KEY TO EUROPE

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20887, 19 August 1939, Page 15 (Supplement)

KEY TO EUROPE

Poland’s Position : : Poor and Patriotic

(Raymond Leslie Buell)

POLAND UNDOUBTEDLY has the capacity of becoming a great power. It is the fastest-growing country in Europe; in 15 years it will have as large a population as France. Its position astride the crossroads of Europe gives it immense military and diplomatic importance. Furthermore, the Poles have high intellectual ability; as one writer has said: “In all Europe there is no other people, with the possible exception of the French, which is naturally so gifted.” Through some of its leading personalities Poland has well served the cause of world culture. Copernicus was a Pole. Two of the three most distinguished foreigners in the American Revolution were Polish— Count Pulaski, who met his death on our behalf, and General Kosciuszko. During the following century the novels of Sienkiewicz and the music of Chopin were known to an international audience. Today the names of Paderewski, Rubinstein, Conrad, Reymont and Madame Curie are world-famous. Poland was the first country in Europe to establish a department of education, and one of the first to have a parliament and a bill of rights. The Poles, however, Face a Serious Economic Problem, arising out of population pressure against an agricultural economy. They number 34,500,000. The population density is less than a third that of Belgium; but Belgium is heavily industrialised, while Poland is predominantly a country of peasants. These peasants lived grouped together in hundreds of tiny, primitive villages, going out to their fields daily during the planting and harvesting seasons. The low level of their existence is indicated by their diet, which consists chiefly of rye and potatoes. They are virtually self-sufficient in food, but have extremely low purchasing power. The poverty of these people is proverbial. It is said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times. The same water would be used over and over again to boil potatoes, in order to save the salt. A peasant village at night is often without any form of light. A writer describes conditions in the north-east, the poorest part of the country, as follows: “At the end of each winter the horses, having exhausted their supply of fodder, are propped up in their stalls in the hope that spring may arrive in time for them to be carried to the pastures before death releases them from their sufferings. The peasants themselves are mere skeletons racked with fever and malaria, their clothes skins and rags, and their foot-coverings of bark cut from trees.” Even if, as some Poles insist, this is an exaggeration, the depressed level of the peasants in many parts of Poland is difficult for Westerners to imagine. In 1933, during the depression, the richest seven per cent, of the population had an average monthly income of only 27 dollars, while the rest somehow got along on an average of 4.50 dollars. The national income had increased 20 per cent, by 1937, but the individual’s share is still very little by American standards. Yet the country as a whole gives an impression of stability. Urban workers are somewhat better off than the peasants, and the cities have a flourishing appearance. Bright, w’ell-dressed people throng the streets and cafes day and night. One of the motivating forces in Polish life today is the Memory of a Glorious Past. In the 16th century, the Polish domain stretched across Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Crimea—the foothold on the Baltic being won after years of hard fighting against the Germans. Poland was then the cultural centre of Northern Europe, as well as an asylum for people fleeing from religious and political persecution in other lands. But the grandeur of medieval Poland rapidly decayed. A custom developed whereby any deputy to the national parliament could “explode” it—that is, adjourn it—by imposing his veto, and this veto nullified all decisions previously made. Fourfifths of the legislative meetings between 1652 and 1772 were thus “exploded.” Parliament was hamstrung, and the king deprived of military and financial support. In the absence of an effective central government, some 16 or 17 great families maintained luxurious courts and regarded themselves as sovereign princes; the rivalry between them led to anarchy and disintegration. Russia, Prussia and Austria took advantage of the situation to lop off chunks of Polish territory. By 1793 these three countries had divided among themselves two thirds of Poland, and the remains were converted into a Russian protectorate. The Period of Captivity commenced, and it lasted despite numerous Polish rebellions until after the World War. Then, as the result of the peace treaties and a two-year war with Russia, Poland recovered its independence and about three-fifths of the territory it held at the height of its power. It is now the sixth largest State in Europe. In territory it is exceeded only by Russia, Germany, France, Spain and Sweden; in population, only by Russia, Germany, France, Britain and Italy. During the Great War, Poland Suffered Greater Devastation than any other nation except Belgium. Almost 2,000,000 buildings wrere burned; 11,000,000 acres of land were put out of use; 6,000,000 acres of forests were destroyed. Before leaving at the end of the war, the Austro-German armies blew up 7500 bridges and destroyed 940 railroad stations. The human loss beggars description in terms of homeless refugees, starving children, families ravaged by disease. Except for the remarkable staying power of the Polish people, and for relief extended by the United States, Communism might easily have triumphed during this period. The task of reconstruction was tremendous. Three different systems of law, social insurance, and public administration, which had developed during the Captivity, had to be unified. Yet since the war Poland has created a centralised administration manned by a civil service of high quality; set up a

single system of roads, railways, posts and telegraphs; establshed a stable, currency and built an imposing port at Gdynia. The Poles have lived down their reputation for inefficiency—Lloyd George could no longer say, as he did once, that one might as well give a clock to a monkey as Upper Silesia to the Poles. The divisive phychologies which arose among the three parts of Poland during the Captivity are being eliminated by the school and university system and military conscription, and a new National Unity is Being Forged. Only one thing now stands in the way of national solidarity: the presence of a large minority of non-Polish peoples, totalling one-third of the population. The most important minorities are the 750,000 Germans, the 3,300,000 Jews, and the 5,000,000 Ukrainians. Most of the Germans are in full sympathy with National Socialism, but they are scattered all over the country and are unorganised. The Jews are even more widely distributed. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, are a compact majority in south-eastern Poland, and are politically well organised. The Ukrainians in Russia, Poland and Rumania have long tried in vain to gain their independence, and the presence of so many Ukrainians in Poland may ■weaken that country in time of war. Poland is not a democracy in the American sense, but neither is it a totalitarian state. Parliament is dominated by one party, a middle-of-the-road group which enjoys the support of the army. The government has sometimes resorted to “protective custody”—a feature of totalitarian regimes —and placed in concentration camps, without a court order, persons accused of “menacing peace and public security.” The government radio can be used only by supporters of the party in power. Thus civil liberties are severely curtailed. However, opposition parties, both of the Left and Right, carry on propaganda and hold meetings, and opposition newspapers continue to be published. And although Poland has the largest Jewish population of any country in Europe, it has not adopted the anti-Semitic measures used by Germany. Poland is making a determined effort to keep from being drawn into either the Communist or the Facist camp. Wedged between the two great totalitarian imperialisms, its position is extremely difficult. But the Polish Spirit is Highly Individualistic and hence anti-totalitarian. Furthermore, there is no country in Europe today, except possibly Ireland, where the Catholic Church has such influence; and the Church in Poland does not wish to suffer the fate of the Church in Germany and Russia. Poland may be able to prevent either Fascism or Communism from dominating the continent. It will resist the ideology of the anti-West-ern Powers provided the democracies give it proper support. In more ways than one, Poland holds the key to Europe. The fate of Poland is bound up in the future relations of Germany and Russia. Should they ght, they would inevitably do so on Polish soil. Whoever the victor might be, Polish independence would be imperilled. The Poles lived under German and Russian rule too long to relish the prospect of playing host to a victorious army belonging to either power. On the other hand, the whole of Central Europe today fears that sooner or later Germany and Russia will reach an understanding. Between 1802 and 1879 Prussia and Russia w’ere in alliance, with profit to both parties. The internal regimes of Russia and Germany are becoming more and more similar, and a strong element in each of the armies favours an agreement whereby Germany would have access to Russia’s raw materials and provide Russia’s industries with badly needed technicians. Poland would be as vitally involved in any such alliance as in a Russian-German war, since an alliance might well be followed by a new partition of Poland. Poland’s foreign policy, therefore, has had two objectives: to keep Russia and Germany apart, and to obtain outside assistance in case of attack by either. Whether Poland succeeds any better than Czechoslovakia in maintaining its integrity depends upon its determination to fight at the First Sign of German Aggression If the Poles sacrifice Danzig, the Corridor and Upper Silesia without a struggle, they will be doomed. If they can resist the. Nazi forces a month or so, it is probable they will receive help in time. Although political considerations may have justified France and Britain in throwing away the Czech forts and 20 divisions of troops at Munich, they cannot equally afford to throw away Poland’s 35 divisions. Up to the present time, Poland hasn’t wanted Russian aid in case of a German attack. Although both the Poles and the Russians are Slavs, and hence hereditary enemies of the Germans, the existence of Communism in Russia has been a barrier to Slavic unity. The Poles have feared that if Russian troops once entered the country, they would not leave and would propagate Communism sentiment. And even before the Bolshevik Revolution, lasting differences separated the two peoples. Poland has always thought of itself as a bulwark protecting Europe from the semi-Asiatic influences of Russia. However, Poland’s national interests undoubtedly will now force it to think in terms of Slavic unity to a far greater extent than it has done in the past. Russia is in a far better position than France or Britain to send troops quickly to Poland’s aid. Less courageous peoples than the Poles might shrink from contemplating a future bound up with such difficult internal and external problems. But Poland’s confidence in itself, its attachment to its past, and its intense sense of mission may carry it through. An ardent patriotism will enable this country, if need be, to suffer adversity and carry on when other States having higher material standards might falter and even collapse.