The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, MAY 22, 1942 THE AIR ARM’S IMPORTANCE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 118, 22 May 1942, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, MAY 22, 1942 THE AIR ARM’S IMPORTANCE

ECENT engagements on land and sea have made plain 'the importance which is to be attached to the air arm in warfare. While the British held the superiority in the air in Burma the advance was held up, but immediately the enemy established supremacy the defence became almost powerless to resist. At the end of last year the Allies had attained to air parity with the Axis, and had not Japan entered the combat the situation would have been very much better than it is to-day. But Japan has conic in and has used Iter air strength with very great advantage. This advantage will, however, disappear as her operations extend, for it will become necessary for her to have airfields, stores, repair plants and also oil supplies at her disposal in any area in which her air arm is operating. This is equally true of Germany, but it is also true of the United Nations. The command which the United Nations have of the main seas gives to them ah advantage in the matter of distributing supplies to various points, and air-power is greatly aided by the possession of sea-power. It has become increasingly plain, however, that sea-powei alone is inadequate, and that it is essential if sea-power is to be retained that effective air-power shall be present. Each is now vital to the other. Inside the sea area now dominated by the Japanese air-power supports their sea-power, and the defeat oi the enemy in the Western Pacific is, in consequence, going to be one of considerable difficulty. The kernel of air-power lies, not simply in the possession of Ihe larger number of aeroplanes, lint also in the possession of a larger number of airfields in order that they may be kept in operation. in Malaya, in Java and in Burma, the Japanese concentrated their attention not so much upon the Allied planes while they were in Hight. They attacked the forward airfields, put them out of commission, and so robbed the defenders of what fighter protection there was. In Greece the Germans hud sufficient planes not on', to avoid contact in the air, but to follow a plane to its base when it went to refuel, and deal with it when it was immobile. •In Malaya troops infiltrated their way close to an airfield and then attacked with tommy and machine-guns as the plane came in to be refuelled. Experts speak of a three-) o-one advantage before air superiority can be effectively established, and air superiority is essential to success. The only general who has succeeded without it is Rommel in his latest advance in Libya, and he did that by reason of the peculiar circumstances which prevail in that region. Having succeeded in getting his tanks close up to those of the British, io nullified in large measure the air superiority of his adversary, for the British airmen could not bomb the German tanks without injuring the British tanks as well. But this manoeuvre could only carry Rommel’s forces so far, h-e could not go beyond what might be conveniently termed “no-maii’s-laiid.” It follows, then, that the Allied nations must establish air superiority in any area in which they desire to attack—and that moans a thn e-to-one superiority—and must have the ground forces and sea-power available in sufficient strength to permit of an advance on land being conducted with thoroughness and speed. The campaign tactics will, therefore, differ in the case of the artack on Japan, on Germany anil on the Balkans, while in Russia the tactics employed in the air must alter again. Air policy, then, does not consist of air action alone, for air action alone will not bring victory: co-ordination in planning and in attack are essential to winning to victory. and every plan must meet the invidual cireumstanees of the front on which it is to be implemented.