HOW TO END THE WAR.

Wanganui Herald, Volume XXXV, Issue 10497, 19 November 1901, Page 1

HOW TO END THE WAR.

<X.oxidozL I>ftily Express.) There 'is one man in England who. probably knows more about the detail history of the' war than anyone outside official circles. That man is Mr Conan Doyle. He hnows it fTecause he haß been in South Africa, because he has conversed with many of the- leaders, hecauso he has read everything on the subject, and because he himself has produced a book upon it iwhich has been acknowledged by both Boers and Britons to be fair ai;d as accurate as he could,make it. , Sinco that book appeared it is understood that Mr Conan Doyle has been keeping-in very close touch with the operations by means of'officers' letters and diaries, a large number of which have passed through his hands. • In the present recrudescence of the war 'we thought it might be interesting to the public to have Mr Conan Doyle's opinion upon the immediate prospects of the campaign. - Our representative called upon him, but found him unwilling to .be interviewed upon the point. Our representations, however, that it might be of some public benefit'broke down his reserve. , "Yes," said he, "I have kept in touch so far as I could. I want to bring out an edition soon which shall include all operations up to the end of the second year of the war. I could only get my material by advertising for officers' letters' and diaries, for the official information is very scanty, and there aro few correspondents left in tho field." , "From your information did you expect this sudden resurrection on the part of the Boers?" ''- J " ' "So much "so that on the day before this Utrecht affair I said: 'Botha will move now, and there will be a British reverse.'" "How did you know that?" "It was known that a concentration was going on, and that the grass was long enough for the horses. As to the reverse, it was evident that he could throw himself at the weakest point of tho British line, and so that the chances were in his favour." 'What do you think of the immediate prospects i 1" "I think it»is a great advantage to get the Boers 'on the move again. We may bring off a big coup now, as we have done twice before. For the sake of that chance, we can afford to lose a few small detachments, or .even guns, though'the flatter are peculiarly awkward at present." "Why at present?" "Because the wholo blockhouse system is dependent upon the enemy having no guns. If they have, every blockhouse becomes a death-trap. That is why it is serious." > "Suppose the enemy get into Natal?*' "They can do no great harm. It is a loyal colony, and the British element is in the great majority. Our forces are fairly mobile, and the distances are not so great as in the Cape Colony." "After all, we must' not lose sight of the essential fact that the Boers are a mere handful now, and that all evidence shows their ammunition to have run low. As long as they hid we could not hope to deal them a fatal blow. Now we have a better chai cc." "Where is the danger point now?" "In the Cape Colony undoubtedly. At tho beginning of the war 90 per cent of the Dutch in the north of the colony joined the invadors. If the Boers could raise the whole Capo, and they have tried very hard to do so, it would be very serious. If Do Wet or De Larey appeared in the heart of the colony then would be the critical moment. It might happen any day." "Do you think the process of attrition is the best for bringing the war to an end?" "It is at any rate the slowest way. I hope it may prove the surest." "What other way would you suggest?" "Well.i it is as if you had to kill a long snake. The process of attrition is like sniping a point off his tail every week. In time you would kill hime no doubt, but it would be quicker if you cut off his head." "How would you cut off his head?" "Well, the head in this case is the two Boer Governments. A very great and constant effort might be made to capture, thoso." "How would you set about it?" "Take the Free State Government, for example. We know where they are. All winter we could always send them #a message when we wanted. They were in the Reitz-Vrede district of the Orange River Colony." "Now, to capture them, one should choose 3000 of the lightest and hardiest men in the Army, give them 6000 of the best horses, one led horse for every man; no guns, no baggago, and a young leader, Plunicr or De Lisle for choice. Let them loose with a free • hand, and help them by stopping the - drifts. Let them follow their chase across Africa if necessary, but let them ride it down at last. When once we had the Governments there would be some chance of peace." "That seems obvious enough." "Yes; but so many obvious''things, seem to have been overlooked. w Surely it has been obvious from the first that a horse is as much a weapon as.a rifle in that country. It is the last horse that must win. And yet look how we imported hSrses from tho ends of the earth when the country itself was full of horses, many of which have gone to the enemy. We have, ourselves got 40,000 from the Cape in the last few months. " "Of course, our generals have had great and novel difficulties to meet; but we have been a long time adapting ourselves to the conditions. However, I'don't suppose-any other nation would have done as "well. These Continental manoeuvres tend to show that." "You think public opinion is sound on the war?" "I think it- is splendid, so patiently resolute. But we must be serious, for it is a life or death affair. There is too much of an air of levity sometimes. That cricket team coming over, for example. The men meant no harm, of course; but fancy the London press ug-