PROCRASTINATION AND COMPLACENCY DOOMED PEARL HARBOUR

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 90, Issue 167, 22 July 1946, Page 5

PROCRASTINATION AND COMPLACENCY DOOMED PEARL HARBOUR

FINDINGS OF INQUIRY COMMITTEE : Reed. 5.30 p.m. Washington. July 21. The Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbour , disaster has issued two reports. The majority, consisting of six Democrats and two Republicans, in a< 10,000-word document, commended President Roosevelt. It said he made every possible effort to avert the war. The report placed the primary blame for the Pearl Horbour unreadiness on the military commanders in Washington and Hawaii. It found no evidence supporting charges made that the President and Secretaries of State. War and the Navy tricked, provoked, incited, cajoled and coerced Japan into attacking the United States in order that a declaration of war might be more easily obtained from Congress.

The Committee declared the attack was an unprovoked, treacherous act of aggression, planned and ] launched while Japanese envoys were carrying on negotiations m Washington. The United States’ diplomatic policies and actions; did not provide any justifiable! provocation for Japan’s action? The enemy attack was well, planned and skilfully executed, and a much more powerful force' than Japan was thought capable! of in a single tactical venture at such distance. |

Fully informed, both the War and Navy Departments forcefully warning them, relations passed beyond diplomacy into the hands of the military. The President and high ofticials mace every possible and proper efforts to avert war with Japan. All the evidence proved that they had oischarged their responsibilities with the distinction, ability, and foresight consistent with the highest ti'au.Uons. The committee declared that the Pearl Harbour disaster was due to the Army and Navy’s failure to mstitute measures to detect the approaching hostile forces and also lacked readiness to employ all the available facilities to repel the Japanese. Virtually everyone was surprised that Japan struck at Pearl Harbour, yet the officials in Hawaii and Washington were fully conscious of the danger cf air attack. Nevertheless, the Hawaiian commands failed to discharge their responsibilities in the light of the warnings received from Washington. The Hawaiian commanders also failed to integrate the defences and alert all establishments by mutual co-oper?.-tion. The Hawaiian commanders also neglected to maintain effective reconnaissance.

However, the committee expressed the view that the errors made by the Hawaiian command were errors ol judgment, not derelictions of duty. The committee said the War Department’s war Plans Division failed to take action when General Short, in an unsatisfactory response to the original directive of the War Department, should have advised the commanding general he had not properly altered the Hawaiian department. The Intelligence and War Plans Division, of the War and Navy Departments! failed to give careful consideration to the intercepted messages from Tok.o to Honolulu. The Intelligence Divi-I slons apparently did not appreciate; the significance of these intercepted' messages, which shoulej have oecn j furnished to the Hawaiian commanders for their assistance. The committee said: “The conclusion is inescapable that there did noi exist any proper demarcation of responsibility between the Army and Navy Departments. Perhaps the administration's most signal shortcoming, both in Washington and Hawaii, was a failure to follow up orders and instructions, and to ensure x hey were carried out. The Pearl Harbour record is replete with evidence of this fundamental deficiency. “The story of Admiral Kimmel's and General Short's administration is an epitome of worthy plans and purposes which were never implemented. Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden, decisive action is essential. Yet, beyond question, the Hawaii and Washington officials were beset by lassitude born of 20 years of peace.” The committee found the relationshin. understanding, and co-ordinai.er i between the War Plans Division </.«! i Naval Intelligence wholly unsatisfic-, tory. “The War Plans Division, particu- i larly, appears to have had an over : zealous disposition to preserve and ] enhance its perogatives.” said the re- j port. “There was jealous adherance to departmental perogatives and an unwillingness to make concessions in the interest of both the Army and the' Navy.” The report recommended immediate action to ensure unity of command at all military and naval outposts and also complete integration of the Army and Navy Intelligence departments, thereby’ avoiding the nitfalls of divided responsibility, which so abundantly were apparent. A minority report, consisting of two Republicans, held President Roosevelt chiefly responsible for the disaster, and said President Truman mpederl the inquiry. One member of the majority, Mr. Keefe (Republican) appended long additional comment, in which he stared the country itself was not ready. Every time President. Roosevelt tried to get his preparedness programme through Congress it was stifled. Whenever President Roosevelt made a statement about preparedness he was vilified for doing so.