EVENTS IN RUSSIA

Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 13, 15 July 1937, Page 17

EVENTS IN RUSSIA

GERMAN INFLUENCE

THE EUROPEAN BACKGROUND

The German Memorandum to Great Britain of March 10 is no longer mentioned in the German Press, says the diplomatic correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian." It is officially regarded as having fulfilled its purpose in continuing the debate on the project of the Western pact—a project in which nobody either here or in Paris or in Berlin believes any more. Germany' 3 aim in foreign affairs is to "gain time" —which happens to be about the onfy aim she has in common with Franca and Great Britain. Germany wishes in any case to await the end of the Spanish civil war, which, according to some prophets, will go on for years. She not only expects General Franco to win, although her confidence in this respect seems to have diminished a little, but also hopes to gain tangible advantages from his victory—advantages that might be forfeited by premature action in. Central Europe. . Germany also wishes to see how Italian foreign policy develops. She has some hope that Italian imperialist aims will be prosecuted with vigour— an expectation which is not shared here. She also persists in hoping for an internal weakening of France, which, would, in her opinion, lead to the isolation of Czechoslovakia. She still believes—for quite undiscoverable reasons—that British foreign policy will change in her favour after the Coronation. TWO VIEWS ABOUT RUSSIA. Meanwhile Germany.is paying close attention to Russian affairs. There are two German theses with regard to Russia. The National Socialist Party on the whole persists in its belief that Russia is on the eve of big internal conflicts which will eliminate Stalin and weaken her as a military Power. Ie is in the hope—a hope which, as seen from here, appears to be romantic —of promoting this development that Germany has been intensifying her conspiratorial activities in Russia. The other German thesis, which would seem to be more serious, is held by an influential part of the Reichswehr, by many German industrialists, and by a growing number of diplomats (especially the former German Ambassador in Moscow, Herr Nadolny). Ao> cording to this thesis Russia is becoming a nationalistic and militaristic State under the leadership of Voro shiloff Once Russia has ceased to be "Bolshevik" then, so the supporters of this thesis believe, Hitler can be persuaded to abandon that anti-Russian policy which is one of his obsessions, for Hitler habitually denounces not Russia but "Bolshevik Bussia." What has helped to fortify the second German thesis with regard to Russia is the eclipse of Marshal Tukachevsky, who. has been one of tha chief exponents of a pro-French policy. (The Marshal was one of those shot after the trial of the generals.) In any case there is now in Germany a distinct movement, finding favour amongst persons of considerable influence, for a German-Russian understanding. What are the chances —as seen from here—of such an understanding? A COUNTERWEIGHT GONE. With' the eclipse of Tukachevsky 4 counterweight to "pro-German" tendencies has gone. It is not believed here that Voroshiloff is "pro-German in any sense. He is regarded as an able soldier and without political colour, but there seems to be little doubt that YegorofE, the Russian Chief of Staff, would favour an understanding with Germany. That Russia has long ceased to be "Bolshevik" is quite clear—if by "Bolshevism" we mean Muscovite Communism, plus belief in world revolution. Indeed, the last remnants of "Bolshevism" in this sense are beingj exterminated under the name of "Trotskyism" in the colossal purge of which the recent "Moscow trials" are only a small fraction, nearly all the older Polish Communists who were rather an elite in the Russian revolutionary movement have been exterminated). ~ The view taken here is that Stalin is on the whole not in favour of a German-Russian understanding, nor ia anything known here that would corroborate the German belief in the impending eclipse of Stalin (it is even suggested that Stalin might outlast Hitler). Hitler regards Stalin as a, "Bolshevik"—erroneously perhaps, but; nevertheless with conviction. And ap-! parently he will look upon Russia asj "Bolshevik" as long as Stalin is inJ power. GAINING A NEIGHBOUR. What carries great weight with, thaj Russians who have considered the possibility of an understanding with. Germany is this: the German price would be a free hand in Poland and Czechoslovakia. This price would, doubtless, be willingly paid by Russia1, if it did not make Germany her neigh-! bour. Once Germany is that, what! guarantee has Russia that, having) established her hegemony overPoland and Czechoslovakia—and per* haps over Rumania—she will not revert to her' anti-Russian policy after all? If Russia could trust Hitlerite Germany she would have absolute security in the West and would then be able to face every conceivable danger in the East—indeed, she would be able, if she chose, to pass from the defensive to the offensive in the East. But can she trust Hitlerite Germany? Tha answer given to that question in Moscow would hardly differ from tha answer given here or in Paris, thought if it were in the affirmative there could be little doubt that Europe would have to reckon with the ex-> Ireme likelihood of a German-Russian understanding. At present the readiness for an understanding would seem to be greater in Berlin than in Moscow, especially since German military experts have formed a rather unfavourable opinion of the Japanese army and Air Force. On the whole it would seem that tha understanding is unlikely for some time to come and, in any case, difficult to conceive as long as botis Hitler and Stalin are in power.