleged excessive automatism of the Anglo-French-Russian contemplated arrangements, Soviet diplomacy can be expected to criticise the idea of a diplomatic consultation whereby unavoidably a ~ood deal of time would be wasted. The word "automatism" has been invested by'too many people with a meaning it does not possess when applied to the execution of international commitment*. Indeed, every sovereign State, whatever are the treaties to which it is a party, always retains the rijrht to decide independently of any other country, whether circumstances have arisen which justify the iit-e of military power.

Therefore under a tripartite pact of mutual assistance, each of the three Rllie.* will be able to past; judgment upon the casus foederis and therefore to stipulate that a procedure of diplomatic consultation should l>e followed. This arrangement would deprive the new system of security of all power of immediate reaction, which is clearly a necessity of the present situation. The Western democracies must try to match the swiftness of decision which is a feature of the dictatorial regimes or thev will be overwhelmed.— ((.'opvnHlt • .VAX.A.) °