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No. 6. —Manawaangiangi.—Petition of Tipene Matua and Others. It is difficult to understand the position of the petitioners. That they were entitled to a considerably larger share in the Manawaangiangi Block than they obtained on the partition of that block in 1895 seems clear enough. Why their claim was suppressed or misrepresented by themselves or by their own witnesses in the Native Land Court is not so apparent. The allegation on the part of the petitioners is that they acted in ignorance of their rights. We find it hard to credit this; but as no other reason is discoverable, it is perhaps safer to give them the benefit of the doubt. We find some justification for so doing in the consideration that of the sixteen or more persons interested some, at all events, may not have been responsible for the conduct —or, as it is now alleged, misconduct- -of the case in the Native Land Court, and should not be made to suffer for it. It is on this ground mainly that we feel justified in recommending a rehearing, with the proviso that all costs of such rehearing and of the proceedings before this Commission be borne and paid by the petitioners, and that as a condition precedent to the rehearing the petitioners deposit with the Registrar of the Native Laud Court at Wellington such sum as the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court shall direct as security for such payment. G. B. Davy. D. Scannell. A. T. Ngata. No. 7. —Ngatikahumate and Other Blocks. —In the Matter of the Succession to Wiremu Kingi Matakatea (deceased). —Petition of Rangipaia Ngamare. The Native Land Court, in 1894, appointed certain persons to succeed to the interest of the deceased in the above lands, the mother of the petitioner being one of them. The lands were divided between the next-of-kin on the father's side and those on the mother's side. The connection of the petitioner is with the father's side. The petitioner asks that these proceedings be set aside on the ground that she, as the adopted child of the deceased, is the sole successor. The evidence shows that the petitioner is only one of several children, each of whom might with equal reason advance a similar claim. The deceased and his wife, being childless, appear to have taken a succession of children to live with them, none of whom, however, can be considered as being in the full sense of the term adopted. One of these was Mokonuikau, the principal opponent of the petitioner before the Commission. As to the will executed by the deceased in favour of the petitioner, he seems to have made several wills, one of them in favour of this same Mokonuikau. We attach, therefore, little importance to the will as supporting the claim by adoption. Of course, all the wills are equally inoperative, the lands being subject to the provisions of the West Coast Settlement Acts. The proceeding in the Native Land Court which it is desired to set aside was based on an arrangement come to in open Court, to which the petitioner was herself a party, and is, so far as we can judge, in accordance with the rights of the case. The claim now set up by the petitioner is an afterthought. We recommend that no further action be taken in the matter of this petition. G. B. Davy. D. Scannell. No. 8. —Lot 18, Onewhero, and other. Lots.—Petition of Te Kono te Aho, for Self and Others.— Succession to Takerei te Aho (deceased). That the petitioners are the persons entitled according to Native custom to succeed to the interest of the deceased in the above lands can be clearly established, and, indeed, was not disputed. The only defence attempted by the persons opposing the petition was a frivolous one, to the effect that the petitioners (who must have been mere children at the time) having joined the Hauhaus were not entitled to succeed to lands granted to loyal Natives. This was the reason given for the suppression of the names of the petitioners, and the substitution of the names of other persons in the Native Land Court. The Court, of course, had only the evidence to go by, and acted accordingly. Unfortunately, it appears that some of the lands in question have been alienated by the pseudo-successors. As to such of them as remain, we recommend that the existing succession orders be annulled, and that the Native Land Court be directed, without further cost to the petitioners, to ascertain who are the persons entitled according to Native custom, and to make order accordingly. G. B. Davy. D. Scannell. No. 9. —Tahora No. 2a. —Petition of Erueti Tamaikoha and Others. The complaint in this case is that the petitioners have suffered injury through the partition without due notice of a block of land known as Tahora No. 2a. The circumstances in this case are almost identical with those in the Te Kauri case (No. 3) already reported upon. There is no doubt that the owners of Tahora No. 2a were taken by surprise by the action of the Court (in this case the Validation Court) in partitioning that block. The petitioners charge Mr. Balneavis (who is himself one of the owners) with having taken an unfair advantage of them in the matter of the partition. A« that gentleman was prevented by unavoidable circumstances from attending before the Commission, we did not hear his side of the question. As in the Te Kauri case, however, we consider that on the ground of want of notice alone the petitioners are entitled to a rehearing.