THE MILITARY ASPECT.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 6593, 19 September 1899, Page 4

THE MILITARY ASPECT.

THE BOER STRENGTH OVERRATED. Under this heading "Blackwood's Magazine " for August publishes an article, evidently written by a military expert, dealing with the problems of a war with the Transvaal. In tho course of it he says : — " The idea is very prevalent in this country that war with the Transvaal means a terrible and bloody struggle— that such a conflict would severely tax British military resources, that it could not be concluded with-

out a vast expenditure of money, and that it must necessarily demand consummate leadership to bring to a successful issue. For this view there appears to be no adequate justification. In some respects it is- not altogether to be regretted that such an opinion should be entertained ; we have so often in the past embarked on campaigns with insufficient troops and without proper preparation, that a tendency to overrate the strength of our enemy is not without its advantages. "The very exaggerated estimate of the fighting strength of the Boers which ia so generally entertained is, no doubt, largely due to the recollections of the disastrous war of 1881, and to the fate of the filibustering expedition generally spoken of as Jameson's Raid. This last fatuous enterprise it is impossible to take seriously from-the military point of view, and to discuss it would be mere waste of time. But Sir George Colley's* campaign stands on quite another footing. In 1881 ai force of regular British soldiers, under a commander of varied experience and great distinction, was defeated on three separate occasions by the military forces of the Transvaal — forces which then possessed far less elaborate organisationthan they do to-day. And it will not be out of place to briefly ' recall the incidents of the few unfortunate weeks, when a small but not unrepresentative portion of our army suffered such signal reverses at the hands of a mere collection of farmers, without disciplineand without guns. " Sir W. Butler's sympathetic biography of Sir G. Colley has recalled facts almost forgotten to many of us who are familiar with the story of the conflicts around Laing's Nek, and who acquainted ourselves with the topography of the little theatre of war when the carcases- of slain horses-and piles of empty cartridge cases still served as marks to denote the vicissitudes of combat. Sir W. Butler makes it clear that the ill-fated commander of the British forces realised from the outset that the Boers were antagonists deserving of respect. But in this he stood almost alone. " '10-disregard local opinion is rarely wise. But on the occasion of the outbreak of the last Boer war, local opinion was strangely at fault. And there can be no question in attempting •what was in reality a. desperate enterprise, the storming of a position so formidable as Laing's Nek with a mere handful of troops, Sir G. Oolley was influenced not merely by anxiety for the beleaguered garrisons in. the Transvaal, but also by the very low opinion of the courage-ond fighting capabilities of the Boers which was entertained in the colony of which he was Governor. This was the first-, and it was not the least, of the causes which brought about the disasters suffered by his force. " Sir G. Colley had practically no cavalry, and this is by general consent among military experts set down as the chief reason for the complete failure of our troops 'to hold their own. It is a recognised principle of tactics that the most- effective way of dealing with mounted infantry is to operate against it with cavalry. So difficult, indeed, is the position of mounted infantry when attacked by cavalry, that the great military, powers will have- nothing to say to a class of troops which now forms a recognised branch of the British Army. The Boers fought exactly as mounted infantry is supposed to fight. Their ponies served merely as a means of transport, enabling them to move rapidly from point to point, and then to operate an foot. And, fighting against an enemy employing such tactics, it was essential that a few squadrons of cavalry should form part of the force, to attack the adversary when on the move, and to harass the adversary when at rest by threatening his horses. li It was the lack of cavalry onthe British side which enabled the Boers ,to swoop down upon the small column moving from Mount Prospect back towards Newcastle, and to catch it in a trap on the heights by the Ingogo River. Nothing in the war more alarmed the Boers than the recoimaisance of a cavalry squadron, when this at last reached Newcastle, far into their territory. It was the belated appearance of cavalry at the frontwhich, more than anything else, checked the hostile raids against the communications of the British advanced troops at Mount Prospect. And the one gleam of light in the dark picture of the combats which took place was the (charge of a few troopers up the steep and difficult slopes on the left flank of the hostile position at Laing's Nek, and the complete discomfiture of the enemy for the moment at that point, in spite of superiority of numbers and of entrenchments." The writer deals at considerable length with other aspects of the problem, and illustrates his points by reference to incidents in the great Franco-Prussian war. His concluding observations are as follows : — ■" The very confidence in themselves which the Boers derive from memories of 1881 will militate against tiheir prospects should there be another war. An exaggerated estimate of their own capabilities will induce them to risk general engagements in place of trusting to guerilla tactics. They will probably fight well once ; but they have to experience what modern shell-fire means on open ground, and to feel their own impotence in face of regular cavalry ; and the effect will ba startling. They will not ba dealing, with a petty column of strength which would be held insufficient to coerce erne of the minor .hill clans of tihe Punjab frontier; they will find themselves confronted by an army. "It has be-an ,stated in many journals that a. conflict with the South African Republic would cost this country thousands of lives .and millions of money. Supposing that the quarrel were to extend over Cape Colony, over the Orange Free State, over Natal, and over Rhodesia, it is not impossible that this alarmist view might be justified. Such a development would be terrible, indeed. But no greater mistake can be made tlhan to snitxposa that the conquest of the Transvaal Boers, left to themselves, is a task which would severely test tns "British army, or which would involve an expenditure which need in the least degree alarm the taxpayer. "To enlarge upon the strategical conditions of the struggle which is looming on the horizon, to suggest the strength of the forces necessary to bring it to a successful conclusion, would obviously be inexpedient. War with a civilised race, well supplied i with modern armaments, and fighting for a national cause, cannot be entered upon without some misgivings. There is no fear of our War Office failing to send an ample number of troops should their services be required. The fear 19 rather that the country may recoil before imaginary dangers besetting what events may within the next few weeks make an imperative duty."