NOTES ON THE WAR

Waihi Daily Telegraph, Volume XXXI, Issue 8832, 12 October 1942, Page 2

NOTES ON THE WAR

DIRECTORS OF DESTINY METHODS OF GOVERNMENT ' COMMON PURPOSES IN WAR Stalin’s replies to an American journalist’s questions on the second front, Allied aid to Russia, and the respective capacities of Russia and Germany in their present struggle, and the comment of leading men in America and Britain on the Stalin statement, illustrate the differences v. in the ntethod of government of the three countries, and the difficulties of reconciling them to the expression of a common purpose in the conduct of the war.

Basically, the conduct of the war depends on the personalities of the three men, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, each of whom stands in a different relationship to his people. Stalin is frankly a dictator with practically complete power. He has been in this position since at least 1927, and is likely to continue there, with undisputed authority, for a long time to come.

The American President is elected for a term of four years, and in that period, save in event of death, his power in the executive field is continuous, absolute and subject to no basic modification.

The British Prime Minister, on the other hand, serves only so long as the House of Commons will continue to vote confidence in him and his Ministers. Technically and constitutionally, his downfall can come any day. Lesson of 1919 Discussing the differences, particularly 'between the two democracies, Arthur Krock, Washington correspondent of the “New York Times,” recalls the astonishment of European statesmen when they discovered after the Peace Conference of 1919 that an American President could propose international commitments which the American Congress could refuse to sanction. The impression in Paris seemed to be widespread, says Krock, that because President Wilson could not be put out of office until March, 1921, he could commit the Government of the United States to any course he thought advisable Krock adds:

The rejection by the Senate of the League Covenant, which was bound up in the Treaty of Versailles, emphatically brought the facts of the American political system into the. consciousness of the statesmen of Europe. And from that time they have often complained that the trouble with the United States as a partner was the difficulty of Presidential agreements, which were not necessarily •binding on the American Government as a whole and therefore had not the force of a compact unless the legislative branch agreed. Effect in 1931

The effect of this distrust, according to the Washington correspondent, was seen in the hesitation of the British Government to back Mr Stimson, then U.S. Secretary of State, in 1931, when he urged Britain to take a firm stand against Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Could Mr Stimson speak for Congress in any move that might easily have led to a state of war with Japan in which Britain would have 'been involved, but which Congress might refuse to sanction? It may be pointed out incidentally that Congress recently refused to pass in full President Roosevelt’s antiinflation measure and that he had to accept a compromise. Thus while the President of the United States has security of tenure, but only partial authority, the British 'Prime Minister has full authority, but no security of tenure 'beyond what the House of Commons will give him by its continued confidence. Understandings Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States, in comment on the Stalin statement, said, “I think you can feel quite sure that Mr Stalin, President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill understand each other very well, and that there is no misunderstanding between them.” This understanding took the form of a treaty of alliance between Britain and Russia, -but an agreement between the United States and Russia.

This is significant. Mr Churchill and the British Cabinet were sure of the House of Commons. President Roosevelt was not so sure of Congress and preferred not to put the matter to the • test. In practice, in the aid given to Russia, and in the memorandum attached to 'both treaty and agreement about the understanding of the “urgent necessity” of a second front, it comes to much the same thing. But it is" well to remember that the positions of the three men in the triumvirate that runs the war is not the same. In Practice

Summing up, in particular reference to the last conference between President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill in Washington in June, Krock says: Thus the realities of the situation,

political and otherwise, wiped out the legal restrictions imposed, on the one hand, by a co-ordinate form of government in' which Congress has an equal voice with the Executive on some matters, and on the other hand by a parliamentary form in .which the Executive can speak for the Legislature during the whole of an indefinite term in office . . .

The realities go further. They extend to the fact that each of the eminent conferees has the full political support of the other, and that, in so far as tact and good judgment permit, this will constantly be made known. Mr Roosevelt likes Mi 1 Churchill and would vastly prefer-to go on dealing with him and no other Prime Minister throughout the war. Mr Churchill has the same preference for Mr (Continued in previous column)