NEW ALLIANCES.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 19848, 17 January 1920, Page 12

NEW ALLIANCES.

THi POSITION IN EUROPE. i AMERICAN ACTION FORCES jp-ESH ARRANGEMENTS. “(By ? FRANK H. SIMONDS. in tho 1 . _ San Francisco Chronicle.”) .jiXhe' dofoat of the Pcaco Treaty will . have; ■Cdftain ■ consequences as tar as Europe is" concerned which will not be modified by .any later ratification. Chief Amoiig, these consequences will be the of tho League of Nations';' Tho- United States Senate miiy'’6’r may not have killed the Treaty of v ; Vprsai'lles, So far as American par tieffetiqn -is concerned, but it has de-strojiod-fhe. League of Nations. And destruction the-way is cleared ;i • fpfria .return to that system of!,thp ‘balance of power, winch for centiiH&r has'been.- the central circumstance in-‘lfiuropean history. : 'Tirsayiug that the League of Nations hjisj-ybgen.discredited and is doomed, no-.implication that it will ho -ftfrjonfce and formally repudiated by the • f nations, who. havo already Kujjsiribed to..tho Treaty of Versailles, tfnf-iiho.-contrary tho various connnis ; -appointed will meet, as prescribed, they--will function for tho time being. ■ since it is of utmost importance thas there he, no further delay, but beneath tlio-surface great and rapid changes wiil ' inevitably take place. -’■•The reason is obvious. When the President went to Europe, carrying his ■ League of Nations project, Europe was divided on the course to follow. Tho : . experienced statesmen of the Continent had little faith in the League, and very grhvp' apprehension as to tho dangers ■ which it would bring in its train. Some ilrgccl that it was a wiso policy to giro •Wilson what, ho wanted, and thus in Bqre-American cooperation; others nrthat the price was too high to jiajr.;; Lloyd Goorgo settled the debate - laf■linst ; the advico of Clemenceau, by Britain’s aid to Wilson. J ; THE TEST OF FIUME AND l vT' , '‘ - SHANTUNG. - >{ Tliis British aid gavo Wilson a decisive advantage in thcconfcrer.ee, 'Olomenceau saw he was helpless, and ■ turned from his course of _ opposition, ■itdly '.and ' Japan, with obvious menial rfesorvr.iions, followed suit. But if British": support of the President was -■ . ‘ steady; - and French relatively certain, ’after tho promise of American anj against" German,. attack, Italian ana . .Japanese refusal to accept Wilson’s dc- . cisions in tho caso of Finnic and Shan *tUTig revealed the real «stato of mind, ''and Italy actually withdrew from tho conference, as Japan threatened to do, .when Wilson with Anglo-French, sup- , :port stood out in the, matter of Finnic. tßuftirinia and Serbia presently went ■alsoj ovcn Belgium threatened to go. , --Looking backward on tho Paris conference, with the slightest regaj* for wh'at:men said, and how they acted, it fs'j’ijlaih ’that tho League‘of Nations wnk'opposed on principle by all coutin tofitai statesmen, with the cordial symfiihy and approval of tho Japanese. It puld’lmvo .been-openly fought, and , prfmipfcly killcdj. but for British championship.; British ' championship was E’ "y- little founded upon faith in the iguc, hut very largely upon tho conS‘ ‘{ion that tho President spoke for the 010 -United States in demanding it. “British supplied tho decisive turn for tho President- in Paris. ; importance in tho world, as ‘it-’existed after the war, was fully ( .grasped, in Europe; but even tho apthe importance-of America ‘ to ( Europo, the need of American loans, would not have to keep the conference in its earlier stages and pre(T general revolt against Wilson’s upon combining the Treaty th e League had British support wavered. BRITAIN WAVERED. ...' ‘ But -British support did not waver .until: toward tho end of March. It survived the shook of the President’s sudden refusal to stand by tho nrogralnme agreed; to hr bis absence and provisionoily aoqoptcd fw him by Colonel House. Ilis vote, of this programme, which put tho.- League of Nations discussion over tho Treaty, was formulated, preci-pitated-the first Teal crisis in Paris, and was despatched from Brest, when bo-landed on his way back from Europe. -‘'-Had Britain refused her support to tho‘President at that moment ho would liaye losb liis control of events; but, clespite' tho unmistakable restivenc-ss in ‘ -certain British quarters, reflected in the Press, tho British delegation at Paris accepted rijkJJj-esident’s decision. Thov further detail in the 'PbhcF America bv satisfying -the-; President. They continued their ■ -course, when Wilson ruled against Bel/giumtond took tho League of Nations to •Geneva. ; They joined with him in op- , French ..occupation of tho left MhK of the Rhine, or annexation of the ■ Saar basin. ’ They stood with him fiinst Italian possession of Fiumo ey really broke with him only over reparations, and this was a matter ot LteAnni death for Lloyd George personAMONG OTHER .NATIONS. ■hfw+lvi e wr. nt *° ' v^ c b. the British supported Rilson at Pans led ultimately K ' r ?w ntrnent on the part ot - " ° a T n °P en denunciation u f the Ita hans. Orlando is -reported to have suggested to Clemcn.ceau at one moment’ that Franco aim .-Haly,- with the ultimate adherence of Rumania, should form a Latin bloc to .mmterbaffince tho Anglo-Saxon duo papers murmured against fifivAnglo-Saxon peace. ° theso proteste were ephemeral G ®o[ge really placated the " ltllou gh ho had at least one quarter of an hour in which ho threatened to take tho confer ente'away from Paris, bv his ? 'their demand for an ’-Win S’ AS ’ against the. President ami i° n , t,,,cnt purposes, but toward the end 'this 03 ”' 10 ; died down, althougM ‘S? n ? 7er J 1 Vg* i «ed tho pop arit - to hod enjoyed, in tho first nmnWs of ] ! /■arrival From start to finito tlm VrLi ... w wmMi is lir/w™' 1 ; '■itte‘Sto “nf TOO lcro "'iM I)- • tno tieaty of insurance and they worn tHtfWiSWW bearing in Pari, sphere of operation.! nf Pttny-politics, and tho Arporionn sit? 'tfittn W aSd th f? fn . Gnds -° f tho Aflminis- _ tratmij.. and the champions of ; Wilton^ ■ who consistently reported nn,i S 7 ?b.‘ hj r at - * Amencau sanction when ■ Senate at last received the Treaty g;>ENATE UPSETS EVERYTHING- ' ireiS over this fairly f ai „iliar "calW H more > becauso onlv by rovr,Esr?pe Can T n h e e eX F/ ail ?- the s ‘ tu^ion f ln*c • ‘P * Eltuation U’ftH 7list ■: itriS u „Td ; . ; ::,»9TOft7 »ugbl n „S‘ “a" T ««• V dorstanding with Amcrtof 0et I tt ‘. r Un ’ ■■ sfl adipini-rtration. . Franco, ‘ d . S . American lr-:todnp. necc l Sarily thought also ot material I'toms

such as now German attacks and possible European combinations growing out of Italian and Rumanian disappointments. Now the action of_ S-voate destroys the whole British conception 01 the American situation. Yi discloses an opposition to tho President which must pass all British conceptions. It reveals the fact, not even suspected in Paris, that British support of the President, however much appreciated by that portion of the American public believing in the League of Nations and approving of the President’s course, necessarily rouses the antagonism ot the President’s opponents. Thus it lias been a matter of frank surprise on the part of Englishmen in their country and here that not a few of the opponents of the President and the League have snoiien with unmistakable bitterness of tho British course in supporting the President. And it is plain that so far from helping along the cause of Britlsh-Aniorican friendship, British policy, while unmistakably winning high opinions in one political camp, lias roused compensating animosity in tho other. , The result is, then, both confusing and disappointing to tho British. Wholly outside of their intention, actually in exact conflict with their purpose, it has made them participants jn American domestic politics. For this, of course, there is only one remedy. It can be no part of British policy to endeavonr to help one political party at tho expense of another. Therefore an inevitable abandonment of tho Paris policy is forecast. EUROPE FORCED TO OLD METHODS. And with tho British will go_ the French, led into their present position mainly by British influence, and with great reluctance on their own part at the outset. Tho Anglo-American partnership of Paris comes io an end- in its place there must come a new AngloFrench Association, an actual alliance ■, since America does not accent for itself tho Wilson principles and programme, Europe will porforco go hoc a to its older methods. Wc may expect, then, as I hare said, that, seeing the situation as it is, the British and rhe- French will proceed to a new agreement. President Poincare s recent trip to London *was accepted abroad as tho first step in tlnjt dh cation- Franco and Groat Britain will proceed to formulate terms of alliance, since both will bo equally menaced if Germany takes up arms again. They will agree to defend the, integrity if Belgian and French soil, by force of arms, and to maintain armies sufficient for this task. WHAT WILL ITALY DO? Franco and Britain will then have to consider tho case of Italy. If Italy joins Germany in a now war, France and Britain cannot hope for victory, and without American aid will probably be doomed to defeat. Therefore, it is essential that Italy should be brought into a new allianco_ such as tho last war created. But this can only bo done by supporting Italian claims in many regions, but particularly in tho Adriatic. Anglo-French opposition to theso claims was at bottom based upon the policy of following Wilson, hut with Wilson out of the situation, and conditions and not theories confronting British and French statesmen, who can doubt tho decision in Downing Street or at the Quai d’Orsay ? We shall have then an Anglo-Frcnch-Itoiian Alliance, which will he tho successor of the old Anglo-Freach-Russian Alliance against Germany. But such an alliance will he concerned about tho independent states of Middle Europe. If Germany can again dominate Europe from Hamburg to Belgrade, from Berlin to Byzantium, all the old dangers will reappear. Therefore for London, Paris and Rome, it will ho a- matter of utmost concern what Rumania means to do, whether Poland will* stand,_ what Czecho-Slovakia can contribute in the way of divisions and guns to block German advance southward. Thus, inevitably, wo shall eco tho new alliance recognise Rumanian claims to Bessarabia, Polish claims in Lithuania, Greek claims in Thrace, and using necessary force to compel the_ Jugoslavs to moderate their Adriatic attitude. In place of a policy based upon abstract justice, no matter how it injures your friends, and.without regard to tho advantages it bestows upon your incurable enemies, wo shall seo''develop a new application of tho older principle of mutual association for mutual profit and protection. MAKING PEACE WITH RUSSIA. Still another consequence of the withdrawal of America from Europe scorns bound to bo an Allied peace with Russia, A general recognition of tho need of clearing away all barriers to peace seems hound to prevail. Tho email countries, Poland, Rumania, and Czecho-Slovakia, together with tho Baltic States and Finland, are unable and unwilling longer to carry on a war against Russia without largo contributions from tho western nations. Tho western nations are not ready to-supply men and money, hence the beginning ot negotiations,. which will not impossibly lead to a restoration of peace between Russia and tho smaller races and states on her outer, fringes. If this comes it will ho only a prelude to a recognition of tho fact of peace by the western nations, under certain conditions, which will insure their financial interests, mainly in the old Russian national debt. In sum, following upon tho action ot the Senate, it seems to me certain that wc shall see a rapid change from the League of Nations ideal to tho balance of Power system in Europe. With this shift, 1< ranco and Great Britain will become the dominant forces in a new alliance, which will in duo course of time include -Italy and Rumania, both enlisted by a tardy recognition of claims rejected while President Wilson’s influence dominated in Paris.