RUSSIA GAVE WAY IN BALKANS TO DOMINATE IN GERMANY

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 90, Issue 164, 17 July 1946, Page 5

RUSSIA GAVE WAY IN BALKANS TO DOMINATE IN GERMANY

ONE OUTCOME OF “BIG FOUR” TALKS (From A. W. Mitchell, Special Correspondent N.Z.P.A.). Recd. 7 p.m. London, July 16.1 “Qualified satisfaction” is fairly accurate summing up of reaction to the Paris conference of the four Foreign Ministers just ended. While no open breach occurred between Russia and the western democracies, and draft treaties were prepared for discussion at the Peace Conference of 21 nations, that begins in a fortnight’s time, there was complete failure even to approach a united decision on Germany or Austria. In the balance-sheets that are now being cast on the outcome of the Foreign Ministers’ talks, the fact that Russia has refused to agree to a working co-operation of the four zones in Germany, and that the whole question of German settlement has been postponed until the autumn, is regarded as heavily weighing the debit side.

The Peace Conference dealing with Italy, Finland and the Balkan countries will, it is felt, be a partial affair, and though it is a step in the right direction a much longer distance has yet to be travelled. Taking the credit side first, however, it is being pointed out here that the latest of the Paris talks did achieve certain positive results. Faced with the possibility of a definite breach between Communism and non*Communism, the Soviet did depart slightly from her policy of non-co-opera-tion and make certain concessions.

Russia did abandon her demand for a mandate over Tripolitania; sanction, without reservations, the transfer of the Dodecanese to Greece; she did accept a compromise on the distribution of the Italian Navy and on Italian reparations. The internationalisation of Trieste was also accepted, and Russia also agreed to withdraw from Bulgaria within a specified time. She also agreed that the question of Italian colonies should be postponed for a year. After three days of wrangling, Mr. Molotov agreed to the procedure for the Peace Conference. It is true that Russia is setting her face against any modifications of agreements reached by the Big Four on draft treaties to be discussed, but there also is a feeling, as voiced by Mr. Byrnes, that the 21 nations will he able to make satisfactory recommendations to improve those treaties. Nobody believes, however, that when the nations do meet their negotiations will be easy, or brief. Hard bargaining on frontiers is anticipated, especially on Trieste, for neither the Italians nor the Yugoslavs like the idea of a free port, while Greece is expected to have much to say on her frontier with Bulgaria. Nor is it anticipated that the smaller nations, including the Dominions, will be content merely to act as ink for a “rubber stamp.” Nevertheless difficult and protracted as the Peace Conference is likely to be, there is satisfaction here that, it is at least being held at all, and that some progress is being made with this peace that comes “dropping slow.**

But it is the question of Germany and “open disagreements openly arrived at” that is causing deep concern for, without a working agreement on Germany a full measure of peace cannot return to Europe.

It is true that while the Foreign Ministers were not expected to produce any real decision on Germany, they were certainly not expected to reveal such fundamental divergencies. Not only did Mr. Molotov block the import export plan for four German zones, but he also put forward what is regarded as a fantastic claim for £2.500,000,000 reparations from , Germany which, it is declared, could only be met by a vast increase in western subsidies to Germany and a progressive decline in her ability ever to stand on her feet economically. It is being remarked, and it is a point made by the “Observer,” that Russia has withdrawn in the Mediterranean only to play for greater stakes in Germany, that Potsdam, as construed by Russia, implies a shortterm policy of consolidation in the Russia zone, coupled with prevention of consolidation in the western zones. It also is considered that Mr. Molo,tov made a decisive move when he came out definitely against the French demand for detachment of the Ruhr from Germany, and sunported the German Communist leader in Berlin in his claim for the Ruhr, for Germany. One outcome of this is that considerable readjustment of French foreign policy may be expected with the object of gaining support of the smaller nations in her demand for effective guarantees against, future German aggression. Another positive side of the Foreign Ministers' Conference, it is remarked, is the decision of Messrs. Brines and |Bevin that if the Potsdam Agreement is not carried out as a whole, to or[ganise their zones as one economic I unit, and avoid further liabilities on th*-' 5 ”. taxnavers. This is seen as a vigorous and positive policy, and a reply m"' hin' that of the Soviet. ' There is little satisfaction about this i line of action, qualified or as it is regarded as a necessity, for neither Britain nor America can afford failure in their zones, which would ultimately lead to Russian domination. That Russia is determined to maintain her domin"" , ce ' - • - = far [west as -ssible is fully recognised I here. It "’so > " w jjj ' co-ooerate onlv to the extent to which she Is oh”-cd 1 ■ firmness on

of 1’- ’ der of the Bi" Powers. Thus the winding, tortuous road to oeace is seen to be H’tered with frustrations and disnut.es, '• r which the icoming Peace Conference is just a milestone.