The wanganui Chronicle "NULLA DIES SINE LINEA." MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1905. THE DEFENCE OF INDIA.

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume XLIX, Issue 12402, 16 January 1905, Page 4

The wanganui Chronicle "NULLA DIES SINE LINEA." MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1905. THE DEFENCE OF INDIA.

In view of its importance, we make no apology for again referring to the subject of the defence of India. As wMI have been seen by our cables in Saturday morning's issue, Mr. Balfour has indicated that the British Government is quite cognisant of the importance of the question. After speak'ng of the real problem of the British Army, Mr. Balfour, referring to the; military reorganisation of India, said it would almost double the efficiency of the Indian Army without making any material: addition to the forces. The most important question Lord Curzon. will have to consider when he ha« settled down to his Viceregal duties'is Lord Kitchener's plan referred to by Mr. Balfour. This plan has, we doubt not, already been, accepted by the Secretary of State of India and by the British Cabinet1, and there is little fea.r of its rejection or nullification. As tba "Spectator" paints out, its man idea harmonises wiith the prejudices of the .people, as we'll) as with tho mature convictions of their ablest guides. The keynote of Lord Kitchener's plan is that with the railway system now in existence and all India conn-acted by telegraph, it is no longer necessary to distribute the British garrison over the* entire peninsula. The work of maintaining local order can bo dono by a reformed police, aided by the knowledge on the part of every inchoate rebel that an irresistible force from the North could be brought against him in a few days by . railway. In.su rrect-on is, in fact, a diminished danger; while of invasion by sea there

is, so long as wo keep our Fileet and hold the Suez Canal, practically no danger at all. There is, however, danger, as there always lias been within the historic period, of invasion from the North; and if it came it would come in a. form which might tax the whole resources of India to defeat. We have only to 'imagine Kuropatkin's army at Herat to know that this is true. We may never be caJled upon to face such an army, any more than to face a coalition at sea; but we aiko may, and the true road of safety is to apprehend the worst, and be ready to meet it if it comes. It is proposed, therefore, to draw the strength of the Indian garrison to the North, and to locate it in divisions, each of which shall' ba a small army in itself, with all that, .is necessary in war time, commanded by a general accustomed to responsibility, and ready to give the orders which will secure instant mobilisation. Tho Commandier-in-Ohief will direct as many of these divisions as he thinks necesisary to the point of danger, and in a few days the invader, who musti, from the nature of the country beyond our frontier, give dear warning of his approach, will be faced by a/ "really large :&nd efficient army, opei&t'ing from a, base which for purposes of supply includes the whole' Indian Empire.. Thai, seiems,, surely, 0 w'se plan,'ihore especially as it can be carried out without suddenly shattering and re-forming the Army of India, which has so long a history of victory. The changes will be mainly changes of location, and reforms in" thei method of training and of making each division complete in all respects for actual war. A sensible Government, of course, th'nks always of its finances; but if, as is stated', the plan can be carried out at an. expenditure of much less than ten millions sterling, it certainly will involve no unendurable- additional burden upon the resources of India, —will, in fact, cost less tihan a successful invailion of India, for a- single month. Those who plead that the Army already costs "too much, and that the "overtaxed native" can pay no more, do not understand how Indja has grown in wealth under the "British peace," or how frightful the economic nrilsory would; be which would :follow any nising of the evilly disposed classes, whom a great defeat of the British power might cause to stir in their lairs. No extra taxation will ba imposed to provide the required sum, which, again, will take at least two years, if not three1, in the spending. The' plan will, of course, be discussed in the British Parliament, andi experts may have a serious word to say. Speaking of the plan, the "Spectator" says it can see only two objections to .ft, neither of them unanswerable. The scheme does mot provide fan the construction of any fortress such as might detain an invader for months, and allow time So rthe concentration of all resources. The answer to thatis, it suspects, that the formation of the1 country through which an invader must march allows of the improvisation of a Plievna as Plevna was improvised; and that bette ruses can be found, even for the immediate purpose, for the great .sums which, as experJence proves, every great fortress consumes. The other objection, is that nothing is said of any great Reserve by wMeh the defensive army might be rapidly, and, iso tto speak, automafcally, increased. At present -th© weakness of the Indian Army for a first-class campaign, consists . in its deficiency of numbers, Indian officers not expecting under normal condition^ the huge losses which mark modern warfare. The "Spectator" supposes the authorities rely, and Lord Kitchener relies,, upon the undoubted truth that if we have to defend India against a issrious invasion by European, troops,, we must find our Reserve in Great Britain) as we did when we had finally to crush the Indian Mutiny. That is sound enough', and is one of the reasons why a complete mastery of the saas :s essential to our safety; but it ds still to! be wished that it were possible, by some iscbeime of reserved' pay, or of pension, or of immunity from taxation, to increase at a fiew days' notice our force of Sikhs, Khoorkas, or other native warriors. The odd tradition that the British Army :tn India should always be regarded as the spearhead of a native army is a sound one, all the1 more so because Asiatics have recently displayed in sa conspicuous a way their ability to meet and defeat European soldiers in pitched battles. It is folly now to tiallk of them as inferior troops; and if we can but make them wiling, there is no end to the recruits they can provide. The Russian is a brave soldier; but there is mo proof that he can walk over a Sikh oi' a Ghoorka any more than over a Turk 4 or'a Japanese. ; ■■"