POLAND CRIED "CHECK" AT DANZIG.

SEIZURE PLANNED.

WAR HUNG ON HAIR TRIGGER

RUSSIA'S INTEREST IN POLISH BUFFER. (By WALTER DIRANTY.) WARSAW. May 14. I find this, country surprising. It may surprise Herr Hitler. t,>o. In Moscow it wa* generally thought that th? Poles were unlikely to light for Danzig, that some compromise would !*■ reached more or lcr-s at the Po'.ir-h expense whereby Herr Hitler would once more obtain his objective without war. Colonel Beck's spec h began to change this view, and in Kiga—where similar notions had prevailed — there war- tiie same change, but yet more developed. But there are still sceptic* who r-ay that the Poles are never so affirmative as when they intend to yield or that the Poles could work themselves up but have not the stamina, or that Colonel Beck is too wily to fight, much le-s to put his trust in Mr. Chamlverlain. But Poland gives a different impre-sion. There are no simis of excitement, no "grim-faced heroes marching" or the display of patriotic fervour we read about in Prague last September. But Poland has a million men under arms and not only Poles, but the minorities, the Belo-Russiatis. Ckrainian-. .lews, Lithuanians joined the colours 100 per cent when the order came. Poland Took a Lesson.

The Government and the people take the stand that Danzig means access to the sea and therefore i„ vital to Poland. They proceed on the assumption that war is inevitable unle-s Herr Hitler back pedals, which he has never done before, and foreign observers say that the Polish Army has already taken up combat po-itions according to a longprepared war plan and is ready for instant act ion. Curiously enough there seems little doubt that Poland was caught badly unaware* by Hen- Hit lei's leap upon Prague on March b">. Then within a. few days the Poles learnt that the farnou* Nazi motorised nine divisions which bloodles-ly conquered Austria, the Sudetcnland. Prague and Metnel were now prowling ominously along Poland's flat and far-flung frontier. On March 21 Herr von Kibbentrop in Berlin put certain ••requirements" before the Polish Ambassador. M. Li]*-ki. The Poles made no reply, but got bu-icr than ever. Without trumpets or proclamation*, reservists were quietly called up. and on the 2«tli the Pole- rejected the German demands. By that time 600,000 men were ready io meet the motorised troops. Which may help to explain the savage suddenness, of HenHitlers denunciation of the GermanPolish pact. Tt may explain, too. the sour jrrapes of the German broadcast that if Colonel Beck were wise he would take a lesson in statecraft from Dr. Benes. The answer to that one is that Colonel Beck has, but not in the way the broadcaster meant.

Self-reliant and Resolute. What also strikes one in Warsaw is that the Poles seem to rely upon themselves and have no blind, unlimited confidence in Mr. Chamberlain or M. Bonnet. They seem to think, too, that it is nearly time that one of Herr Hitler's bluffs" got called and feel that they arc ready to call it. They know that war for Germanv means the risk of much that has been won before it has been digested or consolidated. Warsaw does not under-esti.nate Herr Hitler's intelligence and believes that he will think twice before li" takes such a chance. if only he is boldly outfaced. In this the Poles agree with the Russians, and it is worth noting that Colonel Beck's two hour conversations with M. Potenikin gave lively satisfaction here. The two statesmen talk the same language, not pacts nor guarantees which neither asked for nor wanted, but about the measures to adopt if Herr Hitler carried out his threats.

Poland doe« not want Soviet troops except in a last resort, but would welcome equipment, munitions, supplies and aeroplanes. M. Potenikin, I gather. made no promise, but indicated that if Britain and France join the U.S.S.R. in a mutual alliance, then the U.S.S.R.'s resources vvoujd be gladly at Poland's disposal. Which is an interesting stroke of diplomacy. Further support came, rather unexpectedly, from poor little Lithuania, whose commander-in-chief rushed post haste to Warsaw to nee what might be done. Three weeks earlier General Laidoner, the commander-in-chief of Estonia, which is exceedingly friendly to Poland, was also in Warsaw discussing possibilities. In Riga one of my informants laid great stress on the necessity for the Baltic States to coordinate plans or the actions which they might be forced to take. He said, "If we let them attack us sepuratcly we are lost. Imagine the Lithuanian Army retreating broken upon Latvia and the effects on our morale and the confusion which that would involve. And then we should be thrown back on Estonia with similar confusion and ruin. Whereas all of us together can mass twenty or more divisions and be a real help to the Pole*."

Danzig Danger Persists. The speaker was one of the Latvian minority, which refuses to let wishful thinking hide ominous possibilities, but this minority is growing and the Baltic States are not neglecting precautions. There is the theory in some quarters outside Poland that Herr Hitler proposes to let the Danzig question drop for the time being —meanwhile seeking out other objectives. for instance, in South-eastern Europe, Hungary, Bulgaria or Yugoslavia — in the hope that the cost of mobilisation and the strain on Polish nerves will work on his behalf. That argument is scouted in Warsaw, which perhaps has reason to hope for financial support from Britain. I should say it has good reason for hope, unless Colonel Beck's hand has lost its cunning. And as for Polish nerves, I have seen no signs of them yet.

"You ask why Danzig is the gravest danger point to-day. Don't you realise that Europe was just as near war in the period from March 21 to April 6 as* in the fortnight before Munich last September. The latter crisis attracted world-wide attention, the former passed almost unheeded, but the issues at stake were similar and the war risk equally great. Moreover the Czech crisis has been settled, but the Danzig danjrer persists." This view, expressed by a high-placed foreiftn observer, is universally held in Warsaw. It appears certain that Herr Hitler intended to follow the seizure of Prajrue on March 15 and Meniel a few days later by the occupatl, n of Danzig before April 1. All three coups were Planned for the same reason, that Herr .... tl.b.cntrop had assured his chief that iMMUcr I ranee nor Britain would raise a finger to halt the Nazi legions.

"France and Britain will not fight for a small German provincial town." said von Rihbentrop about Danzig. The night of March 22 «us already chosen for a trial of an anti-aircraft "blackout" in Warsaw. A* if by accident, the blackout continued on the following night. Under cover of that double darkness the Polos called to the colours more than a quarter of a million trained reservists, A leading foreign diplomat told me how. as he felt his way iionic by the light of a pencil torch, he encountered a great column of infantry marching silently to the railway station. It wa- the same story throughout Poland, and the Ccrman demands were refused.

England Wavered—Hitler Waited. I For the next three days po<ico hung i literally on a hair while England J wavered and Heir Hitler waited. Then! the British realised that the Poles had I forced their hand, that they nni>t act before Herr Hitler moved ami war began. So on March 2'J. .Mr. I hamherlain announced that Britain would support Poland. On April 4. v'olonel Beck went to London, and on the I'.ili the official Polish guarantee tart was signed. For the time Herr Hitler was checked as he had !h>pii checked in May la-t year. As on that oeca-ioii. the S.'a/.i~ immediately bepan a triple campaign. First pres-ure and intimidation upon Poland,, secor.d propaganda in Paris and London on the lines of "Why fight about Danzig —it is Herman to begin with and is not worth a major war." Third, the attempt to stir up trouble amid-t the Polish minorities. It was an exact repetition of the tactics that sii.eeeded in (.'/.echoslovakia. It seemed that even the Pope was induced to take a hand in the Nazi*' game, for had his suggestion ol' a conference to settle Dan/.ii; been accepted, it could hardly ha\e failed to develop into a second Munich, at which the Poles and their French allie- would have been compelled to appear with blank cheques to be rilled in and signed. But Colonel Beck is not a second Dr. Bene-, and times have changed since September.' Danzig i- more than a provincial town or a place in Eastern Europe, of which Britain had never heard. To T'oland it is the key-tone of economic independence becati-e its possession by Germany would bar Poland's access to the sea and force Polish trade routes back into the pre-war ea*t to-west line instead of south to-north, thus making Poland the economic \a-sal of Germany. Nor is , that all. At the prc-cnt juncture. Danzig has become a model keystone also as a symbol of insistence to the Nazi-, lis abandonment would mean the collap-e of all hopes in. Pumania. Bulgaria and even Turkey, despite its agreement with Britain, of escaping the Cerman yoke. For such hope* —till cxi-t. despite the hold over Mittel-Europe. which Munich and its consequences and an unrivalled geographical position have given to I Germanv.

"Boiing from Within" Tactics. Perhaps. too, the Nazis underestimate the •■imponderables'' on which Bismarck laid such stre-s and fail to appreciate the effect of the seizure of Prague and Albania upon the small European Powers. Information reaching me -hows that the cynical acts of absorption of non-German and nonItalian countries have had a startling effect in the Balkans. I soon go there to find out at lirst hand. Meanwhile it is a question whether Poland will sit by tamely while the Axis carries on its triple campaign, which will probably be combined with a drive for facile -ucccsses in the Balkans. The campaign and the drive together may throw into blazing relief a new point which Moscow has already noticed, that aggression nowadays does not only mean invasion or the threat of invasion, but cover* "boring from within" among-t the minorities a- was done before in Czechoslovakia and is being done to-day between the Croats and the Serbs.

Sup|Hise the Poles decide to resist Mifh tactics actively, how would the hair-splitting minds in London interpret that in the light of their pledged commitments? As T have said, there are no .-i'jn* of popular excitement in Poland, but the anti-German sentiment burns white hot in every section of the population. Jf the Poles decide to take action they will take it whether Britain approves or not. And there was a very strong and significant article in yesterday's semi-official paper, the "Kurjer Poranny."' which calls the German* severely to account for their action in refusing police protect ion fur the funeral ceremonv of Pilsud-ki in Danzig on Fridav. '

Poland's Value to Russia. The newspaper hints that Poland will not surfer siu-h affronts or such covert hostilities without reprisals. These are times when the C.S.S.R. would approve such a stand by Poland and perhaps not withhold support. The Kremlin's policy is far from static at present and Stalin's phrase •'double blow for blow" was not mere idle words. De*pite the statements, in the recent "Isvestia" editorial that Poland and Pumania were not all of Russia's western frontier, the Kremlin knows the value of Poland as a buffer State. And it is more than a legitimate guess that the new Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw is now further developing the line which M. Potenikin took in hi« talk with Colonel Beck, that Anglo-French hesitation to come to terms with Moscow need not necessarily preclude Russo-Polish collaboration. I hinted in earlier messages that M. Litvinoff's downfall has a positive as well as a negative side. The Kremlin's decision to put an end to shilly-shallying as a grave danger in hours of crisis and iis call to Soviet pride was a gesture of self-assertion which can hardly fail to be followed as a logical process of evolution by the desire to play an active part in the game. (N.A.N.A.)