DEFENCE OF THE PACIFIC

New Zealand Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15594, 28 April 1914, Page 9

DEFENCE OF THE PACIFIC

WHAT MR. CHURCHILL SAYS.

REDEEMING THE 1909 AGREEMENT.

[from our own correspondent.]

London, March 20. In his statement on the Naval Estimates, the First Lord of the Admiralty said he had left the most important feature to the end, and he then entered on a lengthy statement of the position in the Pacific. " The safety of Australia and New Zealand," he said, " is secured by the naval power, and the alliance is based on the naval power of Great Britain. No European State would, or could, invade or conquer New Zealand or Australia, unless the British Navy had been destroyed. The same naval power of Great Britain in European waters also protects New Zealand and Australia from any present danger from Japan. While Japan is allied to Great Britain, and while Great Britain possesses a sufficient margin of naval superiority, Japan is safe from attack by sea from the great fleets of Europe. In no other way in the years that lie immediately before us can Japan protect, herself from danger of European interference. It would appear that the reasons which have led Japan to contract and renew the alliance will grow stronger with time.' "The naval agreement of 1909 with the Dominions had as its central principle the idea that we should keep in the Pacific and Indian Oceans double the force of the Australian flotilla. We are doing more than that. We are not doing it in the same unit, but we are keeping the new battle-cruisers at Home, where alone they will meet their equals, and we have placed on the China and on the Indian stations the two battleships Swiftsure and Triumph, and other armoured cruisers, which are quite sufficient for the work they will have to do, and which are not only an equivalent, but are an improvement upon the mere duplications of the Australian fleet unit. I mention that because suggestions have been made that we have not given full effect to the 1909 agreement, but I maintain that we have given, and are giving, full effect to it. New Zealand's Policy. "There are no means by which, in the next 10 or 12 years, Australia and New Zealand can expect to maintain themselves single-handed. If the power of Great Britain were shattered on the sea, the only course open to the five millions of white men in the Pacific woidd be to seek the protection of the United States. From this point of view the profound wisdom of the policy hitherto adopted by New Zealand can be appreciated.

" In giving a splendid ship to strengthen the British Navy at ?. decisive point, wherever that point may be, the Dominion of New Zealand has provided, in the most effective way, alike for her own and for the common security. No greater insight into political and strategical point? has ever been shown by a community hitherto unversed in military matters. The situation in the Pacific will be absolutely regulated by the decisions in European waters. Two or three Australian and New Zealand Dreadnoughts, if brought into line in the decisive theatre, might turn the scale and make victory not merely certain, but complete. The same two or three Dreadnoughts in Australian waters would be useless the day after the defeat of the British Navy in Home waters. Their existence would only serve to prolong the agony, without altering the course of events. Their effectiveness would have been destroyed by events which had taken place on the other side of the globe, just as surely as if they had been sunk in the battle. The Admiralty are bound to uphold and proclaim broad principles of unity and command, and give advice in a military and strategic sense. The Dominions are perfectly free— matter rests entirely in their hands—and the Admiralty's' responsibility ceases when the facts" have been placed plainly before Ministers, and those to whom they are responsible- It is recognised, however, that time will be required before the principles of naval strategy are applied to their fullest extent in the Dominions,

Dominions and the Navy. " The Dominions want to have their own ships under their own control, cruising in their own waters, based on their own ports; they want to have something they can see and touch and view with pride, with feelings of ownership and control. Those feelings, although unrecognised by military rules are natural, they are real facts which will govern events. It is easily understood that the difficulties of enlisting the active co-operation of the Dominions in naval defence by means of ships they rarely see. and which are absorbed in the great fleets of Britain at the other end of the world arc at present insuperable. The Admiralty have therefore co-operated largely to, the best of their ability in the divertment of the Australian fleet units. We regard the effort which the Australian Commonwealth is making as heroic —(cheers)—and we will leave nothing undone to make it a complete success. A thoroughly sound arrangement has been made between the Admiralty and the Government relating to the use of the Commonwealth fleet in war. We realise the importance of creating a naval sentiment in the Dominion and of creating resen of personnel which arc so valuable, and the local naval establishments which are essential to the full mobility and employment of the Imperial fleet. "It is with the object of combining sound military principles with local aspirations that" the design of the Imperial Squadron has been conceived. The principle in policy of the Imperial Squadron may be compared to a number of farmers, each of whom has the ordinary implements of agriculture on a farm, but who combine together to buy a steam plough or steam-thresher, of which each in turn, according to his needs, can have the use. There should be developed severally in Canadian, Australasian, and South African waters a naval establishment with docks, defences and repairing plant, which would enable tho Imperial Squadron to operate in each theatre for a prolonged period. Side by side with this there should re developed in each of those three theatres so far as may 1"' necessary, local defence flotillas, both do- ! st rovers' and submarines, for the purpose of both defending their bases and establishments and of operating in conjunction ' with tho Imperial Squadron when it I arrives. Great ships move easilv and swiftly about the world, but small craft are bv their nature localised, and can onlv traverse the. ocean with difficulty and effort. Thirdly, the Dominions should iocallv maintain the light cruisers necessary, not for fightine battle fleets, but for' commerce protection in their own waters, and these cruisers would also combine with the Imperial Squadron or detachment of the British fleet, when it arrives, to make the fleet complete in all resneots. In this way a true distinction will re made between the services which are essentially local and those which are necessarily of general Imperial character. The Dominions will be afforded that individual local development which is necessary to arouse and maintain a keen naval interest and to procure from them the sacrifices necessary for the maintenance of development of that naval power, while at the same time by sending any capital ships thev mav have or acouire to the Imoeral Squadron they will create a really strong effective naval force— one or two ships isolated on particular stations—which will be able to move rapidlv and freely about the world brim?ing aid in sufficient strength wherever it mav be needed in tinje of war. That is the right policy."