GERMANS AND POLES.

(From n Diplomatic Correspondent.) In view of tho persistent difficulties which are being placed bv the Soviet authorities in the way of communications between tho Polish plenipotentiaries at Minsk and Warsaw, it would occasion no surprise, were tho Polish Government to recall its peace delegation and suggest tho transfer of the present, negotiations to another venue, from which, either party could freely exchange views with its Government ncic ontally I lea rn that a n,Sr of Bolshevik messages have been intercepted m tho Baltic States, meS s which disclose the grave military, economic, and administrative plight of the Moscow Government, That plight is aggravated by tho failure, due to the defeats sustained by the Bolshevik army in Poland, of tho plans previously agreed to between the "Red" command and certain German organisations in East Prussia and Upper Silesia, for cooperation against both tho redeemed and unredeemed Poles. The German agitators in Tjpper Silesia aro n»w>quietcning down, having been «M abused by the collapse of their RussM confederates, whilo the impartial m™< suros, just taken by General Lerond and * the Inter-Alhed Commission for the maintenance of order in that region will tend to remove any excuse for fear of provocation by any party whatsoever It is significant, however, of the German spirit in East Prussia, as also per. haps m Berlin, that tho local authorities there, under tho pretext of Germany s obligation as a neutral to disarm and intern all such routed Bolsheviks as may lie forced across tho border aro once more urging an increase in the Reichswehr and Sicherheitzpolizei forces at their disposal. What ha s happened at Danzig should servo as a sufficient warning to tho Allied Governments against considering any such request, ror tho use to which such reinforcements could bo put is" pretty obvious. 1 hey might help to reorganise the routed Bolsheviks. They would certainly help to increase the menace to the Polish communications across tho corridor and tho Danzig Free State, to Danzig harbor.

flic rather critical situation wlncii has arisen at Danzig, owing to tho hostility to Poland of tho German population there, need not load to any fresh ntt in the Anglo-French lute, provided it bo handled in the right fashion, as I have reason to believe that it will bo handled. The German Government and the German officials of tho Freo Otatb, piously assert that the sabotago both at tho docks and on tho railways is a Communist, or at least a Socialist, demonstration, whereas it is nothing of tile kind, but a Chauvinistic one, connived at by all the German parties,and the Municipality itself. It, is, like tho ultra vires resolution passed by the Danzig Constituent Council, which interprets the. neutrality of the Freo State as entailing an embargo on tho passage oi munitions for Poland, a doliberate and unwarrantable attempt to destroy the Danzig section of the Treaty of Versailles. Tho British Foreign Office recognises this as fully as tho Quai d'Orsay. Neither does Sir Reginald Tower himself deny the absolute right of either the French or the Americans to land munitions at Danzig. He could not lawfully do so. But he can neither provide the necessary German labor nor the British troops to do the unloading; nor, again, can lie guarantee the safety of Polish or other workers engaged oil such business and the free passage of tho munitions to the Polish frontier. With 2000 British troops at his disposal lie claims, with some measure of justification, to be powerless But if our Krencli. Allies or the American warships insist, in these circumstances, upon disembarking munitions' at Danzig, they are entitled to do so, although tho Higli Commissioner cannot answer for tho consequences of such action.

It is. of course, an open question as io how far his estimate of 20.000 Allied troops as the minimum force required for the maintenance or order at the port and along the railway is correct.; Without necessarily endorsing the 'French estimate of 7000, it may bo said that German truculence at Danzig would promptly subside were the German •authorities and population convinced that stern measures of repression would follow upon any acts of violence. The presence of the Allied warships should suffice to inspire respect in this connection, and I believe that the French naval commander has instructions from his Government, which ho will duly communicate to the High Commissioner, to stand no nonsense from tho Germans. Tiio French munitions will bo landed under the protection, it need he, of a French naval brigade. Meanwhile it is quite clear that the. Allies must vindicate their own and Poland's treaty rights by giving adequate naval and military protection to the Polish dock laborers, who will have to unload tho vessels if the German dockers persist in their refusal to do so. ] seo that tho intervention of the League is invoked by some of our Paris contemporaries. But the. League, so I understand from its own officials, does not enter upon its duties as the statutory protectress of Danzig until after its constitution and the relevant convention regulating the Freo State's relations with Poland have been duly ratified by the several parties concerned, and this stage has not yet been reached. Until then tho supremo authority resides in the Allied-Council, from whom tho High Commissioner derives his exclusive executive authority for the time being. It would appear that in' Italy the Polish victories have had a marked influence upon public opinion. There is certainly an incipient revolt against the pro-Soviet .policy .among several of the bourgeois parties, Nationalists. Catholics, and also Liberals. Tin. leaders or this movement are Signer Orlando and Baron Sonnin'o. It may be recalled that- early in 1.019 Signer Orlando was envisaging a triple alliance between •Italy, Poland, and Roumania,