Thank you for correcting the text in this article. Your corrections improve Papers Past searches for everyone. See the latest corrections.

This article contains searchable text which was automatically generated and may contain errors. Join the community and correct any errors you spot to help us improve Papers Past.

Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image

Severe on General Buller.

A writer 'in a recent issue of the Times says:—"Sir Redvers Buller declares that his failure at Colenso was due to 'rank bad luck.. It may have been; but was it 'rank bad luck' to make a frontal attack upon a strong position protected by an unfordablc river? Was it 'rank bad luck' not to seizo Hlangwanc Hill, the one point of vantago on the south bank of the river? Was it 'rank bad luck' to abandon two baltcrics, half n mile from the river, and not taken away by tho Boers for some hours after they were abandoned? Whatever the roasons for the failuro at Colenso, tho result of it was that Sir Redvers Buller gave up all hope of relieving Ladysmith for the next month, and. without consulting ".the Government, without' giving himself a day or two for reflection, 'suggested' to Sir George White that 'it would be necessary to .-surrender,' And these aro the reasons that, wo are told, actuated him in making that suggestion—a suggestion that has no parallel in English history. He believed that Ladysmith could not hold for a month longer; as a matter of fact, it held out for two months and a half. Ho did not know what supplies there were in Ladysmith. but 'thought ho had it officially in writing' that there was only enough _to last to the end o£ the year! , Ladysmith was tho most important military post in all South Africa, and Sir George White had been busily provisioning it up to tho moment the siege began. And yot the General Commanding in South Africa did not know what supplies there were. Is such ignoranco ovidence of fitness for high command? But if he did not know, or had forgotten, was it not open to him to heliograph to Sir George White and find out exactly how long Ladysmith could hold out? Or, failing the heliograph, could he not have consulted Major Morgan, the officer who had superintended tho despatch of all the stores from Durban to Ladysmith, or the Natal railway authorities? . . . Let us leave aside all question of the honour of the flag, of tho military prestige of a defence conducted to the last gasp. What would have been the immediate practical result of the surrender of Ladysmith at that moment? In Natal Sir Redvers Buller had just been defeated by half the Boer force in that colony. In Cape Colony Lord Methuen and Sir W. Gatacre had suffered disastrous checks. No reinforcements could come for nearly a month. If Ladysmith had yieldod then, Capo Colony would have risen from one end to the other, while the whole Boer force in Natal would have -thrbwn itself on Sir Red vers, Buller, whose 'rank bad luck' might again have brought him to disaster. In those dark December days every hour that Ladysmith held out was precious to the Empire. Sir George White knew that, and thus showed that he possessed at least one great qualification for tho highest command. Sir Redvers Buller did not."

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WH19011119.2.25

Bibliographic details

Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXV, Issue 10497, 19 November 1901, Page 2

Word Count
511

Severe on General Buller. Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXV, Issue 10497, 19 November 1901, Page 2

Severe on General Buller. Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXV, Issue 10497, 19 November 1901, Page 2

Help

Log in or create a Papers Past website account

Use your Papers Past website account to correct newspaper text.

By creating and using this account you agree to our terms of use.

Log in with RealMe®

If you’ve used a RealMe login somewhere else, you can use it here too. If you don’t already have a username and password, just click Log in and you can choose to create one.


Log in again to continue your work

Your session has expired.

Log in again with RealMe®


Alert