THE GRAND FLEET.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume LXVI, Issue 7564, 7 May 1919, Page 9

THE GRAND FLEET.

JELLICOE'S DISCLOSURES

GREAT BRITAIN'S DEADLY PERIL.

(From "Star's" Speehil Correspondent.1)

LONDON,

Feb. 14

If anything cau bring a full realisation j of the perils which beset the Old Conn- j try—and with it the Empire and the ' world during the Irst 18 months of j the war, it is the perusal of Lord Jellicoe's "The Grand Fleet 1914-1916," published this, week by Messrs Cassell and i Co. It is unfortunate that the price or this work (31/6) is prohibitive to any but those with well lined pockets, for >t is a, book that should bo read by every | Briton whilst his memories of the Great War are fresh and green. We are j through the great peril to-day, but the i disclosures in Lord Jellicoe's book have I oven now the power to make the least imaginative feel just a, little bit "creepy," and had we known what we know to-day, in those dark hours when the Germans were in the first flush of thpir onslaught on land, when our great little Expeditionary Force was being harried to s?emin^tv irremediable disaster in its retreat from Mons, we might have given vray to blnnk- despair. And if Germany had known the real condi. tion of affairs as regarded the British Na\ry, it is more than probable that the world to-day would be taking its orders from Potsdam. For thn British Navy was the mainspring; of the Allies' war machine, and it was not nearly so strong as it appeared to be on paper, nor was it "wound up" as we believed, and Germany no douibt beHfived it to be. Lord JfilliVoe'f matter-of-fact chronicle completely shatters the theory that our Fleet wps "ready" in the true sense of the word when the Avar began. It was "ready" in August, 1914. only in the sense it-hot-it was mobilised and actually art sea when war was declared. It had no safe bfli«e on the Eastern coast, and j all the conveniences for the maintenance of th"c Fleet were still in the Channel ports, which were, it would anpear, far from desirable, if not "impossible" bases for our Grand Fleet. Henf« the decision to shift thp Fle?t to the North, but. as Admiral JeHicoe puts it, " While we had shifted our Fleet to the North, all the conveniences for tV"^ rnnintenance of Ilmt Fleet were st.'ll in the Channel nort-s. There were no facilities at the base for the storage of coal either in lighters or on shore. Consequently the whole of the coal required at the base was necessarily kept on board the colliers. *M«.o, wi reniiirorl .ammunition ships. There were no facitities*at Soapa or Cromarty for storage on shore." SAFER, AT SEA. Scapa Flow has three main entrances. There were no guns covering these channels to ward off attack by destroyers. Some 12-pounder guns from the ships of the Fleet were landed, but "no searchlights could, however, be provided, so that the guns were not of much value at night"—and it was at night that destroyer attack was to be expected. As for submarine attack, which "was quite practicable by a determined sub- , marine officer" through Hoxa Sound, no ! obstruction of any kind had been invented or prepared. The Admiral pays : "1 was always far more concerned for the safety of.the Fleet when it was at anchor at Scapa Flow . . . than I was when the Fleet was at sen. "We did onr best in the Fleet to give the impression that we had obstructed the entrances, for. pending the provision of proper obstructions, we improvised various contrivances." Bluff, apparently, was the main bulwark between the Grand Fleet and j disaster for twenty-two weeks. It was not until December 29, 1914, that Hova Sound was closed by one line of proper obstruction, and it was February 19-tfi, 1915, before the third channel, Hoy Sound, had netting across it. NO MINES PROVIDED. The question naturally arises, "Why not lay minefields to keep out enemy craft?" The Admiral's answer is blunt and decisive. " We were entirely unprovided with this, particular form of defence." But that answer provokes another query: "Is anybody going to be hanged because this particular form ot defence was lacking?" A year kiter he records an increased activity on the part of Mir mine-layers, " but the success of our work was unfortunately handicapped by defects in the pattern of mine in use at that time, especially as agnmsm submarines." Yet, at that time, the Germans couM send out a mine-layer to lay 450 mine--}, which were so effective that we left them undisturbed in the Moray Firth, because,, they formed "an excel lent anti-submar-vne defence" To hoist the enemy witli his own petard is, of course, a splendid pa me, /hut to depend on his petards for I the safety of our Fleet is — the reader can supply the missing words. Equally pitiable was the condition of our mine sweeping. There were seven ships to do the whole of the work for the Grand Fleet, and they were only eld gunboats adapted for the purpose. They were sometimes ably to work ahead of the Fleet but when this was not possible, "somf* of i-he older battleships, if they wore in company, were stationed ft head of the main Battle Fleet, in order that should a minefield be encountered these older shins would be the first to striko the mines, thus giving us sufficient warning to enable me to manoeuvre the more valuable ships clear of the field." Now, get that well into your head, gentle reader. The "older battleships' 5 of tho I'th Battle Squadron were sent ahead to discover minefields by tjio simple process of running into them. The officers and mon of these exploring ships knew why they were sent ahead of the main Fleet, and with a cheery acceptance of their fate rechristened theia-* selves the "Mine-bumpers." A TWO-POWER STANDARD. On paper we could afford to risk a few ships, and lose a fair number without reducing our margin over the Germans to a dangerous point. But " cold facts" show that we had nothing whatever to spare; and. indeed, if the Germon High Seas Fleet was really "fit," nothing by way of margin of safety, not only on the outbreak of hostilities, but during the first few months of the war, for the proper strength of the Grand Fleet wa.s a vastly different proposition from its flighting strength. The chronicle of breakdowns in the firpt few wec-ks of the war is an extraordinary one. At the time of the loss of the Audonious (October 1914) the Ajax had developcvl condenser defects, tin* Iron Duke had similar I roubles, tho Orion had to l>e sont to Greenock lor

examination of the turbine supports, which seemed to be defective; the Conqueror was at Devonport refitting . . . ha that the Drearinougt Fleet only consisted of seventeen effective battleships and five battle-cruisers; the German Dreadnought fleet at the time comprising fifteen battleships and four battlecruisers and the Bleucher.

That was the "two Power standard" in capital ships \ And there were other •'lame ducks" among the big craft, for guns, too, developed an uncanny series of defects. The King Edward VII. had two of her 12in. guns wrong before the war was three weeks old. Two days later the Dominion reported that two of hers were crocked. On September 11 the Hi hernia had one of hers cracked.

Moreover, at this period, and for a long time afterwards, Germany hod at I command 88 destroyers, as against our j Grand Flett's 42, and her strength in {submarines was vastly greater than our?, i jAgain, the most up-to-date of the Gerl man big ships appear to have been much less vulnerable under water and above than ours, and the enemy possessed a niuch better armour-piercing shell than we had, and infinitely better searchlights. Ihe Battle of Jutland proved beyond doubt that our huge bat-tle-cruisers and battleships possessed many defects in their construction, th"ir interior arrangements and the disposition of their armour. Lord Jellicoe, reviewing the conditions which existed towards the close of the war, remarks: "Ihe Grand Fleet was given no opportunity of testing in action the methods adopted as a result of our experience doiring the first two years of war and perfected by two years' further training." But he is convinced that " had the German fleet come out to battle, a terrible punishment awaited them." IF GERMANY HAD STRUCK. To revert to the harmless condition of our Grand Fleet during those early cays, and its shortage in cruisers, and still greater shortage in destroyers. What must Admiral Jellicoe's feelings have been during the opening weeks and months of the war? Rumour, with her thousand tongues, was busy as to enemy movements, reports coming into the fleet flagship of the most conflicting and disturbing character. They were as embarrassing as they were'groundless. The German High Seas Fleet had, as was afterwards revealed, determined for the time being noifc to fight, but to see what ■would come of a war of attrition, utilising to the full a marked superiority in sea-going submarines, and carrying out tlu e*tensi% re mine-laying policy for which elaborate preparations had been made. A modern ship of war can remain at sea only for a limited period, owing to fuel demands and engine and boiler requirements, and the British Commander-in-Chief during the early months of the war had to contend with these problems on the one hand, and, on the other, with the defenceless state of his bases. He judged the sea less dangerous than the harbour, and it is now revealed for the first time that the submarine menace in the autnnm ■I of 1914 became so grave that the Grand I Fleet was moved to Loch Swilly. Even there it was not safe, for, as is now 'I known, the Dreadnought battleship Audacious ran into an enemy minefield off 1' the entrance, and sank. The disaster occurred at a very anxious moment, and hence the secrecy observed. While the ships of' tho Grand Fleet were at this Irish base the work of de--1 fending Sea pa Flow was carried forward and not until that anchorage had been 1 rendered reasonably safe did the Grand Fleet return to the North Sea. There ■is every reason to believe that owing to the secrecy observed as to the loss of the Audacious the Germans were un- ■ aware of the extent to which they had j temporarily influenced our strategic poli--1 icy, and thus they missed the opportun- • ity of creating big trouble in the North ' Sea, if not in these islands, denuded of troops as they were at this juncture. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND. A big part of the Admiral's book is taken up with the Battle of Jutland - that titanic encounter which resulted in the enemy receiving such a hammering that German seamen could never again be induced to face such an ordeal. It is clear from Lord Jellicoe? story of the battle that only tactical i s-kill and splendid nerve won the light —it was the men, and not the ships, of Old England that beat the enemy, ?-nd for a time the fate of the world hung in tlu balance. ! We can now reconstruct the scene as ii was enacted amid the mists of the North Sea. The Germans believed that they had caught Sir j)avid Beatty at a I disadvantage, and ths success which they achieved in sinking two of his batthe cruisers led them to persevere. At last, as the day was drawing to its close, tlie German Gommander-n-Cliief found himself confronted with the battle squadrons under Lord Jeliicoe. A German officer has since confessed that '■ we- were utterly crushed from the moment your battle tieet came into action." The enemy's last hope lay in his superior strength in destroyers, which were thrown into the action with some assurance of bringing the British battle fleet to disaster. We can now form a conception of the critical situation which laced the CJom-mander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet during this period of tiie action, when hnndreds of torpedoes were discharged at his ships. The sea was simply " alive" with enemy torpedoes, and the reports received from Uie various ships concerning their escapes from these deadly missle3 show most clearly that had the commanders of the German destroyers shown greater daring they might have turned the fortune ot the day. in Lord Jellicoe's view, it was only the range at which the Germans fired their torpedoes that enabled several of our big slups to avoid thorn by timely use ,of the helm. Had the range been f-horter the greater pace of the oncoming torpedoes would have rendered nvoidance vastly more ui^:cult, if not impossible. NARROW SHAVES. As it was, several of our biggest and , best craft only escaped contact with tlie i deadly "fish" by a tew yards. Thus the Hercules reported that she " turned away six points to avoid the torpedoes, i cue of which passed alongside the st.'Uboard side and forty yards across the bow, und the other pr.ssed close unuer the stern." Tha Neptune reported that 'the tracks of three torpedoes were seen, one of which passed very close, and was avoided by tlie use of the helm." In the Agincourt's report, ? statement occurred that "At 7.S p.m. y torpedo just missed astern, it having j been reported from aloft, and course I filtered." And again, At 7.38 p.m. 1 racks of two torpedoes running parallel were observed approachm;*; rourse altered to avoid torpedoes, which parsed ahead"1, and "At 8.23 i.i.m. torpedo track on starboard side, turned nt full speed; torpedo broke ■surface sit about 150 yards on the starboard bow." The Hevenge remarked : •At 7.35 p.m. altered course to port to avoid two torpedoes; one passed about ion yards :\hefrd. and tlie other about twenty yards astern; find at 7 A.i p.m.', altered course to avoid t'.vo tor--1 pedoes, two nosing j< stern " Tlv; I Colossus stared: "Ac 7.35 p.m. turn-jci

to port to avoid torpedo." The Barliain at this period reported that "At least four torpedoes passed through the l:ne close to the Barham." . The Col'mgwood reported, " Torpedo track was seen coming straight at the ship; large helm was put on, r.nr! the torpedo passed very close astern; at the same tjpur another was seen to pass about SO yard ahead."

feeing the weather was hazy and V.v: ligfit failing when tlie Germans attempted their torpedo "grand slam,"' as we may call it,, we may indeed On j thankful that eyesight and nerve, is well as skill, were on our side, and that the Germans were, a* one of their officers afterwards admitted, bitterly chagrined as the failure of their trump i card became apparent. WHAT OF THE NIGHT. During the weeks that followed th<Battle of Jutland, controversy rag^d round the question why Lord Jellicoa cid not pursue the retreating forces cf yon Scheer. Lord Jellicoe explains why, when ihe day, .with its prevailing mist, closed, he determined not to see'e « night action. He had in mind the very large destroyer torce of the enemy, proportionately rauoh larger than the British flotillas. ■ He had to decide whether he would invite coricmued torpt-do attacks throughout the night, bearing in mind that if the Germans lost a large part of- the surface fleet they could still continue the war, but that if the Grand Fleet was seriously reduced in* strength, the Alhed cause would go under. Summing up the matter, the Admiral remarks "the greater efficiency of German' searchlights at the time of the Jutlani action, and the greater number of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships, combined with his superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the commencement of such an action.'' Much the came view seems to Have 1 een taken by Sir David Beatty, leading his battle cruisers, for in his <Uspatch he remarks that he "did not consider "it desirable or proper to close* with enemy battle fleets during the dark hours." But cruisers and destroyers skilfully dispersed for his pmp.use, harried the enemy as opportuu- [ ity offered, and the Abdiel, by Lord ! Jelliooe's orders, laid a minefield in what proved to be the homeward traeJi of many of the German ships, with the result that several enemy ships were severely damaged. Ovviug to his nearness to his bases, and the superior protection of his ships under water, Admiral yon Scheer managed to get most of his vessels past the Horn Reel shortly after daylight, but it was i fleet mauled and hammered into a pitiless condition, with thousands of casualties and its "moral" damaged oe_yond repair. THE MORAL. Lord Jellicoe's account of his .war command contains many lessons th»^ public of the British Empire must lay to heart, atd it must provoke many strange reflections. The main conclusions to be drawn, however, trom a perusal of this 500-page book is that the British Fleet, upon which the fortunes of the Ahies depended, was so little prepared for the real conditions of war in August, 1914, that we may give K-eartfelt thanks that the enemy decided to adopt "atrition'1 tactics at sea instead of a bolder policy; and that the British Navy won, not because it was better prepared than the enemy, but because it possessed the priceless power of initiative and improvisation, ani v>as manned by better men. The better seamen won.